As a key element of his hold on power, President Milosevic until his electoral defeat effectively controlled the Serbian police, a heavily armed force of some 80,000 officers that is responsible for internal security. Having been forced to withdraw from Kosovo in 1999, the police then repressed opponents of the regime in Serbia. In addition, Milosevic ignored the constitutional role of the Supreme Defense Council, essentially establishing himself as commander in chief of the Yugoslav Army (VJ), which, along with the police, was employed in the brutal campaign against the citizens of Kosovo in 1999. Several times in the past, Milosevic had purged those officers in both the police and military who either failed to follow his orders or who directly challenged his policies in Kosovo, Serbia, or Montenegro. The security forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.

Following the war in Kosovo, international economic sanctions remained in place much of the year. The international community began to remove those sanctions after Kostunica's election. The economy inherited by the new Government suffered from continued exclusion from international financial institutions and from the damage inflicted on infrastructure during 10 years of war. Economic performance is poor due to the general inefficiency in the economy, corruption, and continued resistance to reform and privatization. Unemployment and underemployment remain high, reaching at least 60 percent, as the Milosevic Government was unable or unwilling to introduce necessary restructuring measures. The Milosevic Government also failed to implement needed sweeping economic reforms to help the economy, including privatization, due to the influence of the regime's crony system.

Under Milosevic the Government's human rights record remained extremely poor, and it continued to commit numerous serious abuses. Milosevic attempted to prevent citizens from exercising their right to change their government. The police were responsible for numerous serious abuses, including extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, brutal beatings, and arbitrary arrest and detention. Impunity for those who committed human rights abuses was a serious problem. Often, serious crimes such as murder remained uninvestigated and unsolved. The judicial system was not independent of the Government, suffered from corruption, and did not ensure fair trials. Under the Milosevic regime, there were many cases of political detainees and political prisoners. However, under Kostunica, the new Government released two prominent political prisoners--journalist Miroslav Filipovic in October and human rights activist Dr. Flora Brovina in November. In December Kostunica also pardoned opposition activist Bogoljub Arsenijevic, known as "Maki." Under the Milosevic regime, the authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Milosevic Government severely restricted freedom of speech and of the press and used overbearing police intimidation and economic pressure to control tightly the independent press and media. Most journalists continued to practice self-censorship. The Milosevic Government restricted freedom of assembly and association. Police repressed citizens who opposed the Milosevic regime and severely beat scores of democratic opposition protesters throughout Serbia, sending many to hospitals. The Milosevic Government infringed on freedom of worship by minority religions and restricted freedom of movement. The regime enacted legislation to manipulate the electoral process, most recently in the summer, when Milosevic made changes to the Constitution that allowed him to be elected by popular vote to another term as President of Yugoslavia. Milosevic banned objective international observers from monitoring the September 24 elections for Yugoslav President and attempted to falsify election results. The Federal and Serbian Governments' record of cooperation with international human rights and monitoring organizations remained poor. The Milosevic Government routinely hindered the activities of local human rights groups.

The Federal Government remained uncooperative with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). It again failed to meet its obligations under numerous U.N. Security Council Resolutions to comply fully with the Tribunal's orders, and failed to transfer or facilitate the surrender to the Tribunal of persons on its territory indicted for war crimes or other crimes against humanity under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. (These persons include Milosevic and four of his top aides, who were indicted in 1999 for their role in the Kosovo war). Violence and discrimination against women remained serious problems. Police repression and official and societal discrimination against Muslims in the Sandzak region, Roma, and other minorities persisted. The regime limited unions not affiliated with the Government in their attempts to advance worker rights. There was some child labor. Serbia is a source, transit, and destination country for trafficking in women and girls, and trafficking is a serious problem.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

a. Political and other Extrajudicial Killing

Police committed extrajudicial killings. In November the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) Minister of the Interior, Bozo Prelevic, reported that he had received evidence suggesting that the head of the Republican State Security service, Rade Markovic, was involved in the April 1998 killing of Slavko Curuvija, the publisher of an independent Belgrade tabloid newspaper and weekly news magazine (see Section 2.a.).

The number of political and extrajudicial killings increased, and there were many indications of complicity at the highest political levels. The targets of such attacks were not limited to opposition activists. Numerous deaths of persons close to the regime in the first half of the year suggested efforts on the part of the Government to consolidate its authority and remain in power. Typically no one was arrested for such killings.

The most notable politically motivated killing was that of Zeljko Raznatovic, also known as "Arkan"--a notorious paramilitary commander from the Croatian and Bosnian wars who was indicted by the ICTY. Raznatovic was killed inside Belgrade's Intercontinental Hotel in January. After his death, rumors began circulating of a falling out with the Milosevic regime. There was an official investigation into his death; however, it yielded no conclusive results.

A number of other prominent political figures were killed during the year. In view of the high level of corruption among the political elite, the precise mix of criminal and political motives for these crimes was difficult to determine. Pavle Bulatovic, the former Yugoslav Minister of Defense and a close associate of the Milosevic family, was killed while dining in a restaurant in February. Another close Milosevic associate, Zika Petrovic, the head of Yugoslav Airlines, was shot and killed in April while walking his dog near Belgrade's central police station.

Belgrade investigative judge Nebojsa Simeunovic was reported missing in early November. On December 3, police in Belgrade found his body washed up on the banks of the Sava River. Judge Simeunovic had refused to sign warrants for the arrest of DOS party leaders and striking miners during the October popular campaign to unseat Milosevic. He also was in charge of the investigation of several politically sensitive cases, including the 1997 killing of Radovan Stojicic-Bazda and the February killing of Pavle Bulatovic.

Eight Albanians taken from Kosovo by withdrawing Yugoslav forces and detained in prisons within Serbia died in detention during the year (see Section 1.c.).

In March, criminals Branislav "Dugi" Lainovic and "Bata" Vucurovic were killed in Belgrade and Vojvodina, respectively. Neither apparently was involved in politics when killed, but both played significant roles in paramilitary operations in Croatia in the early 1990's and had links to former Serbian State Security leaders.

On November 21, two Serbian police officers were killed and several were wounded in an attack by the so-called Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja, and Bujanovac (UCPMB), an offshoot of the disbanded Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). On November 27, a 10-year-old boy was killed by an antitank mine planted by the Yugoslav army as his family fled the Presevo valley region for Kosovo. These incidents escalated tensions that had been building throughout the year in the region of southeastern Serbia that borders on Kosovo and encompasses the municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja. This region is populated by both ethnic Albanians and Serbs. In November thousands of ethnic Albanians fled the region for neighboring Kosovo and Macedonia, due to fear of a buildup of Serbian police and military forces. Skirmishes between Serbian police and armed Albanian UCPMB members occurred throughout the year, resulting in the reported deaths of several Serbian police as well as some UCPMB members and a few civilians.

b. Disappearance

Police were responsible for disappearances.

The most notable disappearance was that of former Serbian President Ivan Stambolic, who disappeared while on a daily jog in a park near his home in Belgrade in August. Many observers noted that the timing of Stambolic's disappearance (only a few weeks ahead of scheduled elections), and the fact that state-run media remained largely silent on the issue, suggested complicity by the Milosevic regime and the Serbian security service. The Serbian State Prosecutor's office began an investigation into the case in late November, but it had not yielded any results at year's end.

In April Jan Svetlik, an opposition councilor from Zrenjanin, was abducted by two unknown assailants and kept outside of town for several hours during a session of the local parliament. The abduction allowed the ruling SPS to retain its parliamentary majority despite the fact that two of its own members earlier had defected to the opposition. Police failed to identify the assailants.

Federal and Serbian government authorities have not cooperated fully with efforts to account for the thousands of disappearances of individuals from Kosovo during the first 6 months of 1999, nor have they allowed the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or other international organizations access to many detention facilities. Some 5,500 persons are missing; some 700 are being detained in Serbian prisons (see Section 1.d.).

c. Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Yugoslav and Serbian law prohibits torture and other cruel forms of punishment; however, security authorities regularly and systematically used torture, beatings in detention, and other forms of abuse against citizens and members of the political opposition. The majority of cases of torture occurred before detainees were charged with offenses or during the period between the filing of charges and the commencement of the trial. Freed prisoners reported being subject to beatings with rubber batons, metal batons, and wooden bats, as well as use of electroshock, starvation, withholding of medical care, and having their hands bound tightly with plastic bands.

On May 17 and 18 in Belgrade, police beat peaceful protesters and used excessive force to disperse street protests against the Government's closing of television Studio B and Radio B2-92 (see Section 2.b.). In June police beat four persons at a police station in Zajecar after they put up opposition posters.

In July Bojan Aleksov, a human rights monitor who worked with the Safe House Project for Conscientious Objectors from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Women in Black Against War, was arrested by police in Belgrade after being removed forcibly from his car. During his 23-hour detention, Aleksov repeatedly was threatened with death and interrogated about his human rights work and his connections with the international community. The police tortured Aleksov severely, including by forcing him to stand on his toes while they beat him with a truncheon all over his body. Despite running a fever, the police denied him water for up to 5 hours and kept him awake throughout the night. On the following morning, three police officers beat Aleksov on the soles of his feet, the palms of his hands, and other parts of his body, using a baton. Aleksov finally was forced to write a 12-page confession dictated to him by an officer, which outlined his human rights work and his contacts and visits with international organizations and officials. Under threat of death, Aleksov then was forced to agree to work for the State Security Service. Finally, the police forced Aleksov to repeat parts of the signed statement on video and made him repeat his "confession" three times in order to appear convincing enough. In response to this case, Amnesty International (AI) called for an investigation and the temporary suspension of the officers suspected of beating Aleksov pending final results of that investigation. No investigation was conducted by year's end.

In early September police also beat an Otpor activist, a minor, and forced him to eat one of the movement's posters. A lawyer representing the activist was prevented from attending the interrogation and was not able to contact the activist.

In August police interrogated and beat 19-year-old Rom Sasa Mustafic and threatened his wife, Demira Gezvira, in Belgrade. Mustafic was arrested by police, accused of theft, and allegedly beaten with a stick and punched in the stomach, ribs, back, and head. On September 26, a traffic police officer reportedly beat and threatened Skender Gasi, a 27-year-old Rom from Kosovo, in Belgrade. According to local NGO reports, Gasi did not file a complaint against the officer because he feared reprisals.

In November in Vojvodina police beat and threatened a Hungarian journalist (see Section 5).

In September police detained seven Bulgarian election observers who entered Serbia despite not receiving official credentials. Police beat three of the observers, in one case causing a ruptured eardrum, and confiscated mobile telephones, money, and personal belongings.

Police beat journalists (see Section 2.a.).

There were numerous beatings of members of the political opposition by unidentified groups of men, apparently State Security agents or thugs employed by the Milosevic regime. On February 26, several men attacked and severely beat student Milos Dosen as he pasted up a poster in Belgrade that belonged to Otpor ("Resistance"), a student-led, nonviolent political movement that opposes the Milosevic regime. Despite videotape that showed the attackers and their vehicle's license plates in clear view, police did not investigate the incident.

On April 11, in Novi Sad, two unidentified men beat Radoje Cvetkov, secretary for urbanism in the Novi Sad executive council, which is controlled by an opposition party.

In June police beat a 19-year-old Otpor activist for 3 hours after they found the student movement's material in his car in Lapovo.

According to Human Rights Watch, on September 2, police beat Mile Milic, a DOS candidate for the Lajkovac municipal assembly, after arresting him for hanging DOS posters. On September 3 in Indjija, SPS activists severely beat a minor who was hanging DOS posters. AI reported that on September 4, police beat Darko Pavlovic, an Otpor activist who was arrested in Sabac while hanging DOS posters. On September 8 in Vladicin Han, police detained and beat six Otpor activists. After reportedly tying up the six activists, the police used their fists and batons to beat them on the genitals, kidneys, and heads. One activist, Aleksandar Radic, had a rope placed around his neck. Only after several hundred persons gathered in front of the police station were the activists allowed to leave and seek medical treatment. On September 15, AI reported that police beat two Otpor activists who were spraying antigovernment graffiti in Belgrade and arrested them. They both were sentenced to 10 days' imprisonment for "offenses against public peace and order." Lawyers representing the activists claimed that they were not granted access to their clients before the hearing, and were not permitted to be present while the arresting officer gave evidence.

During the election demonstrations in October, police beat some demonstrators and used tear gas to control crowds (see Section 2.b.).

Serbian Renewal Movement President Vuk Draskovic was wounded slightly after a bullet grazed his head in an attack in Montenegro in June by gunmen reportedly linked to Milosevic's regime (see Montenegro annex).

In June a crowd that emerged from the offices of the ruling Socialist Party attacked activists distributing leaflets in Barajevo.

In early March, unknown assailants damaged the car of Zarko Korac, leader of the Social Democratic Union.

Prison conditions do not meet minimum international standards. Torture and beatings were reported. There were reports that Albanians held in prisons included young children, the elderly, and persons who were blind and deaf (see Section 1.d.). Overcrowding and lack of food, medical care, and heating in winter all are problems.

A total of eight Albanians taken from Kosovo by withdrawing Yugoslav forces and detained in prisons within Serbia died in detention; two were confirmed to have died in August, reportedly one of a heart attack and one of cancer.

A series of prison riots occurred in November. The unrest began in Sremska Mitrovica and spread to prisons in Nis and Pozarevac, as well as Padinska Skela prison near Belgrade and the juvenile penitentiary in Valjevo. Prison inmates demanded an improvement in prison living conditions and an expansion of a proposed amnesty bill for Kosovar Albanian prisoners in Serbia to include other Serbian criminals. Several inmates alleged that they were victims of severe beatings in prison by guards. Prisoners also alleged that they were denied access to health care. Hundreds of ethnic Albanians were evacuated from the Pozarevac prison after they were threatened by Serbs for not joining the protests. One Serb prisoner died after falling off the roof of the Nis prison and several persons reportedly were injured during the riots. In response, the Government pledged emergency funds to improve prison conditions and on November 10, authorities released 14 Serbs and 1 ethnic Albanian from the Pozarevac prison. In exchange, inmates agreed to put down their weapons and to allow guards back in the prison.

On December 14, a military court in Nis sentenced nine Serbian military policemen and one lawyer to prison terms totaling 7 years for extorting money from Kosovar Albanian prisoners.

Although the Milosevic regime generally permitted some prison visits by human rights monitors with sporadic access often subject to the whim of local officials, access generally was poor. On several occasions, outside monitors, including representatives of the ICRC, were denied access to individuals reportedly held by Serbian police, especially draft evaders and Kosovar Albanians whom retreating security forces transferred from Kosovo after hostilities ceased. However, the ICRC had no access to or information about persons detained in military detention facilities at year's end.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

Arbitrary arrest and detention was common in Serbia under Milosevic, with such abuses aimed at opponents of the regime apparently on a daily basis.

Defense lawyers and human rights workers complained of excessive delays by Serbian authorities in filing formal charges and opening investigations. The ability of defense attorneys to challenge the legal basis of their clients' detention often was hampered further by difficulties in gaining access to detainees or acquiring copies of official indictments and decisions to remand defendants into custody. In some cases, judges prevented defense attorneys from reading the court file. Investigative judges in Serbia often delegated their responsibility for carrying out investigations to the police or members of the State Security Service and rarely questioned their accounts of the investigation--even when it was obvious that confessions were coerced from the accused. Results of such sham investigations then were used in court to convict defendants on fabricated charges.

According to the Humanitarian Law Center, at least 10 Kosovar Albanian minors were being held in the country's prisons in January. These children were among the approximately 2,000 civilians removed from Kosovo when the Yugoslav Army withdrew its forces in 1999. Serbian authorities reportedly sold dozens of these prisoners back to their families in Kosovo for prices as high as $25,000 (DM 50,000). Numerous human rights groups have documented an open-air market in northern Kosovo where lawyers purporting to represent these prisoners go to strike deals with families or friends of those imprisoned to secure their release. Despite the exchange of large sums of money, the lawyers often are never seen again. Human Rights groups also noted that in those cases where prisoners are released, the extorted "fees" were divided between the lawyers, judges, and police involved in individual cases and prisons. Human rights organizations believe that the Government still holds approximately 700 Kosovar Albanian political prisoners and detainees. The Government claims that some of these prisoners and detainees were convicted of common crimes.

Visits to political detainees were rare and often were supervised by police. Local human rights NGO's attempted to visit prisoners, with mixed results. The ICRC was able to visit many, if not all, of the approximate 700 Kosovar Albanian political detainees inside Serbia. However, it is not clear that the ICRC has been able to arrange more than an occasional visit.

Opposition politicians faced harassment by police under the Milosevic regime. On February 29, Belgrade police detained and interrogated Ivan Kovacevic, the Serbian Renewal Movement spokesman and a member of the Serbian Parliament. In March a total of 42 members of Vojvodina's League of Social Democrats were arrested in Novi Sad. They were handing out flyers asking for citizens to assemble in front of a construction site, where the regime was blocking the city's efforts to begin rebuilding a bridge destroyed during the NATO bombing campaign.

In May three members of Otpor--Momcilo Veljkovic, Radojko Lukovic, and Dusan Ignjatovic--were arrested after friends of Marko Milosevic, the President's son, beat them severely outside a cafe in Pozarevac, Milosevic's hometown. The Otpor activists claim that they were beaten after they came to the defense of another activist, Dragan Milovanovic, who was being pressured by Marko Milosevic's associates to join the Socialist Party of Serbia.

The beating set off a wave of protests, and the opposition scheduled demonstrations in Pozarevac a week later, which it ultimately was forced to cancel due to intimidation by the Milosevic regime. As a part of its effort to intimidate and prevent the demonstrations, police arrested Nenad Canak, the President of the Vojvodina League of Social Democrats, as he drove to Pozarevac. Police also arrested and interrogated dozens of others, including journalists, opposition politicians, and Otpor activists across Serbia in Nis, Novi Sad, Kragujevac and Pozarevac.

Several days later, Veljkovic and Lukovic were released by the district prosecutor Bosko Papovic, who did not find grounds to prosecute. Papovic in turn was dismissed from his post by the Government, and the activists were rearrested and served a total of 2 months in prison. The judge appointed by the Milosevic regime claimed that releasing the students earlier would "upset the public."

In June police in Leskovac arrested 10 persons, including Igor Olujic, a leading human rights lawyer with the Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Center, Dobrosav Nesic, president of the Leskovac NGO Council for Human Rights, and several opposition party activists. Those detained were protesting peacefully the arrest a few days earlier of Otpor activist Vladimir Stojkovic. During the arrest, police used excessive force against several persons, including Bojana Ristic, a representative from the Serbian Renewal Movement who also serves in the Parliament.

Also in June 20 members of Otpor were arrested in Smederevska Palanka. Police in Ivanjica detained an 11-year-old boy for waiving an Otpor flag in public. Police also questioned the boy's father about his support for Otpor. In September police arrested Otpor activist Branko Ilic in Arilje for the 10th time during the year. By the end of June, Otpor announced that since the winter, more than 1,000 of its activists had been arrested by the police.

Opposition candidates in the Sandzak region of Serbia reported that tactics of the Milosevic regime greatly interfered with campaigning. Police arrested Coalition Sandzak activists for handing out leaflets and banned opposition rallies from taking place.

As the regime intensified its crackdown, in July Yugoslav Army members arrested four Dutchmen, two British citizens, and two Canadians near Montenegro's borders with Serbia and Kosovo. All were charged with espionage. The British citizens charged that they were beaten by the police and nearly lynched by VJ soldiers. Officials of the arrestees' countries had difficulty obtaining consular access to them after their transfer to federal prison facilities in Belgrade. Following Milosevic's ouster, all were released, and the charges against all eventually were dropped (see Montenegro annex).

Federal statutes permit the police to detain criminal suspects without a warrant and hold them incommunicado for up to 3 days without charging them or granting them access to an attorney. Serbian law separately provides for a 24-hour detention period. The police often combine the two for a total 4-day detention period. After this period, police must turn over a suspect to an investigative judge, who may order a 30-day extension and, under certain legal procedures, subsequent extensions of investigative detention of up to 6 months.

Exile is not permitted legally, and there were no reports of its use.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, in practice, Federal and Serbian courts largely were controlled by the Milosevic regime and rarely challenged the will of the state security apparatus. Judicial corruption also is widespread. While judges are elected for fixed terms, they may be subjected to governmental pressure. Serbian authorities frequently deny a fair public trial to non-Serbs and persons whom they believe oppose the regime.

Since 1998 republic-level judges no longer have mandates for life and are required to seek office periodically through election. This process involves obtaining Justice Ministry approval for each judge's candidacy. Local observers fear that the provision in effect makes judges functionaries of the Government, who easily may be removed if they do not cooperate.

The court system comprises local, district, and supreme courts at the republic level, as well as a Federal Court and Federal Constitutional Court to which republic Supreme Court decisions, depending on the subject, may be appealed. There is also a military court system. According to the Federal Constitution, the Federal Constitutional Court rules on the constitutionality of laws and regulations and relies on the constituent republic authorities to enforce its rulings.

The Federal Criminal Code of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia remains in force. Considerable confusion and room for abuse remain in the legal system because the 1990 Constitution of Serbia has not yet been brought into conformity with the 1992 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Under federal law, defendants have the right to be present at their trial and to have an attorney represent them, at public expense if needed. The courts also must provide interpreters. The presiding judge decides what is read into the record of the proceedings. Either the defendant or the prosecutor has the right to appeal the verdict.

Defense lawyers, especially those representing minority clients, have filed numerous complaints about flagrant breaches of standard procedures, arguing that they undermine their clients' rights. Even when individual judges admitted that the lawyers were correct, the courts ignored or dismissed the complaints. For example, in Pozarevac, district prosecutor Bosko Papovic conceded that two Otpor activists were innocent of charges that they had conspired to kill associates of Marko Milosevic. Nevertheless, the two youth activists were imprisoned for 2 months, in May and June. Papovic, along with 15 other judges who defended his decision, subsequently was fired (see Section 1.d.).

Many legal scholars have expressed concern over the 1998 Act on Lawyers, which they believe restricts the freedom of lawyers and interferes with the independence of lawyers in their dealings with clients. They believe that the law gives too much authority to the lawyers' chambers, both at the republic and federal levels, which the Helsinki Committee alleges would enable the Government to exercise stricter control over the profession. According to a Serbian Constitutional Court judge, the law enabled the regime to interfere with the lawyer-client relationship, which even during the Communist era was upheld to a greater degree.

In June the Government debated the passage of a law against terrorism in the Serbian Parliament. With its sweeping powers, the law would have allowed police essentially to arrest anyone, including NGO and media representatives, whom they deemed to be working for the removal of the Government. The law allowed for a minimum sentence of 3 years' imprisonment in such cases. Finally, the law extended the period of detention during which police could conduct their investigation from 3 to 30 days. Although the bill was not signed into law, the threat of its passage hampered many opposition activities against the Milosevic regime.

Under Milosevic, the Government also violated norms of judicial fairness by pursuing cases previously brought against individuals and groups charged under the Yugoslav Criminal Code with jeopardizing the territorial integrity of the country and for conspiring or forming a group with intent to commit subversive activities (undermining the "constitutional order"). Most of the cases involved alleged violations under Article 136 of the Federal Penal Code related to "association to conduct enemy activity," or Article 125 concerning "terrorism." There is no clear estimate as to how many persons remain imprisoned on these specific charges.

Among the most prominent is the case of Dr. Flora Brovina who was transferred from Kosovo to a prison in Nis in July 1999. Dr. Brovina, who is known for her human rights work on behalf of women and children in Kosovo, was tried and convicted on terrorism charges and in December 1999 sentenced to 12 years' incarceration. Dr. Brovina was freed on November 1 by a special pardon from President Kostunica.

The Serbian court system convicted 143 ethnic Albanians in a mass trial in Nis in May. The men, who received sentences ranging from 7 to 13 years' imprisonment, were convicted of being members of the KLA, terrorism, and attacking police. The trial was criticized widely by human rights groups because little effort was made to establish individual, as opposed to collective, guilt. In addition, defense witnesses were not allowed to testify, and the judge reportedly admitted that there could have been "shortcomings" in the prosecution's evidence.

On July 6, six ethnic Albanians in Serbia accused of terrorism and supporting the KLA were sentenced to a total term of 46 years in prison. Human rights NGO's noted that the trial was unfair and that allegations of torture were widespread. The court failed to investigate the allegations of torture and accepted a filmed confession made while the men were in police custody, which already had been aired on Serbian State television. AI noted that this was in clear violation of the Yugoslav Code of Criminal Procedure.

A spokesperson for the Serbian Judges Association stated that as of July, 50 of its members had been forced to resign due to pressure from the regime. This followed the dismissal by the Government of 16 judges for their alleged work with the political opposition, including Djordje Rankovic and district prosecutor Bosko Papovic, who spoke out against the case of the two Otpor activists who were beaten by associates of Marko Milosevic in Pozarevac (see Section 1.d.).

Ukshin Hoti, leader of UNIKOMB, a political party that advocates Kosovo's unification with Albania, was in detention for the entire year. Hoti was in a Nis jail and was reportedly in poor health. His lawyers have been denied access to him since February 1998. Hoti was serving a 4-year sentence in a prison in Nis and was to be released on May 17, 1999. However, the Pristina-based Council for Human Rights was unable to locate Hoti as of July 1999 and there was no further information at year's end.

In December, President Kostunica pardoned opposition activist Bogoljub Arsenijevic, known as "Maki."

The Government continued to hold an estimated 700 ethnic Albanians as political prisoners. Visits to political prisoners are rare and are often supervised by police. Local human rights NGO's have attempted to visit prisoners, with mixed results. The ICRC has been able to visit many, if not all, of the Kosovar Albanian political prisoners inside Serbia.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

Under the Milosevic Government, the authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights. Federal law gives republic ministries of the interior sole control over the decision to monitor potential criminal activities, a power that is abused routinely. It is widely believed that the authorities monitor opposition and dissident activities, eavesdrop on conversations, read mail and e-mail, and wiretap telephones. Although illegal under provisions of federal and Serbian law, the federal post office registers all mail from abroad, ostensibly to protect mail carriers from charges of theft.

The law includes restrictions on searches; however, officials often ignored them. Police raided the Belgrade and Mladenovac offices of Otpor in early September without a search warrant. The previous day, police raided Otpor's Novi Sad office. They confiscated computers, several thousand T-shirts, posters, buttons, and information about the movement's activists. Despite the law, the police did not leave any notification of the items they removed from Otpor's premises. The Serbian Helsinki Committee stated that the raids violated Article 21 of the Serbian Constitution, according to which police may enter a premise with a warrant or, if no warrant is obtained, in order to "save people and property." Before the September 24 elections, as part of its crackdown on independent political activists, police also repeatedly raided the offices of CESID, a Serbian election monitoring NGO, confiscating files and computers.

A government law requiring universal military service is enforced only sporadically; it was not enforced vigorously during the year. The informal practice of the military has been not to call up ethnic Albanians. However, in Montenegro VJ troops forcibly conscripted youths during the year. Of approximately 100,000 draft evaders living abroad at the start of the year to avoid punishment, 40 percent were estimated to be ethnic Albanian. This number in part reflects the large number of conscription-age men in Yugoslavia's Albanian community. Leaders of Kosovo's Albanian and Sandzak's Muslim communities maintained that when forced compliance of these groups with universal military service did occur, it was an attempt to induce young men to flee the country. According to an amnesty bill passed in 1996, up to 12,000 young men for whom criminal prosecution for draft evasion already had started were granted amnesty. Others who did not fall into this category were told that if they returned to Yugoslavia their cases would be reviewed on a "case-by-case" basis, a policy that has not inspired confidence among offenders. A law passed in October 1998 stated that draft dodgers who did not report for military service would forfeit their right to inheritance. In many cases Yugoslav officials have refused to issue proper travel documents to children born to asylum seekers (see Section 2.d.). A new amnesty bill was pending at year's end. The proposed law would grant amnesty to draft evaders, deserters, those who refused to bear arms, and to most political prisoners convicted under Article 136 of the Penal Code (association to conduct enemy activity), but not to political prisoners convicted under Article 125 (terrorism). Many ethnic Albanian political prisoners were reportedly convicted under Article 125, but the exact number is unknown.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and the Press

Federal law provides for freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Milosevic regime severely restricted these rights in practice. The October 1998 Law on Public Information, which was used to silence the independent media during the Kosovo war, continued to be applied to journalists and members of the political opposition. The regime arrested dozens of journalists and levied the equivalent of hundreds of thousands of dollars in fines in apparent efforts to silence the independent media. The regime took over independent television and radio stations and shut down others. State-controlled media coverage was biased severely in favor of Milosevic's coalition parties, the SPS and JUL, particularly in early September. State media carried minimal coverage of opposition parties, and what was covered was cast in a negative light. The regime also severely restricted international media coverage of the September elections by denying entry visas to many foreign journalists and by placing travel restrictions within Serbia on others. In addition, during the preelection period the regime forced international news organizations to broadcast through state-controlled facilities where reports could be censored or blocked.

The Milosevic regime also cracked down on opposition politicians and politically active NGO's, particularly in the months preceding the September elections. Police arrested almost a dozen DOS candidates and raided several DOS offices. In the Sandzak region, police arrested opposition activists for handing out leaflets (see Section 1.d.). Many observers suggested that the disappearance of former Serbian President Ivan Stambolic in late August was meant to be a threatening message to SPS politicians not to stray from Milosevic's party (see Section 1.b.). Police also brought over a thousand members of the Otpor movement into police stations for questioning. Some of these interrogations resulted in beatings (see Section 1.c.).

While the media climate greatly improved after Kostunica's election victory, media independence remained a problem. Observers noted that after the DOS took control of state-owned Radio-Television Serbia, coverage leading up to the December 23 parliamentary elections strongly favored DOS candidates. Other media outlets also lack professionalism.

In March an indictment was filed against Dusan Mihajlovic, an opposition party leader; however, the case was not pursued. Mihajlovic was charged with "spreading false information and disturbance of citizens" because of remarks he made on a television news program criticizing a Milosevic speech.

In May independent journalist Miroslav Filipovic, who also worked closely with the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia and as a correspondent for the Belgrade-based daily Danas, was arrested on charges of "espionage" and "spreading false information" following a series of articles investigating Yugoslav Army abuses in Kosovo. Formal charges were not brought against Filipovic until June. A closed trial held in July was protested by human rights NGO's, as was the 7-year sentence that Filipovic received. Both the prosecution and the defense appealed the sentence. The Filipovic case attracted significant attention from many international press and human rights groups. In addition over 300 journalists from Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia signed a letter to Milosevic protesting the harsh sentence against Filipovic and demanding his release. On October 10, the Supreme Military Court in Belgrade overturned the guilty verdict against Filipovic on procedural grounds and sent the case back to court for a new trial. Kostunica pardoned Filipovic in October, and the charges against Filipovic were dropped.

The Government fined the newspaper Glas Javnosti $5,000 (300,000 dinars) under the Public Information Act, and Slavoljub Kacarevic, director and editor-in-chief of the newspaper, was fined $2,000 (120,000 dinars) for an article published on June 14. Also in June, in Leskovac a car belonging to two independent journalists was vandalized outside the police station while the two were covering protests.

In July independent publishers were forced to reduce the number of pages in their newspapers because the amount of paper supplied by the only domestic newsprint manufacturer was insufficient. The Federal Government turned down a request to import additional paper supplies even as leading Belgrade dailies Blic, Danas, and Glas Javnosti, and weeklies Vreme and NIN, used their last reserves of paper.

According to the Association of Independent Electronic Media (ANEM) network, more than 140 radio and television stations were banned inside Serbia under Milosevic, and, as of April, more than $625,000 (37.5 million dinars) in fines were imposed on independent media under the Public Information Act. Despite this repression, ANEM reported that dozens of independent radio and television stations still were broadcasting.

In mid-January, broadcasting equipment was stolen from the Belgrade television station Studio B. As a result, over 2 million viewers were unable to receive the station's signal. Although no one was ever charged with the crime, ANEM believed that the theft was in direct response to Studio B's broadcast of opposition-related programming.

In a controversial news conference in February, former Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Vojislav Seselj threatened violence against independent journalists.

In March the police attacked a technician and security guard at Studio B and confiscated transmission equipment from the premises. In addition eight print and electronic media outlets were fined for alleged violations of the Law on Public Information. Six additional independent radio and television stations were closed in March.

Foreign journalists were expelled from Serbia and denied entry visas periodically throughout the year, especially during the period prior to the September elections.

Following the beating of the three Otpor activists in Pozarevac in May, there was a wave of arrests as independent journalists publicized the assault. Studio B and the independent dailies Blic and Danas were fined for "false reporting" after they informed the public of the attack.

On May 17, police moved against four of the largest independent media outlets--Studio B, B2-92, Radio Index, and Blic-and closed down the building from which they all operated. Radio Pancevo remained the only source of independent information in the Belgrade area until later that same night when its transmission also was blocked. On May 17 and 18 in Belgrade, police beat peaceful protesters and used excessive force to disperse street protests against the Government's closing of television Studio B and Radio B2-92 (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).

In June security guards beat Hanibal Kovac, a correspondent for Radio Free Europe, in Sabac in a recreation center controlled by a member of the Serbian Radical Party. The guards reportedly told Kovac that he was "first on the list and that other reporters would get the same." Police also beat up a reporter in Novi Sad for wearing an Otpor T-shirt.

On June 2, Dusika Radulovic, owner of a small independent newspaper Borske Novine was sentenced to 3 months in prison for publishing an article that allegedly libelled members of the local government. On June 9, satirist Boban Miletic was sentenced to 5 months in prison for ridiculing Milosevic during a public reading of his latest book.

Also in June, a television crew from Radio Kraljevo was arrested along with Democratic Party officials and four Otpor activists in Kraljevo.

In August journalist Zoran Lukovic was arrested and sent to prison to serve a 5-month sentence for "spreading false information." Lukovic was convicted in March 1999 with another journalist, Srdjan Jankovic, and with Slavko Curuvija, editor of the Belgrade daily tabloid Dnevni Telegraf. Curuvija was murdered in Belgrade in April 1999, allegedly by members of Milosevic's secret service (see Section 1.a.). Lukovic was pardoned and released at the end of the year.

In August the NGO Reporters without Borders protested the Government's jamming of radio broadcasts by opposition station Radio Jasenica and the private station Radio Globus. A press release issued by the organization pointed to "a policy of increasing repression against independent media" prior to the September election. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) also highlighted media repression in the period prior to the elections.

In August five cable networks in Novi Sad stopped broadcasting news from television stations in Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia, and Hungary following a Yugoslav Information Ministry ban on broadcasting "political propaganda programs." Critics charged that the ban was an attempt to prevent 200,000 viewers in the region from having access to independent media during the September election campaign.

The Independent Journalists' Association of Serbia (NUNS) noted in August that "repression of the authorities against the media in Serbia increased in the past few months." In addition the NUNS noted in its Dossier of Repression that the Information Act "in the past few months has become an auxiliary means of carrying out repression." The NUNS confirmed ANEM's report that the independent media were charged the equivalent of hundreds of thousands of dollars in fines by the regime.

On November 27, two policemen beat Hungarian journalist Peter Aradi and threatened to kill him. Otpor reported that Aradi was taken to the police station in Senta, a town near the Hungarian border, where he was interrogated, beaten, and threatened before being released the following day (see Section 5). Also in November, three plainclothes police officers from the Serbian Interior Ministry detained Milos Antic, assistant editor of the Nedeljni Telegraf, and interrogated him for 2 hours at the police station in Belgrade. They pressured him to reveal his sources for an article he had written about Milosevic's alleged attempts to crack down on prodemocracy protesters during the October 5 demonstrations; the officers said they were acting under orders of a prosecutor preparing a case against Milosevic.

In 1998 the Parliament passed the Universities Law. It severely curtails academic freedom by allowing the Government to appoint rectors and governing boards and hire and fire deans of faculties. Deans in turn can hire and fire professors--in effect taking away tenure and promoting regime loyalists inside the universities. The law also discourages political activism among students. After October 5, the new Government reinstated all previously dismissed professors.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Federal and republic level Constitutions provide for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, under Milosevic, the Serbian and Federal Governments severely restricted this right.

In Kragujevac in February, Otpor was prevented from collecting contributions to assist the independent newspaper Nezavisna Svetlost in paying a fine levied against it under the Public Information Law.

On April 14, police stopped buses with opposition supporters traveling to rallies in Belgrade. On May 9, police stopped an opposition rally in Pozarevac by blocking opposition supporters' access to the town. On May 17 and 18, police used excessive force to disperse opposition street protests in Belgrade (see Section 1.c.). Police banned opposition rallies in the Sandzak region (see Section 1.d.).

During the election demonstrations in October, police beat some demonstrators and used tear gas.

Federal and republic level Constitutions provide for freedom of peaceful association; however, under Milosevic the Serbian and Federal Governments severely restricted this right. By the end of the summer virtually anyone wearing an Otpor T-shirt was subject to arrest or harassment by the police.

c. Freedom of Religion

The laws at both the federal and Serbian republic level provide for freedom of religion; however, under Milosevic, there were incidents of government infringement on freedom of worship by minority groups, and the legal system provided little protection for the religious rights of minority groups.

Although in the past the Milosevic regime was allied closely with and gave preferential treatment to the Serbian Orthodox Church, a split between the two widened considerably during the year. The split began with the onset of violence in Kosovo and widened with the regime's continued repression of the political opposition.

The Government repressed Muslims in the Sandzak region along the border between Serbia and Montenegro. Reports of harassment in the Sandzak region indicated that it was carried out mostly by federal Yugoslav army troops.

The Government made no progress in the restitution of property that belonged to the Jewish community, despite Milosevic's past promises to resolve the disputes. The Orthodox and Catholic Churches have had similar difficulties with the restitution of their property confiscated by the Communist regime.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

The Constitution provides for freedom of movement; however, under Milosevic, the Federal and Serbian governments restricted this right in practice. The federal government makes passports available to citizens; however, the authorities under the Milosevic Government restricted Yugoslav citizens from reentering the country. The Milosevic regime continued to restrict the right of Sandzak Muslims and ethnic Albanians from southern Serbia to travel by holding up the issuance or renewal of passports for unusually long periods of time. It also reserved the option of prosecuting individuals charged previously with violating exit visa requirements. Throughout Milosevic's rule, opposition politicians and activists routinely were harassed and arrested as they traveled in Serbia. The Government placed travel restrictions on journalists. Freedom of movement was also restricted in travel between Serbia and Montenegro because of the trade blockade imposed by Serbian authorities.

As Federal authorities had yet to repeal legislation targeting conscientious objectors and draft evaders from the war in Kosovo, many men could not travel freely throughout the country due to fear of arrest. Those conscientious objectors and draft evaders who fled Serbia could not return to the country for the same reason. Passports were denied as a matter of course to conscientious objectors and draft evaders. NGO representatives from 19 Serbian towns gathered in Montenegro in May and called for a general amnesty for conscientious objectors and draft evaders. AI and other NGO's noted that indictments continued to arrive at the homes of draft evaders and conscientious objectors. In several cases, trials against the men were conducted in absentia. After October 5, freedom of movement improved significantly. However, isolated incidents were reported late in the year of draft evaders from Montenegro stopped in Belgrade airport and sent back to Montenegro to face old charges in military courts. Draft evaders would be amnestied by a law being considered by the Federal Parliament at year's end.

Following their exodus from Kosovo, there were reports that Serb refugees were prevented from traveling to Belgrade in 1999. Reports continue to indicate that their freedom of movement is restricted, with many of them being confined to Southern Serbia.

Citizens reported difficulties at borders and the occasional confiscation of passports. Sandzak Muslims and ethnic Albanians complained of harassment at borders when reentering the country.

Yugoslav embassies overseas generally are considered to apply a double standard when issuing passports to their citizens; ethnic Serbs have a much easier time obtaining passports than members of ethnic minorities.

Many inhabitants of Serbia-Montenegro who were born in other parts of the former Yugoslavia, as well as large numbers of refugees, have not been able to establish their citizenship in Yugoslavia, leaving them in a stateless limbo. The Government suspended the processing of citizenship applications during the NATO bombing. Government officials claimed that the country's citizenship application records were destroyed in the bombing, and did not resume processing applications.

The conflicts that have occurred in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo in recent years have led to widespread displacement of persons. Under Milosevic, the Government imposed numerous restrictions on free movement into and within Yugoslavia.

Approximately half a million refugees from Bosnia and Croatia and some 220,000 more recent internally displaced persons from Kosovo, mainly Serbs and Roma, are living in the country. Unemployment among these groups is estimated at over 60 percent due to the country's poor economic climate. Up to 25 percent of the refugee population has moved more than three times since arrival in Serbia. Most Serb displaced persons from Kosovo are housed with host families; some 50,000 are in collective centers. A report by the U.S. Committee for Refugees describes collective centers for refugees as varying widely in quality and population density, ranging from "decent" to "dismal, drafty, and crowded."

There are approximately 45,000 displaced Roma in Yugoslavia. Roma faced a difficult position during the Kosovo conflict. As neither Serb nor Albanian, the Roma in Kosovo tended to adapt to the ethnic group they perceived as dominant. As a result, many of Kosovo's Roma were perceived as Serb collaborators by returning ethnic Albanians, and many fled Kosovo for other areas of Yugoslavia (see Kosovo annex). Living conditions for Roma in Serbia are extremely poor. Local municipalities are often reluctant to accept Roma, hoping that if they refuse to provide shelter or assistance, the Roma may move on (see Section 5).

The Yugoslav Government has been very slow to issue passports to refugees. This is a particular problem for parents who seek asylum. For example, Yugoslav officials in Germany refuse to issue passports to children born in Germany who have a German government document certifying their birth. When these asylum seekers who have been refused in Germany return to Yugoslavia with their children, the children travel on the basis of this document. Yugoslav authorities take the paper at the port of entry and issue a receipt for it. The children then have no documentation in a country where documentation is a basic requirement.

The U.N. Special Rapporteur for the former Yugoslavia noted in 1997 that the 1997 citizenship law would give the Ministry of Interior almost complete control over the granting of citizenship. The Government served notice that it plans to limit severely the granting of citizenship to refugees from the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia. The Government also plans to revise the eligibility status of a large number of persons; refugees who have been granted citizenship since 1992 may stand to lose their Yugoslav citizenship if they have acquired the citizenship of a former Yugoslav republic.

Observers in the Sandzak region also noted that Muslim residents who were forced to flee to Bosnia from Sandzak in 1992 and 1993 may not be permitted to return to Serbia, particularly if they obtained Bosnian passports in the interim.

The Government generally cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared persecution during the year.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens

to Change Their Government

The Federal and Serbian Constitutions provide for this right; however, in practice, under Milosevic, citizens in Serbia consistently were discouraged and often were prevented from exercising this right by the regime's domination of the mass media, control of the police, and manipulation of the electoral process. The regime persistently sought to undermine the effectiveness of the opposition leadership throughout Serbia through financial controls. In July Milosevic altered the Constitution to permit his candidacy in the September federal elections.

Throughout the summer, the Milosevic regime continuously exerted undue pressure on persons and groups attempting to peacefully change their government (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 2.a., and 2.b.). In one such instance, police in August halted the distribution of humanitarian assistance by the Leskovac Human Rights Board, an organization that encouraged citizens to participate in September's elections.

Kostunica came to power as President of Yugoslavia after mass demonstrations in early October by citizens protesting Slobodan Milosevic's attempts to manipulate the Federal Election Commission and Constitutional Court to force a second round of elections. Kostunica ran against Milosevic in the September 24 elections under the DOS Party, an 18-party alliance. Milosevic banned international observers from monitoring the elections; the opposition reported election fraud in some areas, particularly in southern Serbia and the voting in Kosovo. In Kosovo many polling stations were not opened on the September 24 election day. Although the DOS claimed victory for Kostunica, the Yugoslav Federal Election Commission claimed that neither candidate had won an outright majority and called for a second ballot. This sparked citizen protests in Belgrade and a general strike in favor of the opposition beginning on October 2, which culminated in a mass demonstration on October 5 by half a million citizens calling for Milosevic to give up power. Kostunica declared himself President of Yugoslavia that night and 2 days later Milosevic conceded electoral defeat. A federal government was formed by the DOS and the SNP (Socialist People's Party). At the Serb republic level, a three-way interim power sharing government was formed by the DOS, the SPS (Socialist Party of Serbia), and the Serbian Renewal Movement until the December 24 republic elections. Milan Milutinovic remained President of the Republic of Serbia.

There are no legal restrictions that hinder women's participation in government and politics, and women are active in political organizations; however, they are underrepresented greatly in party and government offices, holding less than 10 percent of ministerial-level positions in the Serbian and Federal Governments. Until Milosevic's defeat, his wife Mira Markovic was an exception. She was the leading force in the neo-Communist Yugoslav Left Party, through which she exerted extraordinary and disproportionate influence on policy makers, including her husband. On November 27, female political activists announced that 10 DOS parties agreed to fill at least 30 percent of the places on the party list for the Serbian parliamentary elections with female candidates.

There are no legal restrictions on the role of minorities in government and politics; however, they are underrepresented and ethnic Serbs and, to a certain extent, Montenegrins dominate the country's political leadership. Montenegro boycotted the September 23 elections. Few members of other ethnic groups play any role at the top levels of government or the state-run economy; however, Rasim Ljajic, a Sandzak Muslim leader, was appointed the Federal Minister for Minority Affairs in November. Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo refused to take part in the electoral process at the Serbian republic and federal level, including most recently in federal presidential elections in September. Serbs in Kosovo participated in the September elections, but with low voter turnout.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

The Milosevic regime routinely hindered the activities of and regularly rejected the findings of human rights groups.

A number of independent human rights organizations operate in the country, researching and gathering information on abuses, and publicizing such cases. The Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Center and the Center for Antiwar Action research human rights abuses throughout the country and, on occasion, elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. The Belgrade-based Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia publishes studies on human rights issues and cooperates with the Pristina-based Helsinki Committee in monitoring human rights abuses in Kosovo. In the Sandzak region, two committees monitor abuses against the local Muslim population and produce comprehensive reports. Most of these organizations offer advice and help to victims of abuse.

Throughout the summer, Serbian police cracked down on Belgrade's human rights NGO's, including the Helsinki Committee, the Center for Anti-War Action, and Women in Black Against War. Each organization reports that it was visited and harassed by police in an effort to intimidate the NGO's and document their sources of international support. In June police closed the offices of Women in Black Against War. In a related move, the premises of the Forum for Ethnic Relations also were shut and sealed.

In August the Yugoslav Army announced that it would bring charges against Natasa Kandic, the head of the Humanitarian Law Center. The Yugoslav Army's Information Service alleged that Kandic breached the Law on Information when she published the article "I Will Not Keep Quiet About Horrors" in the independent newspaper Danas. Kandic published a defiant response to the army. The VJ did not initiate charges against Kandic, and threats and harassment against her stopped after October 5.

Citing "political activities," police in Leskovac removed the Human Rights Protection Committee from the register of social organizations and citizens' associations in the southern Serbian town in August. At the same time, criminal charges were filed against the director of the organization for the improper receipt of money.

With some exceptions, the Milosevic Government's Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs systematically denied visas to international nongovernmental human rights organizations.

In 1999 as a result of their actions in Kosovo, the ICTY formally indicted as war criminals former President Milosevic and four other senior officials, including Serbian President Milan Milutinovic, Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic, Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army Dragoljub Ojdanic, and Serbian Minister of Internal Affairs Vlajko Stojiljkovic. President Kostunica has made public statements that he opposes the extradition of any indictees to the ICTY.

On December 11, a court in Uzice convicted and sentenced nine men for "kidnaping" indicted Bosnian Serb war criminal Stevan Todorovic and handing him over to NATO forces in Bosnia in September 1998. On December 13 in the Hague, Todorovic pled guilty to ethnic cleansing.

Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language, or Social Status

While federal and republic-level laws provide for equal rights for all citizens, regardless of ethnic group, religion, language, or social status, and prohibit discrimination against women, in practice the legal system provides little protection to such groups.

Women

Violence against women is a problem and the traditionally high level of domestic violence persisted. The few official agencies dedicated to coping with family violence have inadequate resources and are limited in their activity by social pressure to keep families together at all costs. Few victims of spousal abuse ever file complaints with the authorities. There is no trained police unit to provide protection or assistance to female victims of sexual or other violence. The Center for Autonomous Women's Rights in Belgrade offers a rape and spousal abuse hot line, as well as sponsors a number of self-help groups. The Center also offered help to refugee women (mostly Serb), many of whom experienced extreme abuse or rape during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. The Criminal Code does not recognize spousal rape as a criminal offense; rape is defined as forced sexual intercourse between a man and a woman who are not married.

The country served as a source, transit, and destination point for trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).

Women do not enjoy status equal to men, and relatively few women obtain upper level management positions in commerce. Traditional patriarchal ideas of gender roles, which hold that women should be subservient to the male members of their family, long have subjected women to discrimination. In some rural areas, particularly among minority communities, women are little more than serfs without the ability to exercise their right to control property and children. Women legally are entitled to equal pay for equal work; however, according to the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, women's average wage is 11 percent lower than the average wage of men. Women are granted maternity leave for 1 year, with an additional 6 months available. Women are active in political and human rights organizations. Women's rights groups continue to operate with little or no official acknowledgement.

Children

The State attempts to meet the health and educational needs of children. The educational system provides 8 years of mandatory schooling. However, economic distress has affected children adversely in both the education and health care systems.

Prior to the conflict in Kosovo, the division of Kosovo into unofficial parallel Serb and Albanian administrative systems resulted in Serb and ethnic Albanian elementary age children being taught in separate areas of divided schools, or attending classes in private shifts. Older ethnic Albanian children were attending school in private homes. The quality of education thus was uneven before the conflict started, and the tension and division of society in general was replicated to the detriment of the children (see Kosovo annex).

There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.

The country served as a source, transit, and destination point for trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).

People with Disabilities

Facilities for persons with disabilities are inadequate and the Government did not make any efforts during the year to address the problem. The law prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, or in the provision of other state services. The law mandates access to new official buildings, and the Government enforces these provisions in practice.

Religious Minorities

Religion and ethnicity are so closely intertwined as to be inseparable. Incidents of discrimination against, and harassment of, religious minorities continued, especially in Serbian Sandzak.

The Keston Institute reported that on September 26, a group of 13 young men attacked 2 Romani women and one Romani man, all members of a Romani Pentecostal church in Leskovac, with sticks, bats, and chains. The attack took place 2 days after three young men interrupted the church's evening services and threatened the congregation, throwing firecrackers and shouting that they would force the Roma to leave town. The church reported the incidents to the local police, who advised them to file charges against the men. As of November 24, the attackers had not been found, but no further incidents had occurred.

Societal violence against the Catholic minority in Vojvodina, largely consisting of ethnic Hungarians and Croats, was reported. In addition, Catholic churches frequented by the Croat minority were attacked, although there were few reports of this type of activity during the year.

National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

Ethnic Albanian leaders in the cities of Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja in southeastern Serbia complained of discrimination by Serbian authorities. Very few ethnic Albanians are employed by municipal governments in the region. In part, the problem is due to the refusal of Serbian authorities to recognize the credentials of ethnic Albanians who completed their higher education in Kosovo under the post-1989 parallel system.

There were incidents of official discrimination against the Romani population and skinheads and police occasionally violently attacked Roma (see Section 1.c.). The European Roma Rights Center reported that a group of skinheads attacked two 15-year-old Romani boys in Vranje on April 29. The boys were punched and beaten with baseball bats; one boy reported two broken ribs. In Nis a group of skinheads beat a 15-year-old Rom. Two of the attackers eventually were fined $10 (600 dinars). In May a 13-year-old Romani girl was attacked by a group of her fellow students and several skinheads with a knife. After the incident, police interrogated the girl and threatened to arrest her parents if she did not admit she was lying. In August several Romani families in Belgrade reported that skinheads repeatedly throw rocks at their houses, often breaking windows, shout racist insults, and threaten to set Romani houses on fire.

Roma have the right to vote, and there are two small Romani parties in Serbia. One of the four deputy mayors In Kragujevac is a Rom. However, prejudice against Roma is widespread. For example, in Sabac, in western Serbia, Roma are barred from using a municipal swimming pool that is owned by the president of the local branch of the Serbian Radical Party. According to Human Rights Watch, on June 7, police leveled Roma homes in Belgrade, alleging that they were built in breach of zoning laws; police made racial insults and slapped and kicked some of the Roma who were forced out of their homes. Local authorities often ignore or condone societal intimidation of the Romani community.

In Vojvodina in November police beat and threatened Hungarian journalist Peter Aradi. Otpor reported that police dragged Aradi from a table in a pizzeria where he was dining, threw him to the floor, and placed a gun barrel in his mouth. He then was taken to the police station and beaten. Before Aradi was released, the police reportedly forced him to kneel, hold a Bible, and "say something in Serbian."

Section 6 Worker Rights

a. The Right of Association

All workers except military and police personnel have the legal right to join or form unions. Unions are either official (government affiliated) or independent. The total labor force is approximately 2.3 million persons. The government-controlled Alliance of Independent Labor Unions (Samostalni Sindikati, or SSS) claims 1.8 million members but probably numbers closer to 1 million in reality. The largest independent union is the United Branch Independent Labor Unions (Nezavisnost), which has about 170,000 members. The third largest union is the Association of Free and Independent Trade Unions (AFITU), which has about 50,000 members. Most other independent unions are sector specific, for example, the Independent Union of Bank Employees (12,000 members). Due to the poor state of the economy, over one-half of union workers are on long-term mandatory leave from their firms pending increases in production. The independent unions, while active in recruiting new members, have not yet reached the size needed to mount countrywide strikes. The independent unions also claim that the Milosevic regime prevented effective recruiting through a number of tactics, which included preventing the busing of workers to strikes, threatening the job security of members, and failing to grant visas to foreign visitors who support independent unions.

The largely splintered approach of the independent unions has resulted in few achievements in terms of increased wages or improved working conditions. The Nezavisnost union gained new members as a result of its well-organized and tough bargaining positions during strikes of teachers and health workers in 1998 but has not led any strikes since then; it has focused instead on political action campaigns aimed at raising workers' political awareness. The official union lost credibility with some of its members because it ultimately accommodated the Milosevic regime's position on these strikes.

The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions' 2000 Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights alleges that Serbia's labor laws still favor the official trade union and heavily restrict the right to strike. The report also alleges that the independent union Nezavisnost continued to face discrimination.

The ability of unions to affiliate internationally remains constrained.

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

While this right is provided for under law, collective bargaining remains at a rudimentary level of development. Individual unions continue to be very narrow in their aims, unable to join with unions in other sectors to bargain for common purposes. The history of trade unionism in the country has centered not on bargaining for the collective needs of all workers but rather for the specific needs of a given group of workers. Thus, coal workers, teachers, health workers, and electric power industry employees have been ineffective in finding common denominators (e.g., job security protection, minimum safety standards, universal workers' benefits, etc.) on which to negotiate. The overall result is a highly fragmented labor structure composed of workers who relate to the needs of their individual union but rarely to those of other workers. Additionally, job security fears, which stem from the high rate of unemployment, limited workers' militancy.

There are no export processing zones.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

Forced labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited by law and generally is not known to occur; however, the country served as a source, transit, and destination point for trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).

d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment

The minimum age for employment is 16 years, although in villages and farming communities it is not unusual to find younger children at work assisting their families. Moreover, children can be found in a variety of unofficial "retail" jobs, typically washing car windows or selling small items such as cigarettes, although this practice apparently is somewhat less widespread, since adults lacking other options for employment have taken many of these jobs. With an actual unemployment rate (registered unemployed plus redundant workers who show up at the workplace but perform only minimal work) in excess of 60 percent, real employment opportunities for children in the formal sector are nonexistent. Forced and bonded labor by children is prohibited by law and generally is not known to occur, apart from girls who are trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

Large government enterprises, including all the major banks, industrial, and trading companies generally observe minimum wage standards. The monthly minimum wage is approximately $15 (900 dinars). However, this figure is roughly comparable to unemployment benefits and (at least theoretically) is paid to workers who have been placed in a mandatory leave status. The actual minimum wage is at the low end of the range of average net salaries, $50 (3,000 dinars) per month. The minimum wage is insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. The cost of food and utilities alone for a family of four is estimated to be $120 (7,200 dinars) per month. According to one report, workers' salaries fell 34 percent during the year. Private enterprises use the minimum wage as a guide but tend to pay somewhat higher average wages.

Reports of sweatshops operating in the country are rare, although some privately owned textile factories operate under very poor conditions. The official workweek, listed as 40 hours, had little meaning in an economy with massive underemployment and unemployment.

Neither employers nor employees tended to give high priority to the enforcement of established occupational safety and health regulations, focusing their efforts instead on economic survival. In light of the competition for employment and the high degree of government control over the economy, workers are not free to leave hazardous work situations without risking the loss of their employment.

f. Trafficking in Persons

The law does not prohibit specifically trafficking in persons, and trafficking is a problem. There are laws that could be used to prosecute traffickers although the Milosevic regime showed little interest in addressing the problem. There continues to be little information available on trafficking, although Serbia is a source, transit, and destination country for women and girls trafficked to other parts of Europe for forced prostitution. There were no reports of individuals prosecuted for trafficking.

Belgrade is a transit point, and to a lesser extent, a destination point, for trafficking in women and girls. Reportedly women from Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Bulgaria, and Romania are trafficked to and through the country. There were also reports that women were trafficked through the country to Bosnia-Herzegovina, where they either stayed and were forced to work as prostitutes or were trafficked to other countries. Women are trafficked to Italy, Greece, Germany, the Netherlands, France, and other Western European countries. Women trafficked to Italy often are sent through Montenegro (see Montenegro annex).

Women often are recruited to work abroad through advertisements for escort services, waitresses, and personal advertisements for marriage offers or lonely hearts columns, and then forced into prostitution. Federal legislation allows escort agencies to be registered and advertise; many of these agencies are involved in trafficking.

There are no statistics available for children trafficked to other countries; however, the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights reports that children, mostly Roma, are kidnaped and used for prostitution, begging, and stealing.

There are no Government trafficking prevention programs or services for victims. A very small number of NGO's deal with trafficking issues. Awareness of human trafficking is low; however, the problem received some media attention.

KOSOVO

Kosovo continued to be administered under the civil authority of the United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244. This resolution recognized the continuing sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia) over Kosovo but also called for "substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration." UNMIK began to establish a civil administration in June 1999, following the conclusion of the NATO military campaign that forced the withdrawal of Yugoslav military, police, and paramilitary forces from the province. The chief administrator of UNMIK during the year was the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), Dr. Bernard Kouchner. Within UNMIK the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was made responsible for institution building, democratization, and human rights. To provide for greater Kosovar inclusion in civil administration and to circumvent the risk of quasigovernmental or "shadow" governmental entities, in February UNMIK established the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS). Under the direction of the SRSG and his designated representatives, international and local experts shared policy and advisory responsibility for providing social services and collecting revenues. On October 28, UNMIK conducted elections throughout Kosovo for members of municipal assemblies with wide participation by both political parties and voters other than Serbs. Serbs, citing security concerns and a lack of freedom of movement, declined to register and boycotted the elections. Although there were some logistical problems and voting irregularities, the elections were held without significant violence or obstacles. Election observers concluded that they were carried out in accordance with international democratic standards and met the criteria for credible elections. The elected municipal assemblies were sworn in and took their seats in November; the SRSG appointed members of municipal assemblies in three Serb-majority municipalities where there was no election, and these took their seats in December. UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 established that applicable law in Kosovo would include UNMIK regulations and those laws in effect in Kosovo as of March 22, 1989, the code in effect before the regime of Slobodan Milosevic abolished the political autonomy of Kosovo. This created a complex and in some cases incomplete set of codes. UNMIK issued a series of interim regulations to address the civil and legal responsibilities of governmental entities and private individuals. UNMIK regulations bound all public officials, including judges, to respect international human rights law. The law provides for an independent judiciary; however, the legacy of ethnic conflict and Yugoslav oppression was an obstacle to judicial independence, and some judges and prosecutors reportedly were subject to outside pressure, particularly in cases involving ethnic disputes.

The U.N.-authorized, NATO-led peacekeeping force for Kosovo (Kosovo Force, or KFOR), which included forces from all 19 NATO countries and over 20 non-NATO members, maintained internal security and defense against external threats. KFOR also assisted UNMIK's multinational civilian police corps (U.N. International Police, or CIVPOL) in its role as uniformed and criminal police. Of 4,718 regular, border, and special police positions authorized for Kosovo, contributing countries deployed about 4,000. The OSCE-run Kosovo Police Academy trained over 3,000 local police officers for the newly established Kosovo Police Service (KPS). The KPS partnered with CIVPOL in field training. CIVPOL later began to transfer basic policing functions to KPS in some areas, while continuing to provide oversight. Several hundred additional KPS recruits continued training, and the OSCE was on schedule to have over 4,000 KPS trained by the spring of 2001. The Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), a civilian emergency preparedness service agency that incorporated disarmed former fighters of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), began training to respond to civil and medical emergencies. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) coordinated several dozen humanitarian projects for the KPC, often in collaboration with nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). Some members of KFOR, CIVPOL, and the KPC occasionally committed abuses.

A long history of mismanagement by Yugoslav Federal and Serbian authorities left the economy in poor condition even before armed conflict resulted in the massive destruction of property and economic enterprises. Key industries before the conflict were mining, metallurgy, and related manufacturing enterprise. The prewar economy also had a substantial agrarian sector. Unemployment among the predominantly ethnic Albanian population was estimated at 62 percent. Unemployment rates were much higher among Serb and other minority communities, although some Serbs continued to receive stipends or pensions from Yugoslavia. International organizations and donors continued their programs to improve the infrastructure and provide a regulatory climate conducive to enterprise and investment. About 70 percent of small and medium-sized private enterprises restarted activities. However, the instability of the region, coupled with the destruction of property records and a still weak legal and regulatory framework, caused private capital investment to lag. The privatization of state enterprises stalled pending the resolution of significant property issues. Domestic energy generation capacity was about 50 percent of demand, and energy import arrangements remained uncertain. Remittances from relatives abroad and foreign aid were important sources of national income. Significant criminal economic activity took place, especially in the fuel sector. International financial institutions estimated gross domestic product at less than $400 per capita.

UNMIK generally adhered to international human rights standards in its administration of the province; however, serious problems remained, largely as a result of ongoing interethnic tensions. A few killings resulted from attacks that appeared to be politically motivated. Citizens continued to be killed by landmines planted by combatants during the 1999 conflict. Some kidnapings and disappearances continued. Approximately 3,600 persons also were missing and unaccounted for as a result of the armed conflict in 1999, including approximately 2,750 Albanians, 500 Serbs, and 300 members of other ethnic groups. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) exhumed 3,620 remains in 1999 and 2000, of which about 1,260 remains were still unidentified. There were some reports of the excessive use of force by KFOR and CIVPOL during arrests. Early in the year some KPC members were accused of committing incidents of intimidation and extortion. In the course of carrying out their law and order enforcement functions, KFOR and CIVPOL at times used arbitrary arrest and detention, and lengthy pretrial detention remained a problem. The judiciary was subject to bias and outside influence, particularly in interethnic cases, and did not always ensure due process. Some newspapers engaged in hate speech or printed articles providing personal details of alleged war criminals or collaborators. After some of those individuals were attacked, UNMIK issued a temporary regulation that prohibited articles that might encourage criminal activity or violence. Some observers in both the local and international media criticized this regulation as an infringement of freedom of the press. In order to prevent the potential for large, unruly gatherings, UNMIK occasionally limited freedom of assembly. There were some limits on freedom of movement. Over 150,000 Kosovar Albanians returned to the province during the year; only a few ethnic Serbs and other minorities returned. Rape, violence, and discrimination against women remained serious problems. Religious tension and violence continued. Ethnic Albanians destroyed approximately 20 Serbian Orthodox churches during the year, with a total of 100 destroyed since June 1999 in retaliation for Yugoslav troops' earlier destruction of mosques. Societal violence against ethnic Serbs, Roma, and other minorities was widespread, but decreased somewhat during the year. A total of 245 civilians were killed and 522 cases of arson were reported during the year. Most murders of minorities were rooted in ethnic retaliation; other killings more often were connected to criminal enterprise, political factionalism, and private feuds. Societal discrimination continued to target Roma, in retaliation for the group's alleged collusion with Serbs in the period before and during the NATO bombing campaign. The approximately 100,000 Serbs who remained in Kosovo live primarily in the north or in enclaves under the protection of KFOR. While a few Serbs and other minorities who left Kosovo in 1999 came back, security conditions did not permit large-scale organized returns. Worker rights are not developed fully, and child labor persists. Trafficking in women and girls to and through the province was a serious problem.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:

a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

KFOR forces killed several individuals during operations. UNMIK and military authorities investigated these killings, but found no circumstances in which those responsible had acted improperly. On February 15, snipers wounded two KFOR soldiers. The soldiers responded by killing an Albanian and wounding at least four persons whom they said were firing at them from the rooftops. More than 35 other Albanians were detained on suspicion of involvement in the sniping. In August KFOR troops killed two Albanian males, claiming self-defense; some reports suggested that the two Albanians were shot in the back, and KFOR relieved at least one soldier of his duties pending investigation. On December 17, in Leposavic (Leposaviq) [2], two Serbs were killed and one wounded after rioters protesting the arrest of a Serb man for the attempted murder of a KPS officer surrounded a U.N. police station guarded by KFOR soldiers and took seven KFOR soldiers hostage. One Serb was killed by gunfire; a KFOR commander reported that soldiers had fired warning shots that may have ricocheted and hit a protester. The other Serb died of a heart attack.

In January authorities accused a KFOR soldier, Sergeant Frank Ronghi, of raping and killing a 12-year old Albanian girl. A military tribunal subsequently convicted Ronghi and sentenced him to life in prison.

In July 1999, KFOR arrested three members of a Kosovo Serb family for shooting and killing an Albanian man and wounding a second. In July the court trying the case heard credible evidence from KFOR that KFOR snipers were responsible for the shootings when called to the scene of an altercation (see Section 1.d.).

Several killings appeared to be politically motivated. Some killings and attacks apparently were related to the October municipal elections. The majority of reported political intimidation attempts, which included drive-by shootings, kidnaping, and arson, were said to be aimed at representatives of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), led by Ibrahim Rugova, although other political parties subsequently reported nonlethal attacks as well. The LDK's rival, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) led by Hashim Thaci, the former head of the KLA, often was cited as being behind the attacks, although nonpolitical motives including clan rivalry, criminality, and competition for economic resources also were suspected in some cases. UNMIK police rarely were able identify perpetrators. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that on June 15, two men wearing KLA badges killed senior LDK politician Alil Dreshaj. On August 4, the burned body of Shaban Manaj, an LDK politician and lawyer from Istok (Istog), was discovered following his disappearance 2 weeks earlier. On November 23, Xhemail Mustafa, cofounder of the LDK and President Rugova's press adviser was killed by unknown gunmen in the stairwell of his apartment building in Pristina. No arrests had been made by year's end. Attacks against LDK functionaries occurred in most other regions of the province as well.

Unknown assailants killed two former KLA officers in April and May, respectively, shooting Besim Mala, also known as "Commander Murrizi," in the streets of Pristina, and Ekrem Rexha, also known as "Drini," in Prizren. UNMIK police attributed their killings to business disputes, rather than political motives. On July 12, a supporter of Ramush Haradinaj, a politician and former senior KLA commander, was murdered. On September 20, police found the body of Skender Gashi, a KPC officer and former KLA commander, in Orahovac (Rahovec); he had disappeared 2 days earlier. Local speculation included political, ethnic, and criminal motives for these killings, while the police attributed the murders to personal disputes.

Unknown assailants killed one journalist, Shefki Popova, in September in Vucitrn (Vushtrri) (see Section 2.a.). Popova was listed as a Social Democratic Party candidate in Vucitrn (Vushtrri)'s municipal elections.

The number of killings in the province decreased from the total recorded up to June 1999, when Yugoslav armed forces and Serbian police withdrew from the province, and also from the total recorded in the second half of 1999, about 400 killings. According to available figures, there were 245 murders during the year, including 146 Albanians, 55 Serbs, 9 Bosniaks, 12 Roma, and 23 of unknown or "other" category, including 2 KFOR soldiers. U.N. police made arrests in only 2 to 3 percent of murder cases. Most murders of Serbs and other minorities were ethnically motivated (see Section 5), but the majority of murders of Albanians apparently were connected to family and economic rivalries and criminal activities.

On February 29 in Srbica (Skenderaj), a Kosovar Albanian, Faton Hajrizi, killed a KFOR soldier. Hajrizi was arrested for the killing a number of times during the year and escaped from prison. He was rearrested in December and remained in custody at year's end. A second KFOR soldier was found dead, a presumed homicide, at the end of April; no perpetrator has been identified.

Rexhep Luci, Pristina's director of urban planning, was killed in September. Kosovars and outside observers attributed the killing to Luci's role in heading up UNMIK's program to tear down illegal construction. Local commentators expressed grave concern that the killing would hinder efforts by Kosovar officials to establish civil order.

On November 22, an explosion at the Pristina residence of Stanimir Vukicevic, the Yugoslav representative in Kosovo, killed one man and injured three others. The attack apparently was intended to protest the participation of Kosovo in the December Serbian parliamentary elections.

In December 1999, an ethnic Albanian former judge was killed. He had worked in the Serbian judicial system.

The International Crisis Group reported that in November 1999, five persons were abducted and killed by persons claiming either to be members of the Provisional KPC or the Policia Ushtarake, the KLA's military police, which was outlawed by UNMIK. Their bodies were found around the KLA compound in Lukare, north of Pristina. Four were identified; three as Roma, one as an Albanian woman. All four had been accused locally of having "collaborated" with Serb forces.

Although there was credible evidence of Yugoslav agents and special forces teams in Kosovo, there were no confirmed reports of killings by Yugoslav or official Serbian forces inside the province.

Some Kosovar Serbs continued efforts begun in 1999 to expel Albanians and other ethnic groups from the northern part of Mitrovica. In February, during an increase in violence in that city, groups of Serbs, reportedly including Serbian police, attacked ethnic Albanians on several occasions, killing eight civilians. The attacks were viewed as retaliation for a grenade attack on a U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) bus that killed two Serbs traveling from Mitrovica. During the month of February, over 1,500 Albanians, Muslim Slavs, and Turks fled their homes in the north side of the city, and Serbs withdrew from southern Mitrovica, where they were a minority (see Section 5).

As a result of the 1999 armed conflict, certain rural areas of the province were filled with unexploded landmines and ordnance. Landmines and ordnance explosions killed 93 persons from June 1999 to April and injured more than 300. The U.N. Mine Action Coordination Center (MACC) in Pristina accredited 16 international demining organizations in Kosovo. Well over 1,000 persons were involved in the demining effort in the province, clearing 8,980 mines, 4,932 cluster bomb units, and 5,774 other ordnance. KFOR and MACC cleared over 16,000 houses, 1,165 schools, 1,056 miles of roads, and 124 miles of rail tracks. International organizations and NGO's undertook a widespread public education campaign on mines.

Virtually no town or settlement escaped the effects of the Milosevic regime's campaign of ethnic cleansing in 1999, with reports of dozens, sometimes hundreds, of civilians murdered in each town. Kosovo's still fragile investigative, judicial, and penal systems, in addition to ICTY, worked to ensure that perpetrators were identified and punished. Beginning in mid-1999, the ICTY began its program inside Kosovo, and carried out investigations in support of ongoing and future proceedings against presumed war criminals, including exhuming mass graves to permit the identification of victims of the war and ethnic cleansing. By year's end, the ICTY completed the exhumation of remains, begun in 1999, of some 529 graves, uncovering for identification the remains of 3,600 persons over the 2-season exhumation period. In May UNMIK issued a regulation establishing the Victim Recovery and Identification Commission (VRIC), primarily charged with identification of remains. Working with families on the basis of information they provided, details of the events, and the recovery of clothing and personal effects, the VRIC was able to positively identify victims. The remains of about 1,400 victims were unidentified at year's end.

UNMIK suspended efforts to create a local Kosovo War and Ethnic Crimes Court due to lack of funding, concern over the scope of its mandate, and possible redundancy in view of the presence of international judges.

Proceedings began in the Kosovo courts to adjudicate about 40 cases of alleged war crimes and genocide arising from the conflict, as well as murder cases dating from the period starting in June 1999. Of these, one war crimes case was decided on September 20, with the conviction in Gnjilane (Gjilan) of Kosovar Serb Milos Jokic for murder, attempted murder, and rape. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison.

b. Disappearance

Individual disappearances and kidnapings continued. In June an angry crowd of Serbs attacked UNMIK offices in Strpce (Shterpce) over the disappearance of a Serb shepherd. Marjan Melonasi, a journalist for Radio-Television Kosova who was half Serbian, disappeared in Pristina around September 9 (see Section 2.a.). Human rights organizations and police confirmed the kidnaping or disappearance of several young women each month. Most but not all of these victims reportedly eventually reappeared or were found, many after they were raped.

As a result of the 1999 armed conflict, and despite the efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the ICTY, and other local and international organizations, the fate of over 3,600 persons (2,750 Albanians presumed taken by Serbs, 500 Serbs presumed taken by Albanians, and 300 members of other ethnic groups) remained unknown at year's end. Withdrawing Yugoslav forces also took more than 2,000 Albanian detainees with them into Serbia; Serbian authorities released over 1,300 by year's end, reputedly after payment to Serb middlemen by detainees' families in most cases.

Both the ICTY and the VRIC, assisted by other international governmental and nongovernmental entities, continued their work to identify bodies exhumed from mass gravesites (see Section 1.a.). ICTY and other international experts did not expect to find many new mass graves. A clear gap continued between the 1,260 unidentified remains and the 3,600 persons reported to the ICRC as missing and unaccounted for at year's end. Efforts by governments, international organizations, and NGO's to determine the fate of these missing persons, including through pressure on Yugoslavia, did not lead to any results.

In August the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights named a Special Envoy for Persons Deprived of Liberty in Connection with the Armed Conflict in Kosovo. In September the SRSG announced the establishment of an office in Pristina for detainees and missing persons.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The law prohibits torture and other cruel forms of punishment, and CIVPOL and KFOR largely respected the law in practice; however, there were sporadic reports of the use of excessive force during arrests and other abuses. Military authorities reported in September that nine members of a KFOR unit, including four officers, were disciplined following an investigation into allegations of excessive force, beating of suspects, and sexual assault on women at checkpoints and while on patrol. KFOR used tear gas to disperse a peaceful demonstration in Mitrovica (see Section 2.b.).

Some reports suggested that KPC members were responsible for incidents of intimidation and extortion, and in several zones such misconduct may have been organized and condoned by the local KPC leadership. In response UNMIK and KFOR put into place a KPC disciplinary code and a compliance enforcement framework, which assigned responsibility for investigating and disciplining KPC compliance violations and criminal actions. At KFOR's insistence, all six KPC zone commanders were rotated in October. By the end of the year, documented instances of KPC non-compliance had decreased significantly.

International organizations reported that in the first half of 1999, Serb forces subjected ethnic Albanian women to illegal confinement, rape and other forms of torture. ICTY has ruled that the definition of war crimes includes the Serb use of rape and sexual assault against ethnic Albanians. Kidnapings and mass rapes occurred in Djakovica (Gjakova), Pec (Peja), and Drenica, using local hotels and army camps as mass rape sites, and gang rapes of women occurred in their homes or on the side of the road. Assailants killed male family members who tried to intervene and women who tried to escape. According to credible information, individual KLA soldiers and other Albanians raped Serb and Roma women in the months following Yugoslavia's withdrawal in 1999. Since then, police have registered over 95 individual rape and attempted rape complaints, but there has been no strong ethnic pattern, nor evidence to suggest organized sexual abuse of minority women. However, rape is underreported significantly due to the cultural stigma attached to victims and their families (see Section 5).

Numerous attacks on political figures, particularly members of the LDK, were reported, both before and after the October municipal elections (see Section 3). In most cases, no suspects were found; however, local observers blamed many of these attacks on the rival PDK party and former KLA fighters. Nonpolitical motives including clan rivalry, criminality, and competition for economic resources also were suspected in some cases.

In early December, unknown assailants attempted to kill Hajvas Berisha, a former commander of the KLA and a KPS member, in Pristina. UNMIK arrested three of the alleged assailants; however, because the case involved a family blood feud, no charges were filed against the assailants because the case was settled out of court through traditional Albanian feud mediation methods.

KFOR arrested a group of Serbs in Gracanica in September in possession of a large cache of explosives and arms. The Serbs reportedly were planning terrorist acts against UNMIK and other international entities. Two were reportedly officers of a special forces unit of the Yugoslav Army (VJ).

There were some reports of attacks and intimidation of UNMIK and KFOR officials. In February, a KFOR soldier was shot by unknown assailants while escorting Serb children from school in Gnjilane (Gjilan), apparently in retribution for the killing of two Albanian males by KFOR soldiers earlier in the year. On September 12, Vjosa Dobruna, the Kosovar co-chair of the Department of Civil Society and Democratic Governance, reported that her car was broken into and moved from its parking place; nothing was missing or stolen. On December 7, Serbs beat a U.N. policeman during an inspection of suspected weapons caches in northern Mitrovica. On December 19, unknown persons attacked the UNMIK building in Zubin Potok with automatic gunfire and grenades.

Prison conditions meet prisoners' basic needs of food, sanitation, and access to medical care; however, facilities are in need of further refurbishment and repair. Some facilities are overcrowded. UNMIK established the Kosovo Correction Service (KCS), and the OSCE provided training for over 400 of a planned force of 700-plus corrections officers. The KCS, which included international corrections experts as interim administrators, operated 3 prisons in Prizren (with a capacity 100 inmates), Dubrava (with a capacity of 520), and Lipljan (Lipjan). The latter is to be restricted to women and juveniles and eventually after further renovation is to offer space for mentally disturbed prisoners and detainees after further renovation. CIVPOL and KFOR operated four additional detention centers in Pristina, Mitrovica, Pec (Peja), and Gnjilane (Gjilan). KFOR also held detainees accused of war crimes and serious ethnic offenses at Camp Bondsteel, but planned to turn over all detention responsibilities to the KCS by early 2001. In the absence of currently suitable detention facilities for mentally disturbed prisoners, police released a visibly disturbed female detainee from the Mitrovica detention center on August 22; she reportedly committed suicide 3 days later.

Male and female prisoners are separated, and there is a separate facility in Lipljan (Lipjan) for females and juveniles, but there have been cases of older youths who have been held with the general adult population.

Prisons and detention centers permitted the ICRC full access to prisoners and detainees. In the absence of a formal agreement but pursuant to OSCE's mandate for human rights monitoring under UNSCR 1244, they also offered ad hoc access to the OSCE human rights monitors.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

Under UNMIK regulation 1999/24, issued in December 1999, which incorporated a local law in effect as of March 1989 and current practice, police may detain criminal suspects for up to 72 hours without charging them or granting them access to an attorney; however, in many cases, sources reported that CIVPOL used the 72-hour detention authority as a means of minor punishment with no intention of filing charges. The applicable rules of criminal procedure permit pretrial detention for up to 6 months, but UNMIK has decreed by regulation that this period may be extended by up to an additional 6 months in specific circumstances, in the case of crimes punishable by a sentence of over 5 years.

In some instances, the KFOR Commander (COMKFOR) intervened to continue the detention of persons ordered released by the courts but deemed an ongoing security threat. In July the prosecutor in Gnjilane (Gjilan) declined to press charges against Afrim Zeqiri, an ethnic Albanian accused of shooting three Serbs in May, including a child, and an international judge complied with the order to release him (see Section 5). Given the ethnic sensitivity of the case, UNMIK asked KFOR to hold the accused pending review by an international prosecutor. The case has since gone before another panel of ethnic Albanian judges, and was found without merit. Zeqiri has not been released. COMKFOR also held until July two ethnic Albanians accused of killing two Serbs in July 1999, despite the fact that the Pristina district court ordered their release in November 1999. Some accused persons were held for several months pending the five district courts' becoming operational in January and February. For example, in Gnjilane (Gjilan) district, 12 defendants accused of serious crimes were awaiting trial when the court began hearing cases in February; most of these had been in detention for some time, some as long as 7 months. In May 41 Serb and Roma prisoners in Mitrovica went on a hunger strike for several weeks to protest the delay in holding their trials.

Some observers argued that ethnic bias played a significant role in abuses of due process. In July 1999, authorities arrested three members of the Serb Momcilovic family accused of killing an Albanian and wounding another. The newly appointed prosecutor for Gnjilane (Gjilan) indicted the three in January; their trial took place in April, subsequently was adjourned, and did not reconvene until the end of July. Although at that point there was evidence exonerating the defendants of murder, the court ordered further gathering of evidence before convicting them on weapons charges in August and sentencing them to time served. In the meantime, the other 11 (ethnic Albanian) defendants awaiting a functioning court in Gnjilane (Gjilan) were tried in February. Observers also argued that the Momcilovics' detention was prolonged unnecessarily due to the court's refusal in April to admit a video that tended to exonerate them, and to KFOR's failure to perform a sufficiently detailed investigation into the initial incident and transmit the evidence in a timely manner.

Some 300 persons remained in pretrial detention in CIVPOL and KCS prisons and detention facilities and 57 persons remained in KFOR detention.

At the end of the year, the Yugoslav authorities continued to detain approximately 700 Kosovar Albanians in prison in Serbia, charged with alleged crimes arising from the Kosovo conflict. Federal and Serbian laws regarding conspiracy, threats to the integrity of the Government, and terrorism are vague and were abused by the Milosevic regime. Yugoslav authorities released over 1,300 detainees, allegedly through the payment of bribes in some cases. The ICRC was able to gain permission for some family members to visit detainees in Serbia under restricted conditions.

There were no reports of political detainees.

Exile is not permitted legally, and there were no reported instances of its use. However, the continued fear of ethnic Serbs and other minorities of revenge against them by Kosovar Albanians led large numbers to leave Kosovo (about 150,000 Serbs left during and after Yugoslavia's withdrawal), sometimes more or less voluntarily and sometimes under harassment by Albanians. The departure of Serbs and other minorities continued throughout the year.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

Applicable law provides for an independent judiciary; however, the legacy of ethnic conflict and years of Yugoslav oppression were an obstacle to judicial independence, and some judges and prosecutors reportedly were subject to outside pressure, particularly in cases involving ethnic disputes.

Supported by an Advisory Judicial Commission, UNMIK re-established a court system in Kosovo that included the Supreme Court, 5 district courts, 18 municipal courts, the Commercial Court, 13 offices of the Public Prosecutor, and a number of courts for minor offenses. Of those officials appointed by the UNMIK SRSG, 324 judges and 52 prosecutors began work, as well as 377 lay judges to assess the facts of the case. The judicial corps is almost exclusively Albanian; 8 of 12 Serbian appointees refused to serve. UNMIK also appointed members of other minorities, who are serving.

Approximately 15 UNMIK-appointed international judges and prosecutors work in the district courts alongside local judges in sensitive ethnic cases. UNMIK planned for at least two international judges and one international prosecutor in each of the five judicial districts. UNMIK appointed 405 judges and prosecutorial personnel and refurbished judicial facilities. Courts in all five districts began operations.

The law provides for the right of defendants to be present at their trials and to have legal representation, at public expense if necessary; however, local judicial and legal personnel by and large had not worked in the legal system since 1989, and the full exercise of defendants' rights was not ensured.

The defense bar was weak and disorganized as well as rooted in a more passive approach to defense due to years of practice under Socialist and authoritarian codes. A program was underway to improve the bar at year's end. Legal personnel were in the initial stages of learning and applying international human rights laws and conventions. Since UNMIK and the Kosovar legal community have not approved a new bar examination, recent law students and legal personnel may not practice.

Serb lawyers and judges refused to participate in the judicial system established by UNMIK, reportedly encouraged by the Milosevic regime not to accept the Kosovo system by participating in it. This practice effectively denied adequate representation and due process to Serb defendants.

When they began hearing cases in January and February, the courts faced a high backlog of criminal cases of all kinds. By June the courts had tried 695 criminal cases, the vast majority of them petty crimes and crimes against property; only 13 of them were murder cases, and most resulted in fines or prison sentences under 6 months. An update on the number of cases tried was unavailable at year's end.

There was a perception by human rights observers that in cases with Serb defendants or victims, a fair trial was unlikely due to ethnic bias. In July two Kosovar Albanians allegedly shot and injured three Serb Orthodox clerics (see Sections 2.a. and 5). Police arrested the accused, who were charged with attempted murder. When confusion and miscommunication led the victims missing a court date, the Albanian judge and prosecutor ordered the release of the defendants from pretrial detention. The court president subsequently rescheduled the hearing, and UNMIK assigned an international prosecutor to the case.

After the NATO campaign and Yugoslavia's withdrawal from Kosovo, Kosovar Albanian judges were unanimous in rejecting Yugoslav and Serbian law. On December 12, 1999, UNMIK issued Regulation 1999/24, which defined applicable law in Kosovo to include both UNMIK regulations and legal codes in effect as of March 1989, when Kosovo lost its autonomy. Local legal and judicial personnel were enjoined to apply the Kosovo code in effect in 1989 first, and to proceed to the Yugoslav and Serbian codes to the extent that the first was incomplete. UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 bound all public officials to respect international human rights laws and conventions; although they initially largely were unacquainted with these, international organizations and NGO's implemented programs to increase awareness and application.

Kosovar and European legal experts reviewed the compilation of applicable criminal law to ensure compliance with generally accepted international standards. Legal experts then reviewed a criminal code for Kosovo based on the regulation's guidance, but have not yet issued the new codes.

There were no reports of political prisoners.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

Under UNMIK, authorities generally respected these rights; however, individuals occasionally accused KFOR and U.N. Police of using excessive force and improper behavior in executing weapons searches in private homes, including breaking down doors and destroying personal property.

In Mitrovica Serbs in the northern part of the city continued to seize Albanian property, resulting in over 60 reported illegal house occupations during the summer months. Albanians in the southern part of Mitrovica continued to refuse Serbs access to their property there as well. Civilians were also responsible for the destruction, often through arson, of private property (see Section 5). There were a growing number of credible reports of violence and intimidation being used to force Serbs to sell their homes to Albanians at attractive prices.

Respect for private property rights has proved problematic. Withdrawing Yugoslav forces destroyed most existing property records and this, combined with the disruption of 10 years of Serbian authoritarianism and discrimination and the massive property destruction during the conflict, cast doubt over how current occupants of vacated properties could remain where they were living, how owners could reclaim rightfully their property, where returnees and internally displaced persons (IDP's) could live and build, and how potential investors could gain title to land before investing significant sums. UNMIK created by regulation the Housing and Property Directorate and the Housing and Property Claims Commission responsible for resolving property issues and adjudicating disputes including claims for restitution of property lost through discrimination, requests for registration of informal property transaction, and claims by refugees and IDP's who lost their property. However, the Directorate and only had offices in Pristina, although with mobile teams heard disputes elsewhere. The regulation setting up the Housing and Property Claims Commission removed court jurisdiction over private (as opposed to commercial) property disputes. As a result, most property disputes remained unresolved. There were locally administered ad hoc solutions, and unregulated construction proceeded even as solutions for those persons without accommodation still were lacking.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and the Press

UNMIK regulations provide a framework for recognition of these rights, prohibit hate speech, and regulate media conduct; however, local media and some international media organizations and attorneys criticized UNMIK regulations on speech and the press as undemocratic and an infringement on the freedom of speech and of the press.

UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 requires that public officials respect international human rights laws and conventions, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognizes freedom of speech and of the press. Through its regulation establishing the Department of Post and Telecommunications, UNMIK asserts control over broadcasting infrastructure; the OSCE oversees the Department of Media Affairs. In February UNMIK issued Regulation 2000/4, which prohibited hate speech and speech that incites ethnic violence.

In June UNMIK issued Regulations 2000/36 and 2000/37 on the conduct and organization of both broadcast and print media and established the office of the Temporary Media Commissioner (TMC) and the Media Appeals Board. The TMC is responsible for publishing a broadcast code of conduct and issuing licenses, for issuing temporary codes of conduct for print media, and for imposing sanctions, up to and including closing down offending media organs, in the event of violations of UNMIK regulations or published codes of conduct.

Newspapers resumed publishing, and by year's end, there were seven daily newspapers and seven weeklies or monthlies. All newspapers published in Kosovo were printed in Albanian; journals in Serbo-Croatian were printed elsewhere and imported. The main dailies are aligned with different political parties. While flourishing, the print media often acted irresponsibly, publishing inflammatory articles that provided personal data including names and addresses of alleged war criminals or collaborators and inciting violence against political personalities. For example, the daily Dita published an article on Petar Topoljski, an UNMIK Serb employee who subsequently was murdered (see Section 5). In reaction UNMIK promulgated Regulations 2000/36 and 2000/37, which prohibited the publication in both the print and broadcast media of personal information that would pose a threat to the life, property, or security of persons through vigilante justice or otherwise.

In July Dita accused Serbian Orthodox priests of war crimes. The Orthodox