1. Die Aufnahmebedingungen in Italien begründen für einen alleinstehenden jungen Mann nicht grundsätzlich die Gefahr einer Verletzung von Art. 3 EMRK, da sie nicht mit der Situation einer Familie mit sechs minderjährigen Kindern wie im Fall Tarakhel vergleichbar sind.
2. Die allgemeinen Aufnahmebedingungen in Italien sind nicht mit den Bedingungen in Griechenland zum Zeitpunkt der Entscheidung M.S.S. v. Belgien und Griechenland vergleichbar, so dass nicht alle Überstellungen nach Italien zu untersagen sind.
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THE LAW
27. The applicant complains that, if transferred to Italy, he will be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment proscribed by Article 3 of the Convention due to the harrowing living conditions of asylum seekers in Italy. Article 3 of the Convention reads:
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
28. The Court reiterates the relevant principles under Article 3 of the Convention as set out most recently in its judgment in the case of Tarakhel cited above, §§ 93-99 and §§ 101-104, 4 November 2014, including that to fall within the scope of Article 3 the ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment and its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim.
29. As regards the applicant’s age, which is one of the relevant factors in making this assessment, the Court cannot but take into account that the applicant himself deliberately told the Italian authorities that he was an adult and sought to mislead the authorities in order to prevent his separation from the group of persons with whom he had arrived in Italy. The Court finds that the authorities processing asylum claims must be entitled to rely on the personal information given by the claimants themselves save where there is a flagrant disparity of some kind or the authorities have otherwise been put on notice of a special need for protection. However there is nothing in the present case to suggest that the Italian authorities did not themselves act in good faith in that regard.
30. In any event, as regards the material date, the existence of the alleged exposure to a risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 must be assessed primarily with reference to those facts which were known or ought to have been known to the Contracting State at the time of expulsion. However, if an applicant has not yet been removed when the Court examines the case, the relevant time for assessing the existence of the risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 will be that of the proceedings before the Court (see Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201/06, § 133, ECHR 2008, and A.L. v. Austria, no. 7788/11, § 58, 10 May 2012).
31. Accordingly, the applicant is to be considered as an adult asylum seeker in Italy, even if he has already been admitted in Italy in the past as an alien requiring subsidiary protection, as the validity of his Italian residence permit granted for that reason has expired in the meantime. Consequently, if returned to Italy, he will have to file a fresh asylum request there.
32. It thus has to be determined whether the situation in which the applicant is likely to find himself, if removed to Italy, can be regarded as iincompatible with Article 3, taking into account his situation as an asylum seeker and, as such, belonging to a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection (see Tarakhel, cited above, § 97; and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above, § 251, ECHR 2011).
33. In this connection, the Court has noted that the applicant landed on the coast of Ragusa on 11 April 2009 and that the next day he was subjected to an identification procedure in which he indicated that he was an adult. Two days later, he was admitted to a reception centre for asylum seekers where, maintaining that he was an adult, he applied for asylum. Under this identity, he was subsequently granted a residence permit for subsidiary protection valid until 23 August 2012. The applicant stayed in the reception centre until 7 May 2009. According to information supplied by the Italian Government, the applicant left it of his own volition. According to the applicant, he had been forced to leave this centre because it was about to be closed down. The Court understands that the centre was not yet closed when the applicant left it and has found no substantiation of the applicant’s claim that he was forced to leave it.
34. The Court further notes that, unlike the applicants in the case of Tarakhel, cited above, who were a family with six minor children, the applicant is an able young man with no dependents and that, as regards transfers to Italy under the Dublin Regulation, the Netherlands authorities decide in consultation with the Italian authorities how and when the transfer of an asylum seeker to the competent Italian authorities will take place and that in principle three working days’ notice is given (see Mohammed Hussein, cited above, no. 27725/10, § 30, 2 April 2013).
35. The Court reiterates that the current situation in Italy for asylum seekers can in no way be compared to the situation in Greece at the time of the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece judgment, cited above, that the structure and overall situation of the reception arrangements in Italy cannot in themselves act as a bar to all removals of asylum seekers to that country (see Tarakhel, cited above, §§ 114-115).
36. The Court therefore finds, bearing in mind how he was treated by the Italian authorities after his arrival in Italy, that the applicant has not established that his future prospects, if returned to Italy, whether taken from a material, physical or psychological perspective, disclose a sufficiently real and imminent risk of hardship severe enough to fall within the scope of Article 3. The Court has found no basis on which it can be assumed that the applicant will not be able to benefit from the available resources in Italy for asylum seekers or that, in case of difficulties, the Italian authorities would not respond in an appropriate manner.
37. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and therefore inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 § 4.
38. The applicant further alleged that his transfer to Italy would be in violation of Articles 1, 2, 5, 6 and 13 of the Convention. However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as these complaints are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.
39. It follows that the remainder of the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 of the Convention.
40. The application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court thereby comes to an end.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously declares the application inadmissible. [...]
