To improve the longer-term prospects for inter-Balkan co-operation,
measures should be adopted to relax visa restrictions for entrepreneurs,
publishers, academics and others, whose activities will assist the
developments of socio-economic ties between the Balkan countries.
Tirana/London/Brussels, 1 March 2000.

Introduction
During the Kosovo crisis, Albania won international
praise for its generous response to the influx of more than 450,000
refugees from Kosovo. Despite remaining largely preoccupied with their
own domestic problems throughout most of the crisis, the arrival of the
refugees galvanised Albanians into a new sense of national purpose.
Shocked by the plight of their ethnic kinsfolk, people collected
clothing and food parcels to take to the refugee reception centres, and
thousands of families took refugees into their homes. For once Albanians
in Albania saw there were some worse off than themselves. As one Tirana
resident put it: "We are poor and have own dirty, messy politics, but at
least we can go home to our own beds at night."1
The signing of the Kumanovo agreement in mid June 1999, marked the
end of the war in Kosovo, and for Albania, the beginning of the
withdrawal of the large international community that had gathered there.
International relief agencies, the world's media and the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA)2, whose hierarchy had established itself in
Tirana during the war, all followed the refugee pattern, leaving as
quickly as they had come.
For Albanians, the 'liberation' of Kosovo from Serb control marked a
key turning point in the destiny of ethnic Albanians across the Southern
Balkans. Although there was general relief when the refugees eventually
went back to Kosovo, many people have since felt deflated by the vacuum
caused by the withdrawal of world attention. Tirana is now a city with
an atmosphere of forlorn emptiness; its inhabitants in a state of
anticlimax.
Kosovo might be free, but for many Albanians not much has changed
nine years on from the collapse of the one-party state. Burdened by 45
years of impoverished isolation, followed by spasms of violent
uprisings, anarchic social destruction and political chaos, Albania
remains plagued by endemic crime and corruption. Political rivalry is as
intense and malicious as ever, the population is still heavily armed,
the roads are still impassable and unemployment is growing. The very
concept of democracy remains in an embryonic stage.
The country's problems appear as intractable as ever with a return to
old party politics with the same personalities. The re-election of the
two dinosaurs of post-communist Albanian politics - Sali Berisha and
Fatos Nano - has confirmed the continued predominance of the old guard
in both Albania's major parties. The undisguised hostility between Nano
and Berisha has already raised political tensions, and represents
another unwelcome distraction from Albania's grave problems.
Despite the recent positive moves by the state against corruption and
a slight improvement, albeit only by Albanian standards, in public
order, the main problems facing Albania remain the absence of national
reconciliation and the reconstruction of functioning state institutions.
The overall security situation is still very poor with sporadic violent
incidents continuing to undermine the government's efforts to bring
internal stability to the country. The presence of 1,800 NATO personnel
remains one of the few stabilising factors both domestically and
regionally.
In this paper, the International Crisis Group (ICG) examines the
impact of the Kosovo crisis on Albania, and assesses the relevance of
the redefined 'Albanian national question' - both in terms of new
regional initiatives for closer co-operation, and the resurgence of old
issues, such as the Cham property rights claim. It tracks the ongoing
developments within the domestic setting, and outlines the challenges
ahead in the fields of security, law and order and efforts to combat
organised crime and illegal immigration.

Impact of the Kosovo Crisis in Albania
Overall, the Kosovo
crisis had a number of positive side-effects for Albania. On a practical
level, the economy received a much-needed boost, and the country
witnessed an unprecedented, if short-lived, surge of national
solidarity, with domestic politics for once taking a back seat.
Virtually all but the criminal sectors of the Albanian population
rallied to offer assistance to the Kosovo Albanian refugees.3

The
Economy
According to the Bank of Albania, the Kosovo crisis had a positive
effect on the Albanian economy, helping to create a current account
surplus of 30 million USD in the second quarter. The influx of nearly
half a million refugees, the import of Western food aid to feed them,
and the deployment of a substantial NATO military force, helped Albania
achieve a surplus in services of up to 80 million USD in the second
quarter - 4.6 times greater than in the previous quarter. A bank
official told Reuters, "Our evaluations show that during their stay in
Albania, the Kosovo population spent considerable hard currency on top
of that obtained from foreign aid. The crisis also helped the country
'get visited' by the world's media, international organisations, aid
agencies as well as foreign troops, who all bought services in
Albania."4
The north eastern district of Kukes experienced a decline in official
unemployment due to the opening of the country's border with Kosovo.
According to the government news agency ATA, the number of registered
jobless in the Kukes district fell in 1999 from 6,240 to 5,300. The
opening of the border with Kosovo boosted the activities of local
companies, and therefore the size of the required labour force.5
At the international level, Albania certainly expects substantial
rewards for having put the whole country at NATO's disposal, and having
proven itself as a loyal and stable ally of the international community.
Indeed, in July 1999, as the country eagerly waited for the results of
the Sarajevo Balkans Reconstruction Conference, the Speaker of the
Parliament, Skender Gjinushi, claimed that, "Albania and Kosovo deserve
to be in the centre of this project and the first to get assistance
because the Albanians suffered most during the conflict."6
There is an obvious danger, however, of complacency being born out of
the attention Albania received during the Kosovo crisis. A general lack
of progress - as epitomised in the slow pace of economic reform and the
preoccupation with internal political conflicts, could lead to Albania's
exclusion on these grounds alone from the European Union's Stability
Pact. Tirana will have to realise that as the focus of international
attention shifts, its preferential status shaped by the crisis will
almost certainly continue to wane.

Strengthening Community Ties
Arguably the most significant aspect of the crisis was the arrival of
some 450,000 Kosovo Albanians in Albania. For the overwhelming majority
this was their first ever visit to the 'motherland', which brought the
vast majority of the two Albanian communities into contact with each
other for the first time in their lives. According to a recent poll,
Kosovo refugees displaced to Albania during the conflict say their stay
and experiences there have intensified their feelings of kinship and
nationhood with their compatriots in Albania.
The overwhelming majority of the refugees were satisfied with the
treatment they received in Albania and, despite Albania's lawless
reputation, said they felt safe. A farmer from Suva Reka explained: "We
have never felt afraid of anything here because we have come to our
country and to our brothers, you know it is our blood."7 Throughout the poll people instinctively
used the words and phrases such as 'brothers', the 'same blood', 'the
same family', 'one nation', etc. Nevertheless, many comments were
qualified with statements about the deficiencies of Albania's democracy
and institutions. Some clearly articulated the need for Albania to put
its own house in order. In response to the question: "What kind of
relations would you like the Albanians of Kosovo to have with Albania in
the future", about 50 per cent of the refugees wanted unification with
Albania. Another 25 per cent did not speak about unification but of
relations based on closer ties.
Virtually all the refugees saw the future of the two Albanian
communities as having more intensified and integrated relations on all
levels. However, they did not use the concept 'Greater Albania'.8 An analysis of the poll found that 70 per
cent said that their opinions of Albania had changed for the better and
an overwhelming majority, 89.4 per cent, believed that Albania had a
role to play in the future of Kosovo. This opinion was based on the fact
that they were fellow nationals with a common history, and as Albania
was an internationally recognised state and a UN member, it was
therefore bound to be able to play a contributory and creative role.

Tirana's role in Pan-Albanian Aspirations
Albania is now seeking a role as a regional hearth for ethnic
Albanians living in neighbouring countries. On a recent visit to Tirana,
the vice-chairman of the Kosovo Albanian 'Provisional Government',
Mehmet Hajrizi, called on the Albanian government to give a voice to the
demands, in this instance for early elections. Hajrizi told a press
conference, "Kosovo is not represented at international organisations,
where Albania has done a great job in the past...and I think it should
continue to assist Kosovo to achieve prosperity and peace."9
Albania's influence over Kosovo, however, is much more symbolic than
practical. There is an undeniable sense of wounded pride amongst
Albanian officials, who feel they are being sidelined by the West in
regards to regional planning. Albanian officials feel neglected by the
international community, particularly regarding the future of Kosovo.
"We have observed some hesitation to co-operate with us,"10 Foreign Minister Paskal Milo said during
a seminar in Tirana on Balkan security. Milo said the West's disinterest
in Albania, "is caused by misunderstanding of a few official statements
or from some irresponsible statements" issued by DP leader, Sali
Berisha.11 Milo was attempting to distance the
Albanian government from Berisha's statements at the beginning of
October, which encouraged the notion of an "Albanian Federation" in the
Balkans.
Milo may also have been referring to the series of cancelled visits
to Albania by top American officials, who cited the continued state of
lawlessness in Albania as the apparent cause of their cancellations. On
11 June 1999, Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, decided not to make
a stop in Albania following her visit to Macedonia due to security
concerns. State Department officials claimed that there was a great deal
of 'lawlessness' in Albania, and that the Albanian government was not
able to guarantee the security of high-ranking visitors,12 (she later made a visit in February
2000). Secretary of Defence, William Cohen cancelled his trip to Tirana
in July for security reasons. Defence Department sources said the
Albania visit was cancelled because of 'a threat on the ground'13 related to Islamic militants affiliated
to Osama bin Laden. At the end of August, U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations, Richard Holbrooke, cancelled his planned official visit to
Tirana, due it was said, to a technical fault in his aircraft. Mr
Holbrooke, however, flew to Sarajevo a few hours later on the same
plane. President Clinton avoided Albania altogether on his recent trip
to the Balkans.
Whilst agreeing that security issues were an obvious factor, several
Albanian politicians thought it more likely that the visits were
cancelled in protest against the support of the Albanian government for
the independence of Kosovo, and for the 'Provisional Government' of
Hashim Thaci. The meetings, they explained, could have taken place for
just one hour at Tirana airport, which is far from any centre of
habitation and could easily have been sealed off.14

The National Question
The Albanian national question, which emerged so dramatically onto
the European scene at the beginning of the 1990s, is intrinsically bound
up with the indeterminate status of Kosovo and the political future of
the ethnic Albanian populations of Montenegro and Macedonia.
Whilst the crisis in Kosovo has focused world attention on Albanian
communities throughout the Southern Balkans, the liberation of Kosovo
has not, at least not yet, been translated into demands from Tirana,
Pristina or Tetova for the creation of a 'Greater Albania'. What does
exist is the determination to become regional players politically and
the desire to improve the economic basis of Albanian communities in the
Southern Balkans. Albanians today are in no mood to compromise over
issues concerning their national interests, having drawn the lesson from
the Kosovo conflict that, with concerted effort and determination, they
can change their own fate.
What then is this 'Greater Albania' that causes such alarm amongst
Albania's neighbours?15 Throughout the Southern Balkans maps are
widely circulated of territory that at one time comprised either the
empires of past rulers, such as the Serbs and the Bulgarians, or as is
the case with the Greeks and the Albanians, territory which is claimed
historically to have been predominantly inhabited by people of their
particular ethnicity. Those maps issued by nationalist groups in Greece,
claim territory as far north as the central Albanian town of Elbasan,
while 'Greater Albania', or 'Ethnic Albania' as the Albanians prefer to
call it, comprises the territory of present-day Albania together with
Kosovo, Western Macedonia, south-eastern Montenegro, and the
north-western Epirus region of Greece - known to the Albanians as
Chameria. Without delving too far into the past, it is necessary to look
briefly at how the Albanian people came to be divided in to these five
territories. This may go some way in clarifying what all Albanians refer
to as the 'historical injustices' inflicted upon them by depriving them
of national unification.

The
Creation of Albania's Borders
The 'Albanian National Question' first manifested itself at the
Congress of Berlin in 1878, where the Great Powers agreed that there was
no such thing as an Albanian nation, but rather the Albanians were
merely inhabitants of a geographical area. This fateful decision has
haunted the Southern Balkans ever since. Although after the Balkan Wars
the Powers agreed in principle to support the establishment of Albania
as a new political entity, the 1913 Conference of Ambassadors
nevertheless awarded the Balkan allies large areas of Albanian-inhabited
territory, regardless of its ethnic composition.
Under the Protocol of Florence, most of present-day Kosovo, including
the towns of Pec,16 Prizren, Djakovica and Debar were ceded
to Serbia, despite the knowledge that apart from Shkoder these were the
only market towns for the north Albanian population. With Greece
receiving the southern region of Epirus, or Chameria, the Albanian State
was reduced to the central regions together with the town of Shkoder.
Neither economic nor cultural nor ethnographic arguments determined the
fate of Albania. The Florence Line that decided the frontiers of the new
Albanian State satisfied neither the Albanians nor their Balkan
neighbours. Serbia was deprived of an Albanian port, Montenegro lost the
town of Shkoder, and Greece had to relinquish southern Albania having
been deprived of the Saranda district which, she argued, was
predominantly Greek and was the natural outlet to the sea for the Greek
region north of Janina.
The final border which was eventually established in November 1921
left more than half the Albanian nation outside the Albanian state with
almost half a million Albanians included in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes, and a further 70,000 in Greece, thus creating what became
the world's largest irredenta. It is clear from documentary evidence
that the Ambassador's Conference was merely an exercise to gain time, a
barrier against further war, and that the Powers did not expect the
Albanian state to last long - hence the casual, drawn out and haphazard
manner in which the frontier was finally arrived at.17

Is
there a 'Greater Albania' in the making?
Against the backdrop of the ongoing conflicts in the former
Yugoslavia, Albania's current leadership have acknowledged the
complexities involving the multiethnic nature of the Southern Balkans
and the subsequent threat this poses to the socio-economic and political
development of the region. As a result therefore, all but a few
extremists have adopted a relatively responsible attitude towards
nationalism. Albania's President, Rexhep Meidani, 54, taught physics for
four years, from 1977 to 1980, at Pristina University, during which time
he developed strong ties with the Kosovo Albanians, witnessing at first
hand their difficult relationship with the Belgrade authorities. He
remains, however, an ardent opponent of aggressive nationalism and sees
an urgent need for reconciliation and economic reconstruction of both
Albania and Kosovo in order to weaken nationalism.
Socialist Party leader, Fatos Nano, whilst calling for closer
political and economic ties amongst the Albanians living in the Balkans,
insists this would not involve changing borders. Nano believes that
ensuring freedom of movement throughout the region is the best way to
deflect nationalist calls for establishing a 'Greater Albania'. He
stresses the fact that there is no need to redraw borders but to "make
them irrelevant."18
For all Albanians, the opening up of the border between Albania and
Kosovo has the same significance as the fall of the Berlin Wall, in that
it has provided the opportunity for both communities to finally come
together. The creation of Albania's borders deprived virtually all her
peripheral towns of their natural geographical trading outlets. This has
been a primary cause of the economic decline and subsequent extreme
poverty of these areas. In order therefore to rectify this 'historical
injustice', Albanian leaders are instigating a number of socio-economic
and political initiatives designed to forge closer links between the two
communities.

Economic Initiatives
Tirana is fully aware that the economic prosperity of northern
Albania depends upon the weakening of the border structure between
Albania and Kosovo. The Albanian government is trying to do everything
possible to link Albania and Kosovo by road and rail so that the
Yugoslav province will not need trade and communication links from
Serbia. In August 1999, the then prime minister, Pandeli Majko, asked
Albanians to deposit money in a special bank account to help finance the
construction of a road to Pristina. The road, starting in the Albanian
port of Durrės, will link Tirana and Pristina via the Morina border
crossing in northern Albania. Majko also offered the Albanian port of
Durrės as Kosovo's port city, so that Kosovo would have a port free of
Belgrade's control. Although Majko admitted that the government needed
help from its foreign partners to construct the 350-km (218 mile) road,
he said the Albanian people had to make the first contributions. Majko
said the development of ties between Albania and Kosovo had become a top
priority for his government.19
The Albanian Development Fund has financed the reconstruction of a
6.5-kilometre road linking north eastern Albania with the Kosovo town of
Djakovica. The road runs from the town of Kruma to the border crossing
at Prushi Pass. Albania hopes that its impoverished north eastern area
will benefit from increased business with Kosovo. At present the border
crossing is not viable for the transfer of goods as it can only be used
by small cars. The new corridor is expected not only to help Kosovo's
economy but also to boost economic activity in northern Albania
generally. These areas have been totally isolated, and their development
suppressed, since the border divided Albania from Kosovo and Montenegro
in 1912.
Albanian railways (HSH) is nearing completion of a 200 million USD
railway to connect the Albanian port of Durrės with the town of Prizren
in southern Kosovo. The link will start from the town of Rreshen in the
mountains of northern Albania, pass through the valleys of Small Fan and
the Black Drin and enter Kosovo from the town of Kukes. Both Albanian
and Kosovo Albanian leaders have requested improved road and rail
connections with Durrės which hopefully will boost trade from the
internal Balkans to the Adriatic. Albania's authorities have also agreed
to the request of Kosovo Albanian leader, Hashim Thaci, to allow
concessions on Shengjin port, which lies just south of the town of
Shkoder.
It is not only government-sponsored initiatives that are being
implemented: local people themselves are reactivating traditional links
between Albania and Kosovo. The Gorani minority20 in the northern Kukes district has funded
by itself the construction of a road to connect their villages with the
southern tip of Kosovo, where their ethnic brethren live. People in the
Gorani village of Borja have paved the three-kilometre long road to the
border and then on to the village of Globocica in Kosovo.

Political and Cultural Initiatives
On the political front Albanian leaders have been striving to build a
joint forum of Albanian political parties in Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia
and Montenegro. In December, Fatos Nano referred to the possible
drafting of a common political calendar between Tirana, Pristina and
Tetova that would provide a pan-national integration strategy to
integrate all Albanians. According to Nano, the foundations of this
initiative were laid out in Tetova by himself and Hashim Thaci, together
with the leader of the Macedonian Albanian Democratic Party, Arben
Xhaferi. "It will be a movement not in support of a Greater Albania but
will serve the great European Albanians," Nano explained.21 In recent months, Hashim Thaci also met
with President Rexhep Meidani, Premier Ilir Meta, Fatos Nanos, as well
as opposition leader Sali Berisha.22 At a press conference Thaci stated that,
"These official meetings have been made in the framework of unifying our
national political stands towards the international community."23
Meanwhile, plans for the social and cultural integration between the
Albanians of the Southern Balkans are gathering pace. Last August
Pandeli Majko asked officials in Tirana to draw up plans to unify the
education systems of Albania and Kosovo, and to intensify co-operation
between the universities of Tirana, Pristina and Tetova.24 Three Tirana universities will soon sign
an agreement of co-operation with Pristina University, which will enable
an exchange of teaching staff, organising joint research projects, as
well as workshops aimed at co-ordinating a unified university
curriculum. Moves towards including the education programs of ethnic
Albanians in Montenegro are also being discussed.
The Montenegrin Albanians are very keen to see a quick implementation
of a unified pan-Albanian education system. According to the President
of the Democratic Union of Montenegrin Albanians, Luigj Juncaj,
Albanians in Montenegro are not content with their education system. He
believes that education is the key to the protection of national rights:
"We want the same curriculum for all Albanians in the Balkans. The three
subjects language, literature and history are to us the most important
because with these subjects you can strengthen knowledge about Albanian
culture, heritage and national consciousness."25
The Albanian government has officially repeated its earlier demand to
UN officials in Kosovo that it be allowed to open a diplomatic or
'information' office in Pristina. Given that several European countries
and the US have already established offices in the Kosovo capital, the
Tirana authorities are insisting that the request be granted. The
Albanian government has come under increasing pressure from the general
public for its failure to open an office in Pristina in order to exert
its influence over pan-Albanian issues.

The Cham Issue
Now that Kosovo has effectively been
'liberated', many Albanians feel that it is time to turn their
attentions to that other great national concern - the restitution of
property rights of the Cham people. The Chams are the ethnic Albanian,
and predominantly Muslim, population of the region of north-eastern
Greece known to all Albanians as Chameria - an area of Epirus extending
between Butrint and the mouth of the Acheron river, and eastward to the
Pindus mountains. The name 'Chameria' comes from the ancient Illyrian
name for the Thyamis river, which traversed the territory of the ancient
Illyrian tribe of Tesprotes. Chameria was part of the Roman Empire
before being conquered by Byzantium. After the Ottoman invasion in the
15th century the mostly Albanian population of northern Chameria - from
Konispol to the Gliqi river - converted to Islam, whilst those living
south of the Gliqi down to Preveza Bay remained Orthodox Christians. In
1913 the Ambassador's Conference allotted the Chameria region to Greece,
so today only seven Cham villages, centred on the village of Konispol,
are in Albania itself.
Between 1921 and 1926, the Greek government set about trying to
deport Albanian Muslims from Chameria in order to allot their lands to
Greeks who had been deported from Asia Minor during Kemal Ataturk's
revolution.26 In an attempt, in 1944, to establish an
ethnically pure border region, the Greek government unleashed a campaign
in Chameria, which resulted in around 35,000 Chami fleeing to Albania
and others to Turkey. The Greek authorities then approved a law
sanctioning the expropriation of Cham property, citing the collaboration
of their community with the occupying German forces as a main reason for
the decision. The law is still in force in Greece. Whatever the truth of
this allegation, which has to an extent been supported by some of the
British Liaison Officers based with the Greek Resistance movements27 , the forced movement of the entire
population has left a lingering sense of injustice amongst Albanians in
general, which has contributed to continuing poor bilateral relations
between Albania and Greece.
The Cham issue has remained dormant with none of the post-war
Albanian governments venturing to make it a key issue in relations with
its southern neighbour. Today, the issue is seen - as was Kosovo, as one
more 'historical injustice' suffered by the Albanian people that has to
be corrected. After the collapse of Communism, the Chams in Albania set
up the `Chameria Association' dedicated to the return of their
expropriated lands in Greece. The then Greek foreign minister, Karolas
Papoulias, said in the summer of 1991 that a bilateral commission should
settle these demands. The chances of forming one, however, are very slim
since under current Greek law there is no legal means of challenging
requisition (or expropriation) of land by the Greek state. In the
meantime, the issue has been taken by the Tirana government to the
International Court of Justice, in an effort to secure financial
compensation for lost Cham property. There has been little progress to
date.
Since the end of the Kosovo conflict, support for the Chams has grown
ever more vocal. The Chameria Association is successfully wooing support
to the Cham cause, and is even working on legal procedures to sue the
Greek government at the European Court of Human Rights. The Chams are
frustrated and angered by the Greek government's refusal to discuss
their demands. During the recent meeting between the new Albanian
Premier Ilir Meta and his Greek counterpart Costas Simitis, a
controversy arose when Simitis, answering to questions from journalists
at a joint press conference, said that the Greek government considered
the Cham issue as a closed chapter.28
Back in Tirana, the opposition DP lost no time entering the fray,
accusing Premier Meta of signing an alleged agreement with the Greeks
over coverage of the Cham issue in Albanian history books.29 The prevailing perception was that this
was a clear attempt to erase the issue from the minds of future Albanian
students. At the end of December, the Chairman of the Foreign
Parliamentary Committee, Sabri Godo, urged the International Court of
Human Rights, as well as the Albanian authorities to work out with
Greece a solution to the property rights of the Chams.30 According to a spokesman for the Cham
Association in Tirana, the total value of Cham property at the end of
the World War II was estimated at 340 million USD, whilst the current
market value could reach 2.5 billion USD. The Cham Association wants to
see the 60 year old Greek law authorising the confiscation of Cham
property to be declared null and void, and the Cham people fully
compensated for their loss, thus paving the way for "better and more
just relations between Albania and Greece."31
On a recent tour of southern Albania, DP leader Sali Berisha
threatened to put relations with Greece on hold if it did not comply
with two key demands: more cultural rights for the Albanians living in
Greece, and the resolution of the property issue of the Cham population
expelled from Greece after the Second World War. In a rally in the
southern town of Saranda, Berisha told supporters that Greece should
open an Albanian language school in the northern Greek town of Filiates,
and warned that without a solution to the Cham properties issue
relations between the two countries would remain stagnant. He also vowed
that a solution to the Cham issue would be a precondition for better
relations with Greece if and when his party comes to power.32
A growing number of Albanians feel that now is the time, in the wake
of the world's acknowledgement of the human rights abuses in Kosovo, for
the Albanian government to direct the international community's
attention to the plight of the Chams. The independent daily Koha Jone
applauded Premier Meta for bringing up the Cham issue in his discussions
with Costas Simitis. The paper concluded that for the first time in the
history of Greek-Albanian relations, a Socialist Premier had openly
objected to Athens' preferred position of ignoring the whole issue of
the Cham's property claims.
It seems certain that calls to re-instate the property rights of the
Cham population will be a growing concern for official Albanian policy.
With the widespread and increasingly indignant support of both left and
right in Albania, this is clearly an issue that is not going to go away.

Albanian Politics: From One Crisis To Another
The
controversial elections of May 1996, the collapse of the pyramid banking
schemes which brought the country to the brink of civil war in 1997, and
the attempted coup d'etat in September 1998, have caused Albania to
lurch from one crisis directly to another, and stifled the development
of democratic pluralism. These events have also formed the backdrop of
the continuing bitter hostility between the ruling Socialist-led
coalition and the main opposition Democratic Party, led by ex-president
Sali Berisha. Mistrust, suspicion and enmity between these two political
rivals will likely continue to mar the run up to next year's elections.

Background to the Present Crisis
The parliamentary election of May 1996 was conducted amidst a climate
of acute tension, manipulation and intimidation by the then governing
DP. Although the overwhelming majority of international election
monitors agreed that serious irregularities had occurred in the polling
process, the DP declared itself the clear victor - ignoring Western
diplomatic pleas to re-run the election to stave off mounting popular
anger, not only at the conduct of the elections, but also at the
increasingly dictatorial and authoritarian rule of President Berisha.
For the next six months civil unrest was stalled only due to the
population's belief that instant wealth was achievable by sinking their
life savings into fraudulent pyramid investment schemes. The sudden and
dramatic collapse of these schemes, and the subsequent violent uprising
in the spring of 1997, forced Berisha to face political reality and cave
in to Opposition and international demands for new parliamentary
elections. Despite vigorous protests, Berisha reluctantly conceded
defeat as the Socialists, led by Fatos Nano, won a convincing victory.
Any notion of political reconciliation, however, was put into sharp
reverse in September 1998 when, following the assassination of Azem
Hajdari, a popular founder member of the DP, an attempted coup d'etat by
opposition forces plunged the country once more to the brink of civil
chaos.33 The real motive for the coup attempt was
the bitter personal feud between Nano and Berisha. Nano, a Prime
Minister in the first post-Communist government in 1991, was imprisoned
by Berisha in 1993 for allegedly misappropriating state funds: he was
later freed by supporters during the 1997 uprising that forced Berisha
from power.
The profound anger which led to the uprising, and the anarchic social
disorder that followed, has scarred every facet of Albanian life since
and left ordinary people deeply traumatised. Speculation over Berisha's
involvement in Hajdari's assassination - and Berisha's own refusal to
let the matter rest - have continually focused attention on events
surrounding Hajdari's death. All this has served to undermine any other
initiatives on which the Government or the Opposition might otherwise
have focused.
Hajdari's murder, and the martyrdom status he has since acquired,
will therefore hold Albanian politics hostage until his killers are
brought to justice. This is proving increasingly difficult, since it now
appears almost certain that Hajdari's killers have themselves been
killed. The recent spate of killings in the Tropoja district has
conveniently eliminated several witnesses to Hajdari's death. On 4
November in Tropoja district, two of the supposed assassins of Hajdari
were killed and another wounded. DP supporters persistently claim that
members of the then Socialist government of Fatos Nano were responsible
for killing Hajdari.
According to the pro-DP daily Albania, the killings, as well as
others committed in the Tropoja district, were aimed at "liquidating the
political authors and assassins of Hajdari. They were being undertaken
to hide the involvement in this assassination of senior leaders of the
Albanian State and the majority in power." The paper went on to say that
the "elimination of the executioners is another direct attempt by police
and the government to remove any evidence or witnesses linked to the
crime."34
Two brothers of Berisha's former bodyguard, Izet Haxhia, wanted for
leading the attempted coup, have openly accused Berisha of being
involved in Hajdari's killing and other criminal acts. Isamedin Haxhia,
appointed by Berisha as commander of the operation he ordered against
insurgents in the city of Vlore during the March 1997 revolts, and whom
he blamed for failing to carry out those orders, has published an open
letter in the daily Koha Jone openly accusing Berisha of organising
bloody plans to forcibly crush the March 1997 uprising.
In their statements, the two brothers Ismet and Isamedin who, like
Berisha and Hajdari, are from the northern town of Tropoja, did not
produce any evidence about the accusations. But the Attorney General
Arben Rakipi, said recently that investigations into the 14 September
1998 failed coup d'etat were continuing and that the Hajdari case would
be resolved in the near future.35 Berisha has so far refused several
prosecution summons, claiming he could not co-operate with what he calls
a politically biased prosecution office. Until Haxhia's accusations in
Koha Jone, Berisha had been accused of being involved in murder, but had
not been directly implicated in any specific case.

Changes Within The Two Main Political Parties
The Socialist Party
The perpetually volatile nature of Albanian politics has been further
polarised by the recent defeat of moderate elements in the two main
political parties. In October 1999, Prime Minister and Secretary General
of the Socialist Party (SP) Pandeli Majko lost the race for Socialist
Party Chairman to Fatos Nano. Nano, who received 295 out of 571 votes
from the National Convention delegates, was backed by the older,
radical, hard-line elements in the Party, whilst Majko had the support
of younger more moderate elements, as well as maintaining international
support due mainly to his successful handling of the Kosovo crisis.
Majko also enjoyed the support of many urban voters, and those delegates
who had secured governmental jobs in the capital. On the other hand,
Nano still has much support in rural areas, as well as southern towns
such as Fier, Berat, Permet and Gjirokaster, which have a traditionally
strong radical Socialist base.
Nano, 47, first became SP leader in 1991 when the ex-Communist party
changed its program and statute. He resigned as party leader in January
1999 to begin his campaign to remodel the SP along the lines of the
German Social Democratic Party, where the premier and party leader are
two separate posts. Although the SP has undoubtedly suffered from the
split between supporters of Nano and Majko, the damage done to the party
was partly offset by the appointment of Majko's deputy, Ilir Meta, as
the new Premier.36 A top priority of the new Meta
administration will be to instil confidence amongst the general public
in the new government by demonstrating serious political will to combat
crime and corruption. The re-emergence, however, of former Premier
Bashkim Fino as minister of local government, is likely to prove
controversial. In the immediate aftermath of the 1997 uprising and prior
to his brief stint as premier, Fino was the mayor of Gjirokaster where
he became the overlord of all local political and commercial activity in
the south of Albania. He is accused by many of running a mafia-style
business network.
Meta's appointment was greeted with predictable disdain by the
Democrats. In an interview with the daily Shekulli, DP Deputy Chairman
Jozefina Topalli said that "the DP does not recognise the new
Socialist-led leftist government headed by Premier Meta, because it is a
follow up cabinet to the four previous failed governments, and
discredited and corrupt ministers have been recycled within it."37 Whether Meta's professed aim of giving
police reform and law and order top priority is compatible with all
members of his cabinet is far from clear. The points in Meta's favour,
are that he is possibly tougher than his predecessor and that he has the
support of the Greek minority party, the Union for the Protection of
Human Rights, as well as the fact that that foreign donors, particularly
the 'Friends of Albania' group, hold him in good esteem.38 At a press conference, Meta criticised
Albanians for expecting too much from the international community since
the fall of communism in 1991, and said they had to take the initiative
themselves to build up the country.39
After a year in the political wilderness, Nano has moved quickly to
reassert his control over the party, and to make a regional impact.
There is no doubt that he is a remodelled man. These days he is
noticeably slimmer, drinks less and is more alert and attentive in
discussions. He is also far more receptive to other's opinions, having
previously been impatient and dismissive.40 The 'new Nano' has come as a pleasant
surprise to many Albanians. As the independent daily Shekuli noted,
"Nano is now demonstrating a zeal he has never revealed before. He has
turned into a devoted politician and increased contacts with the
Socialist Party rank-and-file. By this strategy, he is trying to repair
his image."41 The paper said that he had been helped in
part by the cul-de-sac in which the DP had recently found itself, and in
particular, his old adversary, Sali Berisha. Whilst Nano has to some
degree managed to keep his party relatively united, his rival is wasting
time and energy making endless replacements within his party and
launching accusations and counter-accusations which constantly
manufacture more enemies.42
Nevertheless, no matter how liberal and reformist Nano has become he,
along with Berisha, are identified in the general public's mind as being
responsible for the polarisation of Albanian political life, with its
tedious repetition of old arguments and allegations. As one Albanian
analyst recently explained, the two main political camps in Albania are
still using the same political rhetoric as they were in the early days
of 1991: Berisha continues what he calls "the war against communism,"
whilst the Albanian socialists reply with the "war against Berisha."43
In December, Nano became the first Albanian politician since 1948 to
visit Montenegro where he attended the Social Democratic Party's (SDP)
Congress. SDP leader Zarko Ratcevic explained his concerns about ethnic
tension in Montenegro. "Nationalist extremist elements in Montenegro are
trying to promote ethnic hate between Montenegrins and Albanians, using,
unfortunately, Berisha's irresponsible statement on an Albanian
confederation in the Balkans," Ratcevic told Nano.44 Ratcevic was referring to a speech of
Berisha's which warned that Albanians living throughout the Balkans
might unite in a federation if authorities continued to treat them as
second class citizens. We are not seeking to change borders, he had told
a convention of his Democratic Party in Tirana. But he had said that
Albanian minorities in Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Greece should
not be poorly treated, adding that " If anti-Albanian racism is not
halted, one cannot exclude the possibility that Albanians will unite to
form a federation of free Albanians in the Balkans as a fundamental
condition of survival." Nano attempted to reassure Ratcevic that
"Albanians in Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo and Montenegro do not want any
border changes."45

Changes within the Democratic Party
Any factionalisation occurring within the Socialist Party, however,
pales into insignificance in comparison to the deeply damaging split
within the DP. The previous deputy chairman of the DP, Gence Pollo, 36,
who in early September unexpectedly decided to compete with Berisha for
the post of party chairman, withdrew from the race a day before the
party's Congress, leaving behind grave charges against Berisha,
particularly about his questionable business interests. Pollo was, until
recently, a close supporter of Berisha, who appointed him his spokesman
in 1992 and later his political chancellor.
Following the surprise announcement that Pollo was offering himself
as a candidate, his supporters were immediately expelled from the DP's
National Council and Pollo himself resigned from all party posts. Of the
693 delegates at the DP convention, 594 predictably voted to re-elect
Berisha as party president. Since being ousted from power in 1997,
Berisha has reverted to the autocratic one-party style that
characterised his term as President of Albania. As a result, the DP has
become increasingly isolated and marginalised.
Pollo is one of a group of relative moderates within the DP, who want
to see a freer exchange of ideas in the party and more liberal policies,
and who regard as urgent the need to increase the DP's standing in the
eyes of the voters. This group therefore announced on 9 November 1999
the formation of the Democratic Alternative within the party, which
seeks to woo rank and file support by challenging the dominant position
of Berisha. The rebels have refused to comply with several leadership
orders, including a demand to boycott a parliamentary session that gave
a vote of confidence to the government of the new Premiere, Ilir Meta.
The changes under way within the DP, which sees early elections as the
only salvation for the country, could prove a first step towards
renewing the party and overcoming the polarisation between the Democrats
and Socialists that has characterised political life for most of the
past decade.

The General Security Situation
The international community
is pushing the Albanian Government to improve law and order and has
stressed that further international aid to Albania will be conditional
upon an improved security situation. As a result, the Government has
instigated a program of measures to strengthen law and order. Police
ranks are gradually being filled with trained personnel. The Police
forces have also been active in crackdown operations across the country,
in an attempt to wrestle back control from known and specifically
targeted armed gangs.
In response, the opposition Democrats have accused the Interior
Ministry of setting up death squads, whose aim is to execute criminals
rather than have them tried in the courts: "Trained anti-crime teams set
up by the government, which are outside police control, are behind the
recent murders of a dozen criminal gang members," reported the pro-DP
daily, Albania. The paper claimed that sources at the Ministry of Public
Order and the Intelligence Service agreed that the state had drawn up
plans to set up anti-crime squads to eliminate approximately 250
well-known criminals as it was currently impossible to find them guilty
of their crimes.46
By 14 September 1999 the national police chief, Veli Myftari, was
able to publicly announce that the police had finally eliminated or
dissolved all the major gangs operating in Albania.47 Although Myftari denied police
involvement in the physical elimination of several notorious gang
leaders, when questioned about the so-called 'death squads' a senior
Tirana police officer replied "You have to meet violence with
violence."48 The rapid and comprehensive crackdown on
the armed gangs was, in part, to ensure they could not be used to cause
unrest on the anniversary of Azem Hajdari's death. Senior government
officials were fearful of a return to the turmoil of September 1998.
On November 3 the Socialist Party daily, Zeri-i-Popullit claimed that
Sali Berisha had recently decided that he could, in a repetition of the
attempted coup d'etat in September 1998, overthrow the government of
Illir Meta. The paper accused Berisha of having gathered around him a
small contingent of known criminals that were prepared to use
violence.49 The previous Saturday, the police had
apparently identified these criminals at a rally Berisha attended in the
port city of Durrės. Although the recent crackdown on criminal gangs and
illegal immigrant traffickers, initiated by Public Order Minister
Spartak Poci, have proved relatively successful, Poci himself suffered
an embarrassment when, at the end of December, Greek customs officers
caught him travelling in a stolen Mercedes. Poci had been about to start
an official visit to Greece when his large black Mercedes was impounded
at the Kristallopygi border crossing. With the help of Interpol, Greek
customs officers discovered the vehicle had been stolen in Italy at the
start of the year and later sold in Albania. The car was impounded and
Poci finished his journey in a car lent by his Greek counterpart
Michalis Chrysohoidis.

Drug
Trafficking
The involvement of some of the political classes in criminal
activities has provided immunity for criminal gangs throughout the
country. Before apprehending a suspected criminal, Albanian police
officers are placed in the ridiculous situation of having to stop and
consider to which political clan the suspected criminal belongs. This
fact is especially relevant to the escalating trade in drugs through
Albania. Huge amounts of drugs are now arriving in Albania from Turkey
and Macedonia along the route Pogradec-Elbasan-Kavaja-Durrės in Albania,
and then on into Western Europe via Bari and Ancona.
A report in Koha Jone expressed concern that drug trafficking in
Albania was controlled by some senior police officers, who were
themselves supported by high level politicians.50 The paper claims that measures taken
against the drug traffickers have failed since the drug traffickers
themselves have the support not only of certain political forces in
power, but also of key personnel in the Ministry of Public Order. This
creates the improbable scenario where significant police operations
against drug trafficking are being led by the drug traffickers
themselves.

Illegal Immigrant Smuggling
The trafficking of people is also a rapidly expanding business in
Albania. Albania is a young country - an estimated 70 per cent of the
population is under the age of thirty - and almost all, educated and
uneducated alike, wish to leave Albania and work abroad. According to
the Centre for Economic and Social Studies, 77 per cent of graduates
would like to leave Albania. Day after day, hundreds of Albanians wait
outside Western embassies in Tirana in the vain hope of securing a visa
enabling them to leave the country. The vast majority are unsuccessful.
Many subsequently become prey to the gangs who transport illegal
immigrants to Italy. A payment of 1,000 USD buys a place on a speedboat
leaving from the coast around the towns of Vlore and Durrės to an
uncertain destination on the other side of the Adriatic Sea. According
to Italian officials, at least 173 people died in 1999 trying to cross
the Adriatic to Italy.
The Italian authorities intercepted more than 20,000 people
attempting to enter Italy from Albania in 1999 and believe tens of
thousands more entered undetected.51 Turkish Kurds, or Iraqi citizens of
Kurdish nationality, are increasingly using Albania as a springboard
towards Italy and the rest of Western Europe. During the last few months
at least 1,900 Kurds have entered Albania illegally either at Rinas
airport or the Greek/Albanian border crossing at Kakavia.52 The sheer number of Kurds seeking entry
into Western Europe has forced the traffickers to bring them into
Albania by different routes. On 30 November police detained twelve Kurds
carrying false passports and documents in the northern region of
Mirdita. They had apparently entered Albania from Kosovo. This is the
first time Kurds are using the northern entry border points on their
journey to Western Europe via Albania.
The fight against organised crime, alongside the drive against
corruption, is to be the top priority of the new Meta government.
However, there is a growing sentiment that Albania is being unjustly
singled out; At every international or bilateral meeting the cry goes up
that Albania must sort out its law and order problem. And so it must,
but increasingly Albanians are asking the question: "Why just us? What
is Italy doing? What is Turkey or Greece doing to address the
problem."53
The Albanian Interior Ministry claims that the majority of foreign
illegal migrants, who use Albania as a springboard to cross the
Adriatic, come from countries such as Greece, Macedonia and Montenegro.
This is backed up by Italian police estimates which show that of about
49,000 illegal immigrants seized along its south-eastern coastline in
1999, only 7,000 were Albanians.54 Albania is merely a transit point for
this huge clandestine traffic. Before arriving in Albania, they pass
through a large number of eastern countries, including, sometimes,
member countries of the European Union and NATO.
In a recent editorial, Zeri-i-Popullit stated that the Albanian
government had made it clear that the question of clandestine traffic
and organised crime in general is not just Albania's problem but rather
a problem that affects and concerns the whole Southern Balkans region.
The paper stated that while in all bilateral meetings, Italian Interior
Ministry officials persistently asked Albanian police officials to
freeze clandestine traffic on the Albanian side, while not only did most
of the illegal emigrants pass through other countries before getting to
Albania, but the lion's share of the profits of this trade go to the
"super bosses who are centred in the most developed European
countries".55
But more could certainly be done in Albania itself. While the
Albanian police have shown some success in tackling local crime, little
progress has been made in apprehending those involved in organised
crime. With more than 100 policemen murdered during the last three
years, police moral is understandably low.56 No matter how professional or responsible
the police may be, organised criminality in Albania cannot be
comprehensively dealt with unless there is a complete overhaul of the
justice system where corruption is deeply rooted. Public Order Minister,
Spartak Poci, recently warned that he would resign if President Rexhep
Meidani did not put the justice system in order. Poci claimed that the
courts were destroying the work of the police, and that there were
dozens of cases where judges had released defendants who had been
arrested by the police for various crimes.57 A sweeping review of the activities of
judges and prosecutors is urgently needed.

Women
The increase in violent crime in Albania has given
rise to a number of disturbing social phenomena: most notably a dramatic
escalation in the number of blood feud vendettas; a growing number of
girls kidnapped or tricked into prostitution; and a worrying decrease in
the number of girls continuing their education. The lives of young
Albanian women, especially those living in rural districts and towns
other than the capital, are overshadowed by the fear of abduction and
rape. Stories abound of girls being snatched by armed men, who then ship
them to a life of enforced prostitution in Western Europe.
Thousands of girls are not being allowed to continue schooling beyond
primary level because their parents fear for their safety and honour. A
border monitor working for the Organisation for Security and
Co-operation in Europe, (OSCE) who is currently completing a study of
the issue, noted a typical case of a girl in Pilaf village near the
north eastern town of Peshkopi who had finished high school with good
grades, yet her family decided not to send her to secondary school
because this would have meant a fifteen minute walk to school every day.
They were worried that she might be approached and her honour
compromised during this daily trip. In another example, a nineteen
year-old woman from Muhur village said she had stopped going to school
at age fourteen because her parents were worried about the security
situation, she was shortly about to embark in an arranged marriage to a
man from a neighbouring village.58
A number of EU member states have expressed alarm at the rise in
criminal activities controlled by Albanian gangs. Belgium is now facing
a rising tide of young Albanian prostitutes, who have been tricked into
paying traffickers up to 5,000 USD to be smuggled into Western Europe.
These girls are part of a growing wave of victims of human trafficking
that is having a particularly damaging effect upon the lives of Albanian
women. A senior Brussels police officer, Christian Van Vassenhoven,
estimates that as many as half of the foreign prostitutes who work in
Brussels are Albanian.59
Eric Van der Sypt, a public prosecutor specialising in the problem of
prostitution, told Reuters that "a new phenomenon has emerged of
Albanian men selling women from Albania and Belgium. It appears that
Albanian criminal groups are establishing links with Bulgarian
organisations. Some of the girls are abducted, others have been made
false promises of work, but once they get into Italy they are forced to
work as prostitutes."60 The girls are thus caught in a no win
situation between exploiters and the authorities. They have no legal
documentation, they are far from their families, and they fear
retribution from their pimps and the local authorities should they try
and escape.

Blood Feuds
There are two main reasons why district judges
and prosecutors let prisoners off - either straightforward bribery or
fear of retaliation by the criminal's relatives. Despite efforts by the
government to wipe it out, the 15th century code of customs, the Kanun
of Lek Dukagjini, has re-appeared throughout northern Albania. The
Kanun, which has been handed down orally through generations, lays out a
code of "laws" governing marriage, birth, death, hospitality and
inheritance, which have traditionally served as the foundation of social
behaviour and self-government for the clans of northern Albania. In
particular, the Kanun regulates revenge killings in order to stop the
total annihilation of families.
The Kanun has been used as a system for administering justice in
northern Albania, which historically has remained isolated from central
government law. With the collapse of communism in 1991 and the
subsequent lack of nationwide law and order, the number of vendetta
killings has soared. Today, revenge killings in the name of the Kanun
have taken on threatening proportions. A recent survey on the Kanun by
the Independent Social Studies Centre, Eureka, expressed concern that
many killers were using the rules of the Kanun as a cover to commit
ordinary crime. According to the Eureka statistics, over 50 per cent of
teenagers polled said that they respected the rules of the Kanun and
would be willing to take revenge in the name of the Kanun. The report
also highlights the fact that thousands of male children are being
locked inside their homes because of the fear of revenge (females are
exempt from revenge killings).61
In one sense it could be argued that northern Albanians are resorting
to the Kanun in order to fill the law and order vacuum. In most cases,
however, it is not the traditional rules of the Kanun that are being
applied but rather a self-selected interpretation. In fact it is a means
of settling accounts amongst gangs of traffickers, smugglers, and other
criminal elements who, in the absence of official law and order, can use
the fear, respect and moral justification associated with the Kanun to
terrorise local people into a code of silence.
A blood feud can start over any number of causes - an untoward
advance to a woman or the killing of a sheep dog. A typical example
occurred in mid-December when a father and son gunned down a neighbour
who shot their dog. The man was walking his horses back home at night
when he was attacked by the dog and, fearing for his life, shot the dog.
The dog's owners witnessed the shooting and immediately wreaked revenge
with machine guns.62 Even drivers responsible for traffic
accidents have been killed by their victim's families. The vast majority
of contemporary feuds, however, are the result of disputes over land and
water rights.
Since the end of the one-party state in 1991, collective ownership of
the land has been abolished. This has resulted in a land grab whereby
the pre-1944 owners have returned to reclaim their property and forced
the "occupiers" to relocate themselves. Conflict has become inevitable
due to high population growth, together with an acute shortage of
agricultural land and the absence of firm policing. Despite the
existence of several blood-feud reconciliation bodies, such as the
Tirana-based Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution Centre, there has
been no concerted and co-ordinated strategy devised to combat this
growing and deeply damaging phenomena.
The Kanun is being used to compensate for a weak and corrupt judicial
system, as well as the fact that for too long now it has become the
accepted tenet that northern Albania is beyond the rule of law, that the
government has no jurisdiction in the north, and so the north must rely
on its own customary law to provide justice for its citizens. Blood
vendettas are particularly rife in and around the town of Shkoder where
gangs routinely call at bars in the town to collect "gjoba" or
protection money, which if not paid will result in the automatic killing
of the bar's owner.
One such example occurred at the beginning of July 1999 when a dozen
men armed with kalashnikov assault rifles called at the Sahati bar in
the centre of Shkoder. The bar's owner, Ibrahim Isufi, was waiting for
them. In the ensuing shootout, five of the gang members were killed and
three of Isufi's relatives were wounded. As a result, Isufi's male
relatives are hiding in their homes for an indefinite period, in the
hope of escaping the inevitable quest for revenge by the families of the
five dead gangsters. Throughout northern Albania, hundreds of men have
not stepped outside their homes for months for fear of being murdered. A
few have managed to escape abroad but the majority remain trapped
indoors, having to rely on their womenfolk to bring in supplies and to
work the land, a fact that is severely hampering economic progress. The
reintroduction of the Kanun into the lives of the communities of
northern Albania must be seen as a serious challenge to the state. Today
paperback copies of the Kanun are widely available in Albania, Kosovo
and Western Macedonia, and the fact that new translations and
interpretations of the Kanun are appearing must be viewed with real
concern.

Conclusion
Pan Albanian Aspirations
It has now become increasingly apparent, in the aftermath of the
Kosovo conflict, that Albania has a significant role to play in
providing a national support mechanism for Kosovo Albanians. That role
may include Albania lending its diplomatic support on the international
scene, or providing a 'nationally sympathetic' platform to discuss
differences and grievances between the various Kosovo Albanian and
Albanian political factions. Since the end of the conflict, Albania has
also become a base for instigating pan-Albanian initiatives on social,
cultural and economic grounds.
'The National Question' regarding the future status of Albanians
living outside Albania will therefore continue to dominate Albanian
foreign policy. Albanians, whether Tosks or Ghegs, Democrats or
Socialists, agree upon the fact that Kosovo must be declared independent
from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The only discord is on the
question of timing and means: with northerners demanding immediate
independence, and southerners more likely to accept the notion of Kosovo
remaining as a UN protectorate until the rival Kosovo Albanian political
factions can guarantee a smooth transition of power following
elections.63 Whilst national reconciliation within
Albania itself is making very slow progress, the concept of regenerating
links between the nation as a whole is gathering momentum.
This is a distinct and separate process from calling for the
geographic unification of the nation. The overwhelming majority of all
Albanians agree that the different historical paths taken by the people
of Albania as distinct from those from the former Yugoslavia, mean that
a certain amount of time has to pass before either group is ready for
the difficulties that they themselves, let alone their neighbours, would
have to face in trying to unite geographically all the Albanians of the
Balkans. Nevertheless, a new political and national identity is still in
the process of formation.
Some of Albania's Balkan neighbours are watching these moves with a
certain uneasiness, translating as it does for some, most notably Serbia
and Greece, into designs for a 'Greater Albania', which would by
definition necessitate changing international borders. Albania's current
leadership has been at great pains to demonstrate a responsible attitude
towards, on the one hand, pan-Albanian goals for various forms of
reintegration and, on the other hand, accepting there can be no demands
for border changes. Indeed, nowadays the only people willing to talk at
length about a 'Greater Albania' are to be found in the offices of the
Serbian Renewal Movement and similar establishments in Belgrade.64
The Cham issue is now a serious one for Albanian nationalists, who
wish to see a major perceived historical injustice corrected. With the
Chams supported unanimously by all Albanians of the Southern Balkans and
in the larger diaspora, regardless of their political affiliations, it
is an issue that has to be addressed. While relations with Greece cannot
be allowed to suffer should the Cham question be exploited in the run up
to the next parliamentary elections, it is an issue that all Albanian
political parties are going to have address in one form or another, or
risk being accused of not only letting the Chams down but the nation
also. The difficulty is that relations with Greece are perhaps more
important than those with any other of Albania's neighbours: Greece has
been, after all, a major contributor to the easing of socio-economic,
and thereby political, tensions by absorbing up to 400,000 Albanian
migrants, whose remittances keep their families afloat.

Strengthening Economic Ties
The Tirana authorities are equally keen to promote a weakening of
border structures and a corresponding growth in economic and political
co-operation with their Greek, Montenegrin and Macedonian neighbours.
Commercial links with Greece and Macedonia are constantly expanding,
whilst the reopening, after the conflict, of the border with Montenegro
was enthusiastically welcomed in Albania's northern town of Shkoder. The
sudden closure by the Yugoslav Federal Army of the border again in
mid-January 2000 interrupted the burgeoning economic activity of
numerous Shkoder traders, who had re-established close business
relations with Montenegro. Belgrade's closure of the border was a
gesture of disapproval at the prior signing by Tirana and Podgorica of a
memorandum of understanding on the strengthening of relations between
Albania and Montenegro. The memorandum provides for the opening of two
new border crossings and an Albanian-Montenegrin committee to discuss
proposals for greater co-operation between the two countries.
It is also economic rather than nationalistic considerations that
make it imperative to improve communications between Albania and Kosovo.
The appalling state of Albania's roads, the majority of which have not
been repaired in any form since the mid -1970s, have now deteriorated to
a point where they have become a major barrier to the country's
development. For the people of Kukes, it is far easier and more
economical to drive the short (seven kilometres) distance to the
southern Kosovo town of Prizren to trade, than to risk the dangers and
appalling discomfort of the nine hour drive to Tirana.
During the Kosovo conflict, thousands of military and humanitarian
lorries tore up the already bad road from the port of Durrės to Tirana,
the main route from the capital leading northwards. At one point, a
stretch of this road on the outskirts of Tirana deteriorated to such a
extent that after the frequent heavy rains its potholes were transformed
into a series of ever widening mini-lakes, which brought traffic to a
total standstill. What would it take to repair seriously potholed
stretches of road such as this in conjunction with major and ambitious
road programs such as Corridor 8?65 If the concept of an "integrated Europe,
via an integrated Balkans" - a very popular phrase in Tirana at present
- can be advanced through such initiatives, then the need to contemplate
changing borders in order to geographically and politically unite all
Albanians becomes redundant.

Domestic Developments
In marked contrast to the moves to break down national barriers, on
the domestic front Albania's internal politics remain divisive and
confrontational. Many in the leadership of the DP are unlikely ever to
accept the legitimacy of the present Socialist-led government, and will
therefore continue to try to undermine it and to disrupt the political
process generally. It is now nine years since the end of the one-party
state. Yet Albania's subsequent experiments with democracy have proved,
in many respects, as traumatic as the years suffered under the communist
regime.
As always in Albania, settling accounts with the past plays a large
part in the reality of the present, causing the country to remain
entrenched in conflictual politics. Profoundly disillusioned by the
whole political process and the glaring absence of democracy, the
Albanian people have become largely apathetic in matters relating to
politics. Currently Albania is far from a state where understanding and
tolerance co-exist with public trust in the institutions of law and
justice. Unfortunately, the defining characteristics of social relations
in Albania are still a lethal combination of conflict and aggression,
combined with an entrenched legacy of corruption and nepotism.
Believing that their political class will constantly betray them,
Albanians are impatient for change, yet are bewildered as to how to make
it happen. The options open to the majority of this disproportionately
youthful population are severely limited: either to become a low-paid
migrant worker in Greece; an illegal immigrant in Western Europe; or
remain unemployed in Albania. Bearing in mind that Albania has had nine
cabinets in nine years, even those in the much coveted
government-appointed posts see their jobs as temporary in the extreme,66 fearful of being replaced immediately
once there is a change of government. Consequently, for the short
duration of their appointment many try to grab what they can.
In the meantime, criminality offers some a fast track route to the
riches and comforts of the West. The present level of organised crime is
such that corruption, smuggling and the trafficking of people, drugs and
weapons are now amongst the country's major economic activities. This in
turn is fostering an ever increasing number of gangland feuds which, in
the absence of an effective legal and police system, is causing an
escalation of cold-blooded assassinations, thinly disguised and morally
justified, as revenge rightfully taken in the name of the traditional
laws of the Kanun.
As far as crime in general is concerned, it is clear that Albania is
just one small cog in the very large wheel of organised crime. Although
Albania is a major launch pad for drugs and illegal migrants into
Western Europe, more than two thirds of these migrants are not Albanian
and have already been smuggled through several other countries before
arriving in Albania. The same is true of the smuggling of drugs, most of
which are not of Albanian origin. The Tirana authorities therefore are
asking that Western, and particularly EU, pressure be put upon other
countries to also tackle the problem. Turkey, Bulgaria and Macedonia in
particular must also be subjected to the same degree of scrutiny and
pressures to act against organised crime. But Tirana must also put it's
own house in order to deat with organised crime: urgent reforms are
needed in the police, customs and the judiciary together.
Albania's most pressing needs remain the establishment of a civic
society based on sound and stable state institutions. Yet this depends,
for a large part, upon the country's politicians discarding their
deep-seated personal animosities in order to concentrate instead on
regaining the Albanian people's faith in the democratic process. This
would be a sorely needed first step towards healing the deep political
wounds that scar Albanian politics and encouraging Albanians to abandon
their political loyalties to personalities in favour of loyalties to
democratic political institutions. These are daunting but essential
tasks if Albania is to end the cycle of economic and political
destruction of recent years, and continue its tortuous path towards
democracy.

Responsibilities of the International Community
International actors - in particular the European Union and the World
Bank - must remain engaged and committed to assisting Albania in
combating its most urgent problems: organised crime, illegal smuggling
and drug trafficking, as well as a whole host of domestic problems,
including access to education, which have developed out of weak state
institutions. Without this assistance, Albania's problems will continue
to be transported outside its own borders.
The international community's financial assistance to Albania - in
programs such as the EU Phare initiative, must continue to be directed
primarily at projects which develop technical capacity within Albania's
weak state structures. Much of what has been achieved in Albania has
been undone by the ability of organised crime to penetrate and undermine
state institutions. Reversing this trend can only be achieved through
implementing donor-funded programs which strengthen the judicial and
policing responses to lawlessness and criminality.
A complete re-evaluation of the law enforcement system is urgently
needed if an effective response to justice and criminal issues - both
domestically and regionally - is to be developed. The anti-crime
measures already adopted by the Meta Government last summer must be
supported by the international community if they are to have any chance
of success, but they are only a beginning. A key priority is
strengthening the judiciary. Salaries and training schemes for High
Court Judges should be funded under present Council of Europe
initiatives, and to improve public confidence in the judiciary generally
consideration could be given to the establishment of selection panels of
mixed Albanian/EU composition, perhaps with a Chairman from the European
Court of Justice.
The low level of competence and training of local police, combined
with the restricted terms of reference for the Western European Union's
(WEU) Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) - the key
international agency active in policing - has resulted in little
progress in Albania's effort to combat rampant criminality. The MAPE
force, consisting of 150 policemen from a variety of countries, has a
very restricted mandate which allows advice to be given yet excludes all
enforcement operations. Consideration should be given to the
transformation of that mandate, at least for a defined transitional
period, to allow WEU officers to become active participants in the
exercise of policing duties. The creation of a well trained and
appropriately-paid Albanian police force, trained under existing MAPE
structures, should remain the medium term priority, but in the immediate
term a major improvement in police effectiveness is very necessary.
Less formal measures can also be extremely helpful in addressing
different aspects of the law and order problem. A good investment by the
international donors would be more resources to establish conflict
resolution centres in northern Albania to tackle the issue of blood
feuds. The aim would be for such centres to bring feuding families
together, and to develop understanding of alternative methods of dispute
resolution. Such an exercise was attempted in February 1995 when a
conflict resolution centre was set up by a British anthropologist
Antonia Young in the northern city of Shkoder. Unfortunately, this
centre, though successful collapsed due to lack of funding.
The problem of illegal immigration from Albania is one that requires
a particular effort not just from the Albanian government, but from
those in the wider region. Given that Albania is merely the last port of
call for illegal immigrants attempting to use Albania as a springboard
into Western Europe, measures should be urgently taken to strengthen
co-operation between Albania's neighbours - Kosovo, Greece, Bulgaria,
Turkey, Macedonia and Italy. Despite the recent strict checks on Turkish
citizens of Kurdish origin entering into Albania through Rinas Airport
and border crossings with Greece at Kapshtica and Kakavia, illegal
immigrants are being smuggled into the country from Kosovo and Macedonia
through any number of little known border crossing points. More help for
Albania's beleaguered police force is again required, as well as closer
monitoring of regional borders.
According to an agreement signed on 11 January 2000 in Rome between
the Interior Ministers of Greece, Italy and Albania, any illegal
immigrant caught along Italy's shores will be returned and held in
Albania. If present trends continue, Albania can expect to shelter an
estimated 42,000 foreign illegal immigrants per year - mostly from
China, Sri-Lanka, Bangladesh and Turkey - in holding centres, whilst
they await repatriation to their countries of origin. Albania will need
assistance from the Italian Government, but also from agencies such as
UNHCR to maintain reception centres with adequate food, bedding and
medical equipment.
Critical to Albania's future in many ways identified in this report
is greater inter-Balkan co-operation. One of the numerous practical
obstacles to promoting that co-operation is the existence of tough visa
requirements between the countries of the region. Measures should be
adopted to relax such restrictions for entrepreneurs, publishers,
academics and others, whose activities will assist the developments of
socio-economic ties between the Balkan countries.
For too much of its recent history, Albania has been isolated from
the international mainstream. It is in everyone's interest that it
rejoin the international community as a functioning, economically
viable, responsible democracy, and sooner rather than later. For that to
happen the country has to help itself, but it also needs all the help it
can get, from its immediate regional neighbours and from the European
Union in particular.

Appendix: Acronyms and Place Names
|
| Acronyms |
| DP |
Democratic Party |
| EU |
European Union |
| OSCE |
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe |
| PHARE |
Pologne Hongrié Assistance et Reconstruction Economique |
|
Poland Hungary Economic Reconstruction Assistance |
| SDP |
Socialist Democratic Party |
| SP |
Socialist Party |
| MAPE |
Multinational Advisory Police Element |
| WEU |
Western European Union |
| Place Names (Kosovo) |
| Serbian |
Albanian |
| Djakovica |
Gjakova |
| Pec |
Peja |
| Pritina |
Prishtinė |
| Prizren |
Prizren |