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WELCOME TO IWPR'S CAUCASUS REPORTING SERVICE, NO. 17, February 4, 2000.

RUSSIA'S GROZNY DEAL. Russia claims to have driven the Chechens out of
Grozny, but others suggest it struck a humiliating deal to save itself
further embarrassment at the hands of the rebels. Andrei Matyash in Moscow
reports.

PUTIN'S RECIPE FOR SUCCESS. Acting President Putin's phenomenal popularity
is founded on his vision of a "strong state" prepared to ride roughshod over
democratic principles. Viatcheslav Morozov in St. Petersburg looks behind
the image.

EX-MINISTER IN ARMENIAN 'SHOW TRIAL'. The trial in Armenia of a former
interior minister appears to be satisfying the public's hunger for political
scapegoats. Emil Danielyan in Yerevan follows the case.

GEORGIAN GLOOM IN ABKHAZIA. Inhabitants of the only remaining Georgian
enclave in Abkhazia feel they are living on borrowed time. By ZaZa Chitanava
in Gali reports.

AZERI CYBER FORCES. Sparks are flying in cyberspace as the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict takes on a new and unexpected dimension. Mark Grigorian in Yerevan
follows the links.

**********************************************************

RUSSIA'S GROZNY DEAL

Russia claims to have driven the Chechens out of Grozny, but others suggest
it struck a humiliating deal to save itself further embarrassment at the
hands of the rebels.

By Andrei Matyash in Moscow

On the night of February 1, a force of up to 2,000 Chechen fighters
abandoned key positions in Grozny and slipped through the federal blockade.
The battle to seize the capital was all but won -- but not in a way that the
Russians would have chosen.

General Victor Kazantsev, heading the Russian troops, was denied his moment
of glory. He would have liked to have swept through Grozny at the head of an
armoured fist, driving the demoralised Chechen rebels before him.

Instead, it would appear that the bulk of the defending garrison pulled out
in a well planned operation, leaving the Russians with nothing more than a
handful of prisoners - mostly fighters who were too badly wounded to move -
and a virtual wasteland of blasted concrete.

The Chechen withdrawal was perhaps not as seamless as the rebel commanders
might have wished. Most versions of the event agree that a sizeable force
under maverick warlord Shamil Basaev blundered into a minefield near the
village of Alkhan-Kala, before being caught in a punishing artillery
barrage.

Casualties were heavy: top field commanders Aslambek Ismailov, Khunkar-Pasha
Israpilov and Lecha Dudayev, mayor of Grozny, were killed. Basaev is
rumoured to have lost a leg.

Nevertheless, it is hard to explain how 2,000 heavily-armed rebels could
have broken through a cordon of 60,000 federal troops in the heat of some of
the fiercest fighting that Europe has seen since World War Two.

It is even harder to explain what happened afterwards. Western journalists
in Alkhan-Kala reported that scores of Chechen wounded were given
rudimentary first aid at a local hospital while their comrades regrouped to
the south of the village. Then a force of around 200 fighters came down from
the mountains to cover the rebel retreat. An extraordinary feat when one
considers that Alkhan-Kala was supposedly under federal control at the time.

The Russian military suggests that two months of carpet-bombing had
effectively broken the rebels' fighting spirit. General Vladimir Shamanov
claimed that 800 Chechens surrendered prior to the exodus, then the bulk of
the shattered defence force was deliberately lured into a cunning trap.

He explained that an agent provocateur with the Russian security service FSB
had promised to secure the Chechens a safe corridor to Alkhan-Kala in return
for $100,000. The rebels then, "like complete idiots", stumbled into a
specially laid minefield and fell victim to "the withering crossfire of
federal troops".

Colonel Alexander Veklich, head of the press centre for Army Group North,
announced, "The federal command made a conscious decision to lure the
fighters out of the city, so as to minimise our losses."

However, it is infinitely more likely that the "conscious decisions" were in
fact made by the Chechen high command. January 31 was the official deadline
for a Russian amnesty offering safe passage to any Chechen fighters
surrendering their weapons to the federal troops.

On the same day, a total of 140 rebels gave themselves up to pro-Russian
Chechen militiamen in the Staraya Sunzha district. Of these 60 per cent were
seriously wounded or suffering from a variety of illnesses ranging from
pneumonia to kidney infections.

According to Bislan Gantamirov, former mayor of Grozny and head of the
militia, most of the prisoners were aged between 18 and 23, men recruited by
Basaev and Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov in October and November. The
fighters, he said, "had simply been browbeaten by their leaders and
recognised the futility of resisting the Russian forces."

It seems much more likely that the rebel forces were actually getting rid of
their "dead weight" prior to breaking out of the city. Certainly, Russian
troops seized nothing more than a few assault rifles whilst the bulk of the
Chechen arsenal was spirited away to the hills.

Why did the Russian generals wait three days before announcing that the
"complete idiots" had fallen into their crafty trap? In the past, they have
been quick - usually too quick - to trumpet their victories.

No less suspicious is the fact that, even according to official reports, 75
per cent of the Chechen forces came through the "withering crossfire"
unscathed and took refuge in Alkhan-Kala for at least 24 hours - time enough
for Basaev to undergo emergency surgery and plan his next move.

If the trap was so carefully set, then why were there no Russian troops
waiting for Basaev in Alkhan-Kala? Why was the operation not seen through to
its logical conclusion?

All the evidence points towards a bargain that was, in fact, initiated by
the Russian general staff. Appalled by the rising human cost of the siege
and the stubborn Chechen resistance, the generals went cap in hand to their
rebel counterparts and offered a safe passage out of Grozny to the entire
garrison - failing to mention, of course, that there was a minefield
directly in their path.

>From Alkhan-Kala, the guerrillas were able to make good their escape to
nearby mountain strongholds. It was a trade-off that allowed Russian Acting
President Vladimir Putin to save face and the Chechen guerrillas to gather
their strength.

Then it was simply a case of putting on a noisy show for the media.
Artillery bombardments rained down on unmanned rebel positions, tanks
pulverised empty buildings and blood-soaked prisoners were paraded in front
of the TV cameras. Finally, the Russian army began advancing through the
conquered city at a leisurely pace, savouring their long-awaited victory.

Andrei Matyash is a correspondent for the Internet publication Gazeta.ru in
Moscow <www.gazeta.ru>.


PUTIN'S RECIPE FOR SUCCESS

Acting President Putin's phenomenal popularity is founded on his vision of a
"strong state" prepared to ride roughshod over democratic principles.

By Viatcheslav Morozov in St. Petersburg

The image of Acting President Vladimir Putin as a liberal, committed to
democracy, may be nothing more than a side-show aimed at softening potential
opposition in Russia and the West.

Politicians and analysts alike remain unsure how far he is prepared to go in
his military campaign against the Chechen rebels. Russian democrats,
meantime, are concerned that the March 26 presidential election is rapidly
becoming a one-horse race.

But there can be little doubt that Putin's actions as a hardline leader -
prepared to annihilate the nation's enemies - is a solid springboard for
election victory.

Fortunately for Putin, the Russian public, it seems, has little desire to
discover the truth behind Russian military losses. In sharp contrast to the
last war, the majority of the population, whilst naturally regretting the
losses suffered "by our boys", continues to support the campaign.

As a result, there is little reason to expect that Putin will not be
distracted from his plans in Chechnya, regardless of increasing military
losses or Western condemnation.

Most Russians believe previous attempts to strike a deal with the Chechen
separatists led to the creation of a criminal regime in Chechnya.
Consequently, any Chechen leadership that is not controlled by Moscow will
continue to pose a threat to law and order in the country as a whole.

However, the public's attitude to the "anti-terrorist" campaign is only one
element of Putin's phenomenal popularity. In the past few years, Russian
society has been pinning its hopes on the vision of a "strong state" - a
phenomenon stemming from the absence of any significant liberal alternative.
A recent survey by the Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion showed
that 72 per cent of people believe that civil order is the most important
issue in Russia today "even if achieving that order means limiting some
civil liberties and compromising democratic principles".

Today, Putin embodies this image of a "strong Russian state". And, contrary
to Western beliefs, the "liberal reformers" and the "communist-nationalist
patriots" share this vision - a fact echoed in the recent rapprochement
between the Unity faction, which supports Putin, and the Communist Party.

This desire for a strong state system is not unique to Russia - it is common
to most of Eastern Europe. The difference lies in Russia's relations with
the West. Russia is determined to resist the imposition of Western values on
its governing principles and to establish its political independence.

In this context, one cannot overestimate the significance of last year's
conflict in Kosovo. NATO's attempts to bring a halt to ethnic cleansing were
depicted by the Russian media as a front for a hidden agenda amongst the
Western allies. Hence, the Russian public now views the virtues of democracy
with a wholly new cynicism.

And Putin's political rivals have done little to inspire the voters with
confidence in the democratic process.

In December's parliamentary elections, Grigory Yavlinsky's Yabloko - which
had previously spoken out against the Chechen campaign - lost much of its
following over accusations of "double standards" as the party attempted both
to exploit a nostalgia for Soviet times and promote its links to the ruling
elite.

The Union of Rightwing Forces (URF) - which boasts the redoubtable Irina
Khakamada, the human rights activist Sergei Kovalyov and former prime
minister Yegor Gaidar among its ranks - could provide a viable alternative
to Putin's cabal. But the URF has thrown its weight behind the acting
president in the hope of winning his support for its ambitious reform
program. Of course, it remains to be seen whether or not Putin will be
inclined to return this favour in the event of an election victory.

The vast majority of voters believe there are no real alternatives to Putin.
But this fact, per se, is not a threat to Russian democracy. The real threat
is the cynical attitude of society itself to democratic values and human
rights abuse - which raises deep concern for Russia's future.

Viatcheslav Morozov is senior lecturer in European Studies at St. Petersburg
University's School of International Relations.


EX-MINISTER IN ARMENIAN 'SHOW TRIAL'

The trial in Armenia of a former interior minister appears to be satisfying
the public's hunger for political scapegoats.

By Emil Danielyan in Yerevan

Flanked by two impassive security guards as he sits in the dock, Vano
Siradeghian, 52, is pale and subdued - barely recognisable as the flamboyant
interior minister, who, just two years ago, was one of Armenia's most
powerful men.

His hands tremble visibly, his voice faltering under relentless
cross-examinations. Occasionally, he flinches at the muttered insults hurled
across from the public benches.

Behind Siradeghian, 11 co-defendants stare out between the bars of their
iron cage. They seem grimly aware that public opinion is set firmly against
them in a largely one-sided trial seen as part of a drive by President
Robert Kocharian's government to discredit the previous regime, headed by
Levon Ter-Petrosian from 1991-98.

The 12 men stand accused of conspiring to murder two police officers, Karen
Rafaelian and Artur Hovannisian, in 1994. Prosecutors also claim that
Siradeghian ordered the deaths of five prominent figures including Hovanes
Sukiasian, a local government dignitary, and railway chief Hambartsum
Ghandilian, shot dead in 1992 and 1993, respectively.

In a nation desperately searching for political scapegoats, the Vano trial
has been the focus of intense public interest for the past four months. It
comes as Kocharian himself struggles for political survival as an
investigation into the assassination of eight Armenian politicians last
October looks set to implicate members of his inner circle. [See "Armenian
President Faces Resignation Calls," Mark Grigorian, CRS No. 16, 28-Jan-00]

The Yerevan court has been told that, in January 1994, Siradeghian, ordered
two serving police officers to assassinate Serge Jilavian, a wealthy
Armenian living in Moscow who had previously crossed swords with
Ter-Petrosian's administration. According to the prosecution, the murder
plot was foiled when the hitmen were arrested by Russian police and flown
back to Yerevan.

It was then that Siradeghian allegedly instructed his deputy, Vahan
Harutiunian, commander of the Interior Ministry troops, to "execute" the
would-be assassins in punishment for the fiasco. Harutiunian and a squad of
10 men are said to have shot the two police officers in a country dacha
outside the Armenian capital.

Last week, Harutiunian confirmed this version of events under
cross-examination. But Siradeghian dismissed the testimony on the grounds
that it was "extracted under duress" by police investigators.

A leading light in the Armenian National Movement (ANM), the former interior
minister has claimed the charges against him are politically motivated since
investigators asked the National Assembly to waive his immunity from
prosecution a year ago. Three weeks before a ruling was made, Siradeghian
left Armenia for Dubai, ostensibly to receive medical treatment, and was
arrested on his return to Yerevan in May.

Former President Ter-Petrosian has also condemned the case against
Siradeghian, who was one of his most trusted associates.

But the prosecution has brought a stream of persuasive witnesses to the
stand.

"I'm scared of Vano, I'm sure he killed my son," said Mayis Rafaelian,
father of one of the dead policemen.

Seated a few yards behind Siradeghian, Rafaelian has been a permanent
fixture at the court proceedings, volubly joining in the hostile chorus of
insults directed at the former minister.

Media coverage of the Vano Trial has been largely one-sided, with
pro-Kocharian state television taking every opportunity to reiterate the
charges levelled at the 12 defendants. The press bias has come under fire
from Tigran Janoyan, until recently Siradeghian's defence counsel, who
complains that the accused have little chance of getting a fair trial.

"As a specialist, I would say that the trial of Vano Siradeghian is
bordering on the absurd," he said.

However, Siradeghian still enjoys unquestioning support from his own ANM
party and from members of his Noyemberian constituency in northern Armenia.
When Siradeghian was re-elected to parliament in May 1998, Noyemberi
villagers feted his campaign victory by slaughtering sheep and holding a
celebratory feast.

Siradeghian's most powerful ally, Armenian prime-minister Vazgen Sarkisian,
was among the political figures gunned down when five assassins burst into
the parliament building in October last year.

Siradeghian first came to prominence in Yerevan's intellectual circles as a
talented fiction writer. His political career was launched on the back of
the 1988 movement to unite Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. By 1990, with the
republic's first democratic elections, Siradeghian was a leading figure in
the ANM, which embraced the unification issue at the heart of its manifesto.

Within two years, Siradeghian was Minister of the Interior, notorious across
the country for his cynical rhetoric and parade-ground swagger. However,
rumours of police oppression, fraud and corruption dogged his term of office
with political rivals claiming that the minister built up a vast personal
fortune at the expense of a downtrodden nation.

On one notorious occasion, Siradeghian threw a lavish party for army and
police chiefs who had helped crush a riot in the streets of Yerevan. The
demonstrators were protesting against the results of the 1996 presidential
election, which saw Ter-Petrosian score a dramatic victory over rival Vazgen
Manukian. The interior minister was later to admit openly that the vote was
rigged in Ter-Petrosian's favour.

Emil Danielyan is a correspondent for RFE/RL in Yerevan.


GEORGIAN GLOOM IN ABKHAZIA

Inhabitants of the only remaining Georgian enclave in Abkhazia feel they are
living on borrowed time.

By ZaZa Chitanava in Gali

The old man lives in enemy territory. He has refused to join the other
Georgian refugees who settled across the Enguri River. He prefers to remain
in the Abkhazian village of Gali where he was born - despite constant
harassment from local Abkhaz.

"Once they stopped us on the road when we were moving from one village to
another," said the old man, who asked not to be named. "An Abkhaz with a
machine-gun opened a door and forced me to look at three corpses lying in
the corridor. 'You and your friends will be lying next to them soon,' he
said. It's a miracle that they didn't kill us."

The old man survives by selling the tangerines and nuts he grows in his
allotment. He sends what he can to his family living on the opposite bank of
the river.

Gali is the last Georgian enclave in Abkhazia. In the aftermath of the war,
it was the scene of random killings and arson attacks. People lived in their
cellars. Now conditions have improved marginally but ethnic Georgians are
still obliged to stay indoors after dark and they are discouraged from
speaking their mother tongue.

The town centre of Gali is devastated: bullet-holes still pockmark the hulks
of burned out buildings while cows and pigs have the run of the municipal
park. A statue of a lion, erected in memory of the 21 Georgians who died in
the Tbilisi riot of 1989, is scarred with shrapnel.

Today, around 2,000 Georgians live in the Gali region, moving between
deserted villages, buying their way out of trouble. Young men constantly run
the risk of being kidnapped or forcibly drafted into the Abkhazian army. The
elderly suffer constantly from ill health aggravated by substandard living
conditions.

The city hospital is only capable of providing primitive first aid.
Georgians in need of medical treatment are generally taken by ambulance to
the Enguri bridge before crossing by foot to Zugdidi. Abkhazian residents
make the long trek to the capital at Sukhumi.

The market is open three days a week, selling locally made and imported
products for Russian rubles. Here the old man hopes to sell 11 tons of
tangerines that lie rotting in his yard - but the Abkhazian traders
discriminate against Georgian sellers and his prospects are uncertain.

"As soon as I sell them, my wife and I will cross the river," he explains.

"This is the most bitter part of my long life. Both the Georgians and
Abkhazians should share the blame for what has happened. Time is the best
healer and reconciliation is the only solution. More killing will only spark
another tragedy," he says.

War came to Gali at 1 AM on September 29, 1993. Abkhazian forces had taken
Sukhumi two days previously but no one thought they would cross the
Ghalidzga River into what was then neutral territory sandwiched between the
two warring states. However, as separatist troops occupied the town,
refugees streamed along the road to Zugdidi, leaving behind anything they
could not carry.

In Georgia, they joined the 300,000 refugees crowded into boarding houses,
hostels, hospitals and derelict buildings. Humanitarian aid quickly ran out,
whilst the government monthly allowance of seven lari ($3.50) per person was
barely enough to survive on.

As the fighting subsided, many of Gali's Georgian residents returned to the
town to harvest the nuts, corn and tangerines. However, attempts to sell the
produce in Zugdidi were thwarted by gangs of Abkhazian brigands who robbed
the farmers on the main highway.

Unexpected intervention came from armed Georgian irregulars, stubbornly
waging a partisan war against the occupying troops. The fighters forced
local Abkhazians to buy the Georgian produce at rock-bottom prices.

However, the Abkhazian separatists were quick to retaliate, burning houses
and villages, which had accepted help from the partisans. There were
numerous reports of random arrests and killings among the civilian
population until May 1998 when Abkhazian forces, supported by Russian
volunteers, launched a concerted sweep through Gali, forcing locals to flee
their homes for a second time.

Seven-year-old Khatuna, who watched her father being beaten to death two
years ago, remembers, "As we left the town, a Russian border-guard said,
'You'll never come back.'"

But time passed and, once again, Gali's Georgians trickled back to their
small holdings. Badly in need of a workforce, their Abkhazian neighbours
made no attempt to turn them away. Government rulings demanding they change
their citizenship were generally circumvented by bribes.

Just before New Year, a Georgian who had returned to Gali for the first time
in seven years celebrated the new millennium in his neighbour's house
because his own cottage had been burned to the ground. There were two
Abkhazians at the table. They had come to buy tangerines. One asked why he
had come back. "He came to have a look at his house," the host told them.

"You don't have to go back to Georgia," said one of the men. "We won't harm
you. My house was burned down too but there are plenty of empty houses
around. This is your land. You should defend it. Come and join us!"

"Both Georgia and Abkhazia are my countries," the Georgian said. "Which
should I defend from which?"

The men got angry at that. The host tried to diffuse the situation. "Don't
pay him any attention. He's only a kid." The Abkhazians smiled, "Too young
to know . . ."

Then he realised that he was eating and drinking with people who were
responsible for the deaths of many fellow Georgians, while those who survive
behave like strangers in their own land.

ZaZa Chitanava is a correspondent for the EcoDigest newspaper in Tbilisi.


AZERI CYBER FORCES

Sparks are flying in cyberspace as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict takes on a
new and unexpected dimension.

By Mark Grigorian in Yerevan

Azeri computer hackers are sabotaging a series of Armenian web sites, which,
they claim, spread lies about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Two groups of hackers - which go under the monickers of Green Revenge and
Hijak [sic] Team 187 - are said to be involved in the virtual hijacking,
which has provoked a storm of protest in Azerbaijan and Armenia
<www.greenrevenge.domainvalet.com>.

The hackers - who sabotaged the Armenian State Television and the Armenian
Assembly of America sites earlier this month - claim in broken English that
they want to provide an accurate picture of events in the disputed enclave.

"The general mission of our project is providing true information about real
situation of Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict," the hackers' site says. "At
present a lot of Armenian sites provides tones [sic] of lie to you. We
decided to fix this, using our best efforts."

Their tactics are primitive and unsubtle. Visitors to hijacked sites are
greeted by a blank page, which forwards them to the hackers' site. Here they
are regaled with a litany of anti-Armenian abuse as well as a guest book
featuring messages left by other callers.

"Congratulations Azerbaijan," reads one note signed by Adolf Sturm, from
Austria. "I think if you hacked Armenian sites you will have back your own
lands in Karabakh!"

Samir, in Holland, is more outspoken, "Azerbaijan Rules!!! Armenia Sucks!!!
You Armenian losers soon will be crawling on your dirty knees. Actually, you
are on your knees already. Greatly [sic] done, Green Revenge. Avenge our men
and old people who were scalped and whose eyes were poked out by Armenian
terrorists."

None of the e-mail addresses provided in the guestbook appear to exist.

The incidents have provoked howls of outrage from the press in both
Azerbaijan and Armenia. "The Karabakh war has moved to the Internet," wrote
Zerkalo ("The Mirror") in Baku while Golos Armenii ("The Voice of Armenia")
in Yerevan branded the hackers "hooligans".

Eldar Zeynalov, director of the Human Rights Centre of Azerbaijan, said the
hackers targeted the sites because they were trying to toady up to the Azeri
leadership. He called for official sites to play a more responsible role and
provide unbiased information on political issues.

"All sites purporting to give information about the Karabakh conflict stress
external aggression and victimisation," said Zeynalov. "They make no
contribution to the peace-process."

So far, Armenian hackers are refusing to be drawn into a virtual vendetta.
Yerevan webmaster Avetis Avagyan said, "I've been waiting for Armenian
hackers to retaliate but I haven't noticed anything so far. We shouldn't
fight on the Internet. We should be above that."

Grigor Sahinian, technical director of Yerevan's Arminco Internet company,
says Armenian hackers have the know-how to launch a crushing offensive
against the Azeris. "They [the Azeris] don't know the meaning of real
hacking. But we've no intention of getting involved."

One Armenian webmaster reportedly posted a message calling on volunteers to
"organise a group and hack a couple of Azeri sites" but the appeal fell on
deaf ears. An Armenian website posted a long warning about the hackers,
including advice about how to take protective countersteps
<www.armenia.com>.

Internet experts are confident that tracking down the culprits should
present few problems. One American webmaster speculated, "The so-called
groups are just one person and we have information that he occupies a senior
position in a major telephone company in Baku."

Mark Grigorian is IWPR Project Editor in Yerevan and Director of the NGO
Co-operation and Democracy.

IWPR'S CAUCASUS REPORTING SERVICE, NO. 17

********** VISIT IWPR ON-LINE: www.iwpr.net **************

IWPR's Caucasus Reporting Service provides the regional and international
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The service forms part of IWPR's Caucasus Project based in Tbilisi and
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For further details on this project and other information services and media
programmes, visit IWPR's Website: <www.iwpr.net>.

Editor-in-chief: Anthony Borden. Managing Editor: Yigal Chazan; Assistant
Editor: Alan Davis. Commissioning Editors: Giorgi Topouria in Tbilisi,
Shahin Rzayev in Baku, Mark Grigorian in Yerevan, Michael Randall and Saule
Mukhametrakhimova in London. Editorial Assistance: Felix Corley and Heather
Milner. To comment on this service, contact IWPR's Programme Director: Alan
Davis alan@iwpr.net

The Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR) is a London-based independent
non-profit organisation supporting regional media and democratic change.

Lancaster House, 33 Islington High Street, London N1 9LH, United
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The opinions expressed in IWPR's Caucasus Reporting Service are those of the
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Copyright (c) IWPR 2000

IWPR'S CAUCASUS REPORTING SERVICE, NO. 17

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