Konversion führt nur bei Erregung öffentlicher Aufmerksamkeit zu Verfolgung im Iran:
1. Die Ablehnung des Asylantrags des zum Christentum übergetretenen Beschwerdeführers ist fehlerfrei. Er wurde zu seinem Glaubensübertritt persönlich befragt und sein Asylantrag in mehreren Verfahren von zwei Instanzen geprüft (in Abgrenzung zu EGMR, Urteil F.G. gegen Schweden vom 23.3.2016, Nr. 43611/11, wo keine Prüfung der Konversion stattgefunden hatte - siehe EGMR-Rechtsprechungsübersicht in Asylmagazin 4-5/2016).
2. Unter Berücksichtigung einschlägiger Berichte über die Situation von zum Christentum konvertierten Muslime im Iran ist die Einschätzung der Schweizer Behörden adäquat, dass Konvertiten im Iran nur dann dem Risiko einer Misshandlung ausgesetzt sind, wenn sie durch die öffentliche Ausübung ihres Glaubens die Aufmerksamkeit der iranischen Behörden erregen. Zum Christentum Übergetretene, die ihren Glauben diskret pflegten, hätten demgegenüber kein Risiko zu befürchten.
3. Im vorliegenden Fall hat der Beschwerdeführer nicht dargelegt, dass für ihn die öffentliche Ausübung wesentlich ist. Daher unterscheidet sich seine Situation von dem Fall, der dem Urteil des EuGH vom 5.9.2012 in der Rechtssache Deutschland gegen Y. und Z. (C-71/11 und C-99/11 – asyl.net: M19998) zugrunde lag. In diesem Fall war für die Betroffenen die öffentliche Ausübung ihres Glaubens essentiell für die Bewahrung ihrer religiösen Identität.
4. Die Abschiebung des Beschwerdeführers in den Iran würde nicht zu einer Verletzung von Art. 2 und 3 EMRK führen.
(Leitsätze der Redaktion; siehe EGMR-Rechtsprechungsübersicht in AM 3/2018)
Iran, Christen, Konvertiten, Apostasie, Flüchtlingsanerkennung, Asylverfahren, Asylrelevanz,
EMRK Art. 2, EMRK Art. 3,
2. The Court’s assessment
38. The relevant general principles were summarised recently by the Court in F.G. v. Sweden (cited above, §§ 110-127). [...]
41. At the outset, the Court observes that the present case differs from that of F.G. v. Sweden (cited above), in which the Court found that there would be a violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention if the applicant were to be returned to Iran without an ex nunc assessment by the Swedish authorities of the consequences of his conversion. In the present case, the consequences of the applicant’s sur place conversion were examined by the Swiss asylum authorities, who questioned the applicant in person, and by the Federal Administrative Court in the second set of asylum proceedings (see paragraphs 11-16 above). It was subjected to another assessment at two
levels of jurisdiction in the set of proceedings leading to the present application (see paragraphs 17-21 above).
42. In T.M. and Y.A. v. the Netherlands ((dec.), no. 209/16, 5 July 2016), which also concerned the deportation of Christian converts to Iran, the Court saw no grounds to depart from the conclusions drawn by the domestic authorities in that case concerning the credibility of the applicant’s alleged conversion. It noted, inter alia, that the applicants had been heard and assisted by counsel at two levels of jurisdiction, that the domestic authorities had thoroughly examined all the relevant information, and that the applicants had not made any submissions about any circumstances or provided any supporting documents to the Court which called into question the domestic authorities’ thoroughly reasoned conclusions.
43. In contrast, the domestic authorities in the present case did not base their conclusions on a rejection of the applicant’s conversion as not being credible. Albeit expressing doubts as to whether his conversion was genuine and lasting, they considered that Christian converts would, in any event, only face a real risk of ill-treatment upon return to Iran if they manifested their faith in a manner that would lead to them being perceived as a threat to the Iranian authorities. That required a certain level of public exposure, which was not the case for the applicant, who was an ordinary member of a Christian circle (see paragraphs 16 and 18-21 above). They considered that the Iranian authorities were aware that Iranian citizens at times attempted to rely on conversion to Christianity abroad in order to obtain refugee status and would take such circumstances into account, resulting in the person not facing a real risk of ill-treatment upon his or her return (see paragraphs 20 and 21 above).
44. It was in that light that the Government submitted that a nuanced approach was called for as regards the situation of Christian converts in Iran, arguing that converts who had not come to the attention of the authorities, including for reasons other than their conversion, and who practised their faith discreetly, did not face a real risk of ill-treatment upon return. In that regard, the Court observes that the circumstances of the present case differ from those of the Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. Y (C-71/11) and Z (C-99/11), decided by the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union on 5 September 2012. In that case, the finding was that the domestic authorities had established, inter alia, that the persons concerned were deeply committed to their faith and considered that the public practice of it was essential for them to preserve their religious identity. In the present case, the domestic authorities, who questioned the applicant in person, did not reach similar conclusions, and the applicant has not submitted any evidence or arguments to the Court which would call for a different assessment of the applicant’s faith, notably as regards the public practice of his faith.
45. The Court has regard to the fact that the applicant was examined in person by the domestic authorities with regard to his conversion to Christianity, that this claim was examined at two levels of jurisdiction in two sets of proceedings, and that there were no indications that the proceedings before those authorities were flawed. It also has regard to the reasoning advanced by the domestic authorities for their conclusions and the reports on the situation of Christian converts in Iran (see paragraphs 26-31 above). On the basis of these factors, and in the absence of any fresh evidence or argument before the Court, it sees no grounds to consider that the assessment made by the domestic authorities was inadequate (see F.G. v. Sweden, cited above, § 117).
46. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the applicant’s deportation to Iran would not give rise to a violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. [...]