Rechtmäßige Abschiebung nach Marokko nach Verurteilung wegen terroristischer Aktivitäten:
1. Die Abschiebung eines wegen Terrorismus verdächtigten Staatsangehörigen Marokkos aus den Niederlanden in sein Herkunftsland war rechtmäßig.
2. In Marokko kommen zwar Misshandlungen und Folterungen durch die Polizei und Sicherheitskräfte nach wie vor, insbesondere im Falle von Personen, die des Terrorismus oder der Gefährdung der Staatssicherheit verdächtigt werden. Allerdings besteht keine allgemeine und systematische Praxis der Folter und Misshandlung.
3. Den marokkanischen Behörden dürfte die Verurteilung des Betroffenen wegen terroristischer Straftaten in den Niederlanden zwar bekannt sein. Jedoch deutet nichts darauf hin, dass sie Interesse an dem Beschwerdeführer hätten (anders als im Fall Ouabour gegen Belgien, Urteil vom 2.6.2015, Asylmagazin 9/2015, in dem ein Auslieferungsersuchen erfolgte).
4. Die niederländischen Behörden haben ausreichende Informationen zur Beurteilung der Lage eingeholt. Es kann davon ausgegangen werden, dass Marokko das Verbot der Doppelbestrafung (ne bis in idem) einhalten und den Betroffenen nicht wegen seiner Verurteilung in den Niederlanden verfolgen wird.
(Leitsätze der Redaktion)
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76. The Court emphasises that the issue before it is not whether upon his return the applicant risks being monitored, arrested and/or questioned, or even convicted of crimes, by the Moroccan authorities since this would not, in itself, be contrary to the Convention. The issue is whether the applicant’s removal to Morocco would expose him to a real risk of being tortured or subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention.
77. In examining this matter, the Court observes that from the international material cited above (see paragraphs 47-55 above) it transpires that the human rights situation in general has improved in Morocco over several years and that the authorities are making efforts to comply with international human rights standards. However, it also transpires from, inter alia, the findings of the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention in its August 2014 report on Morocco (see paragraphs 47-49 above), the observations of the United Nations Human Rights Committee on the sixth periodic report on Morocco, adopted on 2 November 2016 (see paragraphs 50-51 above) and the information on Morocco set out in the report released in March 2017 by the US Department of State (see paragraph 52 above) that, despite the efforts undertaken by the Moroccan Government, ill-treatment and torture by the police and the security forces still occur, particularly in the case of persons suspected of terrorism or of endangering State security. Nevertheless, in the Court’s opinion, a general and systematic practice of torture and ill-treatment during questioning and detention has not been established. [...] Thus, the general situation is not of such a nature as to show, on its own, that there would be a breach of the Convention if the applicant were to return there. The Court therefore has to establish whether the applicant’s personal situation is such that his return to Morocco would contravene Article 3 of the Convention. [...]
79. The Court notes that, unlike the situation in the cases of Rafaa v. France (no. 25393/10, 30 May 2013) and Ouabour v. Belgium (no. 26417/10, 2 June 2015), in which Morocco had requested the applicants' extradition on suspicion of terrorism, no such request has been made in the present case. It further notes that, unlike the situation in the case of X. v. Sweden (no. 36417/16, 9 January 2018), the applicant has been convicted of terrorism-related offences and it must be assumed that the Moroccan authorities are aware of the nature of his conviction in the Netherlands. Moreover, unlike in the Swedish case, the Dutch authorities conducted an investigation into whether the applicant was being searched for in respect of any criminal offences in Morocco.
80. As regards the alleged risk of the applicant being prosecuted in Morocco as a terrorist suspect because of his conviction in the Netherlands, the Court finds, on the basis of the material before it, that it has not been established that the Moroccan judicial authorities fail to respect the principle of ne bis in idem (see, in particular, paragraph 33 above). Accordingly, it finds that it has not been demonstrated that the applicant would risk prosecution in Morocco in respect of the same facts held against him in the criminal proceedings in the Netherlands, as contended by the applicant.
81. As regards the alleged risk of the applicant being prosecuted for terrorist offences due to his link with the dismantled terrorist cell in Morocco, the Court has found no indication in the material before it that the Moroccan authorities – who must be assumed are aware of the applicant’s existence, identity and country of residence – have ever taken any steps demonstrating an interest in the applicant. This is not altered by the fact that the applicant’s name was mentioned in the Moroccan judgment convicting nine members of the dismantled terrorist cell (see paragraph 31 above), which must be seen in the context of the facts held against B.B.. Accordingly, it finds that it has not been demonstrated that there are grounds to assume that the Moroccan authorities regard the applicant a suspect of terrorism. Moreover, it has not been argued, and the case file contains no such indication, that any of the nine convicted members of the dismantled terrorist cell or G.H. (see paragraphs 23, at point 6.2, 33 and 61 above), to whom the applicant seeks to compare himself, was, in the course of the criminal investigation against them, subjected to treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention.
82. The Court concludes that the assessment by the domestic authorities was adequate and was sufficiently supported by domestic and other reliable and objective material (compare F.G. v. Sweden, cited above, § 117) and that, in the light of the forgoing considerations, the applicant’s removal to Morocco would not give rise to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. [...]