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Subject: IWPR'S BALKAN CRISIS REPORT, NO. 128
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WELCOME TO IWPR'S BALKAN CRISIS REPORT, NO. 128, March 28, 2000

MONTENEGRO BORDER COMPROMISE Serbia and Montenegro have resolved a stormy
border dispute, which brought the two republics close to war. 
Milka Tadic reports from Podgorica.

SUMADIJA TAKES ON BELGRADE Disillusioned with Serbia's supine opposition,
the historically rebellious region of Sumadija has decided to take on the
Milosevic regime on its own. Miroslav Filipovic reports. 

THE MITROVICA SYNDROME The Mitrovica violence has raised serious questions
about the international community's administration of Kosovo.
Anthony Borden reports from Mitrovica.

MAROONED IN MACEDONIA Thousands of Romany refugees eke out a hand-to-mouth
existence in Macedonia, unwanted by the West and unable to return to their
Kosovo homes. Zeljko Bajic reports from Skoplje.

DODIK TOYS WITH MUSLIM VOTE Republika Srpska Prime Minister, Milorad Dodik,
considers appointing Muslim ministers to break political deadlock. Janez
Kovac reports from Sarajevo.

****************** VISIT IWPR ON-LINE: www.iwpr.net ****************** 

MONTENEGRO BORDER COMPROMISE 

Serbia and Montenegro have resolved a stormy border dispute, which brought
the two republics close to war.

By Milka Tadic in Podgorica

The Montenegrin authorities appear to have bowed to pressure from Belgrade
by accepting the presence of Yugoslav Army soldiers along its borders.

It follows months of bitter dispute over control of Montenegro's frontiers,
which threatened to trigger a conflict with Serbia. 

 A joint statement said a border checkpoint with Kosovo near Rozaje will now
be jointly patrolled by Yugoslav Army, VJ, and Montenegrin Interior Police,
MUP, as part of efforts to halt illegal arms and drugs shipments across the
frontier.

The checkpoint agreement, signed by senior officers of the VJ Second Army
and the Montenegrin MUP, allowed for the creation of other joint
checkpoints.

"The agreement was reached following severe pressure by the VJ," a senior
official in the Montenegrin ruling coalition told IWPR. "The generals were
accusing us of tolerating the transit of arms, that allegedly go to the KLA
[Kosovo Liberation Army] and its rebels in the vicinity of Presevo through
Montenegro. The representatives from the VJ threatened to block the crossing
near Rozaje. We had to back down in face of such accusations and allow the
control of goods going towards Kosovo." 

The official said behind-the-scenes negotiations have been ongoing for weeks
between the VJ and Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic's coalition
government.

The VJ set up an army checkpoint on the Montenegrin-Albanian border at the
end of January, in violation of the Yugoslav constitution. VJ troops then
illegally deployed along the republic's frontier with Bosnia in early March
(See Tribunal Update No 122 - Serbia Tightens Montenegrin Noose).

Montenegro interpreted the moves as a clear show of force by Belgrade,
escalating the long-running feud between the two republics. For some years
Montenegro has increasingly sought to distance herself from Belgrade, taking
over responsibility for foreign relations, the economy and even the
republic's currency.

Hence last week's compromise accepting the presence of VJ troops has come as
a great surprise to the Montenegrin public.

Control of the Kosovo border crossing points is particularly important to
the Montenegrin authorities. The transit of goods through Montenegro into
Kosovo has generated millions of German marks for the Podgrocia authorities
since the arrival of KFOR in the province.

Within two days of the joint checkpoint being set up, traffic towards Kosovo
was significantly down. Some fear the VJ presence will continue to cut the
volume of goods crossing the border, reducing Montenegrin government.

Despite the obvious concessions made to the Yugoslav military,
representatives from parties in the ruling coalition parties, the Democratic
Party of Socialists and People's Party, are trying to portray the agreement
as a victory for the Djukanovic government.

"If this reduces the tension, there is no reason to conduct an analysis now
as to who made concessions to whom," said Dragan Soc, Montenegro's justice
minister and leader of the People's Party.

The Social Democratic Party, the third member of the ruling coalition, has,
however, expressed reservations about the agreement.

"The Belgrade regime immediately took our goodwill as a sign of weakness,"
said Ratko Krivokapic of the SDP. "The army's representatives have already
demanded the creation of new checkpoints."

That part of the media under the control of Milosevic has remained silent
over the agreement. Milosevic failed to inform his political cronies in
Montenegro, the Socialist People's Party, SNP, about the negotiations
between the VJ and the Montenegrin MUP. 

The deputy leader of the SNP, Pedrag Bulatovic, accused Djukanovic
throughout the negotiations  of waging a propaganda war against the VJ to
stoke up tension and destabilise Montenegro.

Djukanovic's fierce rival, Momir Bulatovic, the federal prime minister and
leader of the SNP, claimed the negotiations were secret. On March 24,
Bulatovic said the Montenegrin police minister visited Belgrade recently and
talked to colleagues in the federal and Serbian government.

The agreement no doubt points to Djukanovic's eagerness to buy time and gain
some concessions from VJ generals. In his game with Milosevic, the
Montenegrin president has so far managed to avoid outright conflict. But,
despite negotiating and compromising, he is losing elsewhere on all fronts.
Slowly but surely the Yugoslav Army is taking over control of Montenegro's
borders.

Milka Tadic is a regular IWPR contributor 


SUMADIJA TAKES ON BELGRADE

Disillusioned with Serbia's supine opposition, the historically rebellious
region of Sumadija has decided to take on the Milosevic regime on its own.
 
By Miroslav Filipovic 

Like their forbears over 100 years ago, the people of Sumadija are girding
themselves for rebellion.

The springboard for several uprisings against Ottoman rule in the 19th
century, the central Serbian region - bounded by the towns of Cacak,
Kragujevac and Kraljevo -  has now become a centre of resistance to the
Milosevic regime.

"The uprising against the Turks started here in 1804, so will this one,
against Milosevic," Dr Predrag Stojanovic, from Kraljevo, declares.   

Spring protests in Kraljevo began relatively harmlessly when teachers and
subsequently pupils took to the streets. Residents then demanded the return
of a TV transmitter seized by the federal authorities. And finally
reservists defied the military draft-board and called on the army to end its
provocations in Montenegro.

Senior military officials visited the city to try to calm to things down,
but refused to address the reservists' complaints. Now everyone expects the
barricades to go up on Kraljevo bridge, if not around the town itself.

In the neighbouring town of Cacak, residents have mounted a 24-hour armed
guard around the town's television station and placed bear-traps around its
transmitter.
There have been similar demonstrations in Cuprija, Pozega and Kragujevac. 

The protests in the main have either been spontaneous or organised by
ordinary citizens disenchanted with the deteriorating economy. Political
parties have hardly been involved and, when they have, protesters have
complained that they only get in the way.

In contrast to the tumult in Sumadija, cities like Belgrade have remained
relatively quiet. The mayor of Cacak, Velimir Ilic, one of the leaders of
the Alliance for Change, blames this on incompetent opposition parties who,
over the years, have been weakened by government co-option and bitter
quarrelling. 

"It is a simple matter," Ilic told IWPR, "the leaders who had the trust of
Belgrade residents have betrayed them. Belgraders are now looking for new
leaders." 

One of the leading authorities in the Orthodox Church, Bishop Stefan,
agrees. "The Serbian authorities have themselves formed the opposition and
are holding it tightly in their clutches.  The people understand this and
are now fighting for freedom on their own."

The mayor of Kraljevo, Mladomir Novakovic, believes the citizens of his town
have waited far too long for the opposition in Belgrade to take the
initiative." Now, we have had enough. We cannot wait for anyone. If Belgrade
wants to join us, it would be easier but we can manage well enough without
it," he said.

Nebojsa Krstic, a senior official from Kragujevac's Civil Alliance, takes a
similar view. "Perhaps Belgrade has time on its hands. We, however, cannot
wait.  Kragujevac is dying as a city.  We're not merely protesting against
the government, we're fighting for our life."

The international community has given the Sumadija uprising significant
encouragement, letting local people know that it is keen to see democracy
and opposition to Milosevic thrive.

In local elections three years ago, the opposition scored victories in the
cities of central Serbia. Residents proudly declared their homes "free
cities". And, despite the opposition's failure to mount a united front
against Milosevic, the cities have escaped his authoritarian rule. 

Sociologist Aleksandar Veljovic said, "In Kraljevo, Cacak and Kragujevac
people are suffering. But at least they've experienced a little freedom. Now
they are determined to preserve and extend it."

The most prominent Serbian politician in between the two world wars, Nikola
Pasic, used to say that the authorities are responsible for the misery and
captivity of the people, the opposition for its future and morale.  

The view is shared by the mayor of Cacak, Velimir Ilic, "The Serbian people
live in misery because their government is bad, but if they lack hope for
the future, it is because they have a poor opposition."

The citizens' uprising against Milosevic started shortly after last summer's
NATO bombing campaign. The protest did not last long because it was lead by
a weak opposition. The region has learned its lesson -- but it has not
turned its back on the opposition altogether. The hope is that it will learn
a lesson or two from Sumadija's example.

Miroslav Filipovic is a correspondent for Danas in Kraljevo


THE MITROVICA SYNDROME 

The Mitrovica violence has raised serious questions about the international
community's administration of Kosovo.

By Anthony Borden in Mitrovica

The barbed wire tumbling across the dusty bridge is a forlorn sight, and
deeply depressing for anyone acquainted with the Balkans.

This is Mitrovica, the current flashpoint in Kosovo, but it looks just like
hundreds of blockades erected by military forces in the region over the past
decade: a few soldiers ambling about on either side, the haphazard array of
obstacles, the lazy checking of occasional vehicles and pedestrians
determined to pass.

The appearance may be mundane, but the meaning is always crystal clear:
partition.

The recent series of violent incidents between Albanians and Serbs here has
raised serious questions about the international community's administration
of the territory. 

With Albanians on the north side of the river fleeing south, the town has
been left fully segregated, except for three apartment blocks protected by a
half-dozen NATO tanks. "It is a completely multi-ethnic area," insisted the
French commander, as I passed through the barbed wire barrier.

Mitrovica is at the heart of the challenges facing the UN and NATO in Kosovo
now. As the largest remaining minority enclave, with several thousand Serbs
who have come to this grim place from other parts of the province as well as
from the south of the town, it is seen by Serbs as their last chance to
sustain any meaningful community in Kosovo. It is also the base for militant
forces almost certainly operating in some kind of cooperation with Serbia.

Up to 50,000 Serbs populate the wider area. "Partition is not pleasant. But
if this place falls, all of these people will head north to Serbia," a
Serbian journalist said.

Recognising the centrality of the issue, Lord Robertson, the British NATO
secretary general, planned a walkabout in the troubled town on his visit
with top NATO General Wesley Clark on the anniversary of the bombing
campaign. At the last moment, the Mitrovica leg was aborted, and probably
not for security reasons or any logistical problems official cited. A more
likely reason is the Mitrovica offers nothing to commemorate, and a photo
opportunity there could only advertise a fundamental failing at the heart of
the Kosovo project.

But the problems go still beyond building some kind of common life between
Albanians and Serbs. Even assuming the checkpoint on the bridge at Mitrovica
stays for years, or worse that all Serbs leave Kosovo, the central problem
of organising a stable and democratic society remains.

Keen to side-step the politically explosive question of the future
sovereignty of Kosovo, the international community has put off the matter of
a central Kosovo political administration. The West knows that the first act
of any Albanian government in Pristina will be to call for formal
independence from Serbia. The political inexperience, bitter internal
rivalries, and influence of the former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) further
recommended this approach.

But the result could be worse. To establish some kind of political
accountability, the UN is now stressing local elections, projected for the
autumn. As a result, the previous Albanian political structures are
splintering, and almost every day a former KLA commander launches a new
political party. This could be seen as the start of healthy democratic
debate.

Except for Mitrovica. The lesson of that bridge is not just Albanian-Serbian
mistrust. It is also the absence of basic security. Notably, the UN
postponed two murder trials in the town - unconnected with the unrest -
because it could not guarantee security for the witnesses, judges and other
experts required.

In the north, I happened upon UN police arresting a Serb who, terribly
drunken, had stabbed to death a guest at a Serbian wedding ceremony earlier
in the day. My Serbian journalist colleague predicted that, unable to manage
a legal case, the UN would only take him to the border and dump him onto
Yugoslav authorities.

As Bernard Kouchner, the UN chief, has widely complained, contributing
states have only provided half the roughly 6,000 police requested. Financial
contributions are also desperately off pace for his administration's annual
budget - which he says is equivalent to only the cost of half a day's NATO
bombing. 

While civilian head in Kosovo, Kouchner does not control the NATO forces,
which themselves are subject to internal disagreements. Complicating matters
still further, the main civilian bodies, the UN and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE, are also subject to rivalries and
disputes.

As a result, rule of law is a distant concept, and central government is
effectively non-existent. Crucially, Kosovo has no constitution - some argue
that such a document would contravene Yugoslav sovereignty or even UN
Security Council Resolution 1244. As a result the competencies of local or
any other levels of administration have yet to be defined. The UN and KFOR
have tired of being asked the question of sovereignty every day: we are in
charge here, they insist. But it may be in fact that no one really is.

Local elections, says one leading Kosovo Albanian analyst, thus risk giving
democratic legitimacy to former warlords now establishing their own regional
economic and political fiefdoms or "cartels". Open political debate, much
less serious independent journalism, becomes simply too dangerous. "Money
has entered politics, and if you criticise someone now, you are attacking
their business," the analyst says.

The localised problems of Mitrovica, or of the breakaway KLA group fighting
on the eastern border with Serbia, are therefore not the main problems
themselves but only consequences of this fundamental lack of central
authority.

Such a pessimistic view does collide with many fundamental accomplishments
of the implementation so far. Building the peace is always a long-term and
more challenging process. The refugees have returned, some basic civic
institutions (license plates on cars and even insurance!) are emerging, and
economic activity - even if mainly to serve the international circus - is
nevertheless picking up.

And the process of real Kosovo Albanian politicking has begun. The problems
are due in part to the previous decade of effective Yugoslav military
occupation, which led to underground movements and irresponsible political
posturing. 

It may not look pretty now, but the legacy will take years to overcome. In a
positive sign, at least a few voices now argue that the only way forward is
to find some kind of accommodation with Serbs, and even with alternative
political groups in Belgrade. The UN will point to the recent agreement to
disband the breakaway KLA group at Presevo - seen as a political success for
Hashim Thaci, the former KLA leader, who helped broker the deal.

Kosovo was arguably an inevitable war, which risked dragging in the entire
region. The international intervention, messy as it was, nevertheless
limited the effects and removed that risk. Yugoslavia remains a basket-case,
and conflict is very possible this year over its renegade second republic,
Montenegro. But the prospect of a regional war no longer hangs over the
southern Balkans.

This just leaves Mitrovica. The West has invested much in Kosovo, perhaps
not always very wisely. But if those soldiers on the bridge are ever to go
home, it must first, for a time, increase its authority and its expenditure
here. That time is now.

Anthony Borden is executive director of IWPR.


MAROONED IN MACEDONIA

Thousands of Romany refugees eke out a hand-to-mouth existence in Macedonia,
unwanted by the West and unable to return to their Kosovo homes

By Zeljko Bajic in Skoplje

Romany refugees in Macedonia are living on borrowed time. On March 21, the
government decided to extend their leave to remain in the country by three
months. What will happen to them after that is anyone's guess.

One young Romany, expelled by the Albanians after international peacekeepers
arrived in Kosovo, said, "We want to go home to Kosovo, and they are only
extending our stay. What has the international community done to help us
return home?"

United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) representatives are
putting increasing pressure on the Macedonian government to grant asylum to
the Romanies and the authorities are showing signs of conceding.

But the Romanies are unhappy with this alternative. They have no wish to
stay in Macedonia as they see few prospects there. They dream of emigrating
to the West, or returning home to Kosovo. But both possibilities seem
equally remote.

Macedonia is currently home to 8,500 refugees, most of them Romanies. They
have joined an existing ethnic community estimated to number between 60,000
(according to official figures) and 150,000.

The refugees flooded in from different parts of Kosovo last summer, after
being expelled by Albanian extremists. They spent the first few months
living under canvas in makeshift camps, where they were given basic
foodstuffs and primitive medical care.

Although Macedonia has a good track record for its treatment of Romanies,
some locals resent the sudden influx of refugees.

Last December, the inhabitants of Stari Dorjan, a small town on the Dorjan
Lake, joined forces to picket a children's holiday camp earmarked for Romany
refugees. The locals threw up roadblocks around the camp and defied the
authorities for several days until their demands were met.

The refugees encountered the same level of hostility from residents in
Mavrovi Anovi, a town on the slopes of Mount Mavrovo which is a popular
winter resort.

In both cases, the townspeople voiced fears that the Romanies would disrupt
the ethnic balance in the area and trigger a rise in crime and prostitution.

As a result, 230 gypsies took refuge in the Stenkovec camp, where they
endured sub-zero temperatures without warm clothes or blankets.

A total of around 2,400 Romany refugees have been housed in 10 special
centres across Macedonia -- mostly abandoned holiday camps. Most believe
that returning to Kosovo would spell certain death.

Rashid Ramadani, a refugee from Gnjilan, comments, "We can't return to
Kosovo. The Albanians would kill us. They accuse us of collaborating with
the Serbs. There may have been a few individuals who served in Serbian
paramilitary units, but you can't hold an entire people responsible for
that. We have always lived in peace with our Albanian neighbours." 

Ever since the refugees arrived in Macedonia, the government has been
insisting they return home, claiming it lacks the facilities to look after
them properly. The authorities even entered into negotiations with Belgrade
over the return of the Romanies to Serbia which, they say, has a duty to
take care of them. These initiatives, however, have since been abandoned. 

Despite daily reports of attacks on minority groups in Kosovo, Skoplje
insists that it is safe for the Romany refugees to return to the war-torn
enclave. 

In an interview last weekend with the state radio station, Minister of
Internal Affairs Dosta Dimovska said every effort should be made to persuade
the refugees that they face no real dangers by returning home.

Meanwhile, the UNHCR is encouraging the Romanies to stay in Macedonia, even
if the economically challenged republic has little enough to offer its own
subjects, let alone refugees.

Although many still dream of a fresh start in the West, no Western country
has yet shown any signs of putting out the welcome mat.

One refugee staying at the children's holiday camp on the Vodno Hill near
Skoplje said, "Journalists and aid workers come and visit us every day. Then
they leave. We are left with the same problems, with the same memories about
what happened to us. Maybe, at the very beginning, there was some desire to
help us. I don't know how long this will last but, all the same, we are
hoping for a brighter future."

While deciding to extend the refugees' leave to remain, the Macedonian
government ruled that the Romanies must vacate the holiday camps by April 1.
The decision was most likely prompted by the approach of the tourist season
and the need to free up rooms for holiday-makers.

After April 1, the UNHCR together with the ministries of employment and
town-planning will be obliged to find alternative accommodation -- probably
under canvas.

But those who have been unable to get a place in a hotel or receive help
from the Macedonian Red Cross and the UNHCR have been forced to fend for
themselves. In most cases, this means renting a room in Skoplje's Shuto
Orizari district, the only Romany enclave in Europe.

Nezdet Mustafa, Shuto Orizari mayor and leader of the United Party of Roma,
describes the settlement with pride. "This is the only Roma bastion in the
world," he says. "We have over 40,000 Romanies living here."

But, even though the settlement has recently been modernised, some areas
still lack a proper sanitation system and sewage spills across the streets.
About 80 per cent of Shuto Orizari residents are unemployed.

In some cases, as many as 10 people live in a single room. Rents -- which
range between 150 and 200 German marks a month -- are prohibitively
expensive for unemployed Romany refugees.

Surviving from day to day has become a bitter struggle. Many sell cheap
milk, peas, rice and cooking oil from humanitarian aid packages at the Shuto
Orizari market, using the income to pay their rent and buy small quantities
of fruit, vegetables and meat. Sometimes, they can stretch to cigarettes and
alcohol as well.

"We survive somehow", says one refugee. "But Macedonia remains the most
tolerant country in Europe as far as Romanies are concerned."

Zeljko Bajic is a regular contributor to IWPR


DODIK TOYS WITH MUSLIM VOTE

Republika Srpska Prime Minister, Milorad Dodik, considers appointing Muslim
ministers to break political deadlock.

By Janez Kovac in Sarajevo

The political crisis in Republika Srpska sank to new depths last week when
its assembly failed to agree on an agenda for a parliamentary session after
seven hours of heated, futile debate.

The minority care-taker government sought to play down the seriousness of
the incident, saying the session shouldn't have been called at all so close
to local elections on April 8.

But several Bosnian Serb sources say they're very concerned the
deteriorating political situation in Republika Srpska may prompt voters to
turn their backs on the pro-western coalition of Prime Minister Milorad
Dodik.

The opposition has been quick to make political capital out of the latest
crisis. President of the hard-line Serbian Democratic Party, Dragan Kalinic,
described it as "a direct assault on the only remaining legitimate
institution in Republika Srpska."

Kalinic, one of the closest allies of war-time Bosnian Serb leader and main
war crimes suspect Radovan Karadzic said the episode had opened the way for
the "final dissolution" of the assembly.

"This was the biggest attack against the parliament since its
establishment," said Vice-President of the Republika Srpska Socialist Party,
SPRS, Dragutin Ilic. Ilic accused Dodik of deliberately obstructing
parliamentary business.

Yet it was the withdrawal of the SPRS from the ruling Sloga coalition last
month that in fact precipitated the current turmoil.

The move, allegedly orchestrated by the Yugoslav President, Slobodan
Milosevic, widened the growing rift between Bosnian Serb politicians and
delivered a blow to the international community's efforts to promote
stability in the region. 
 
It's feared the political chaos could facilitate the re-emergence of the
hard-line Serbian Democratic Party, formerly led by Karadzic, in general
elections scheduled for later this year.

The SPRS exit, which left Dodik with a minority government dependent for its
survival on the support of international organisations in Bosnia, resulted
from ideological divisions within the party and the growing confidence of
its hard-liners. Its nationalist wing, led by Ilic, appears to be strongly
influenced by Milosevic. 

After the party's departure from Sloga, several senior members were
dismissed or stepped down. The move effectively divided the SPRS and
delivered a critical blow to the fragile balance of power in the Republika
Srpska assembly.

The SPRS and two other Sloga members had 28 parliamentary seats and was
reliant on the support of Bosnian Muslim and Croat parties for a
decision-making majority in the 83-seat assembly.

But Dodik's stubbornness and occasional nationalist rhetoric has
disappointed and angered his Muslim and Croat partners. As a result, over
the last few months they have given their votes to Dodik and the Sloga
coalition only when it served their interests.

After SPRS left the Sloga coalition, Dodik publicly stated that he was
prepared to appoint three Muslim officials to his government. 

The proposed move, obviously aimed at securing Dodik Muslim votes in the
parliament, was significant nonetheless. Were it to materialise, it would be
the first time non-Serbs have taken up posts in exclusively Serb
institutions since the end of the Bosnian war.  

But Dodik has made several similar promises in the past, always managing to
backtrack on them at the last moment. And he is likely to do so again. For
while only Muslim votes can break the parliamentary deadlock, he knows the
appointment of non-Serbs to government positions could cost him many
hard-line votes in the forthcoming elections. 

Janez Kovac is a regular IWPR contributor from Sarajevo

****************** VISIT IWPR ON-LINE: www.iwpr.net ******************

IWPR's network of leading correspondents in the region provides inside
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Anthony Borden <tony@iwpr.net>.

Balkan Crisis Report is supported by the Department for International
Development, European Commission, and Swedish International Development and
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from the Ford Foundation.

For further details on this project and other information services and media
programmes, visit IWPR's Website: <www.iwpr.net>.

Editor-in-chief: Anthony Borden. Managing Editor: Yigal Chazan. Associate
Editor: Gordana Igric. Assistant Editors: Christopher Bennett, Alan Davis
and Heather Milner. Kosovo Project Manager: Llazar Semini. Translation:
Alban Mitrushi and others.

The Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR) is a London-based independent
non-profit organisation supporting regional media and democratic change.

Lancaster House, 33 Islington High Street, London N1 9LH, UK Tel: (44 171)
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The opinions expressed in "Balkan Crisis Report" are those of the authors
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Copyright (C) 2000 The Institute for War & Peace Reporting 

*** VISIT IWPR ON-LINE: www.iwpr.net ***

IWPR'S BALKAN CRISIS REPORT, NO. 128

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